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INTRODUCTION

In the traditional story of immigration to America ( th e " assimila
tion story") , 1 the most motivated, talented, and intelligent of the
world's dissatisfied people-our ancestors-came here to seek success
in the world's largest, freest, and deepest n ational marketplace . The
American syste m , we are told , was demanding but fair, h olding out
equal economic opportunity in exchange for two things. First, the
system required hard work on the job. Second, the system required
hard work on the identity: to avoid consignment to America's lower
economic caste, immigrants h ad to root out the linguistic and cultural
components of their old-world selves and substitute the less affected,
more facilitative incidents of American identity. Eventually, the immi
grants' self-reliant efforts would bring the reward of Ame ricanization.
vVe refer t o the norms implicit i n the assimilation story as "assimilation norms."
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This transformation, h owever, called for patience . Only th e most
clever and ambitious could reconstruct themselves completely within
a few years of arrival. The rest had to be content with life as quasi
Americans of foreign origi n. Their children, however, would go on to
achieve a full American identi ty and its accompanying e conomic op
portunity. 2 The third generation would complete the process of
Americanization; internal ties to the antecedent language3 and cul
ture4 would not burden the immigrants ' grandchildren .
The assimilation story, while always normative , 5 has taken a par
ticularly sharp normative edge in recent tellings . These versions set
the assimilation pattern of early twentieth-century European immi
grants as a standard against which one should measure the social sue2 See Stanley Lieberson et a!. , The Coune of l'viothetcTongue Diversity in Nations, 81 Avr. J.
Soc. 34, 55 (1975) (asserting that the first generation's loyalty to ancestral language gives
way to a preference for English among their children); Alejandro Partes & Richard
Schauffler , Language and the Second Generation: B ilingu alism Yesterday and Today , 28 I=--n'L
MIGRATION REv. 640, 643 (1994) (noting that "the first generation [learns] enough English
to survive economically; the second . . . speak[s] the parental tongue at home, but English
in school, at work and in public life").
3 See Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 643. The results of a recent generation of
empirical studies of immigrant income make for an interesting comparison with this tradi
tional three-generation acculturation story. Barry R. Chiswick, The A)fect of Americanization
on the Earnings of Foreign-Bam JV!en, 86 J. PoL. EcoN. 897, 919 (1978), using the 1970 census,
finds that foreign-born white men achieve income equality after approximately 13 years,
implying that thev successfully assimilate after sufficient education about the labor market
and in the English lang·uage. Later studies suggest a much slower rate of convergence,
partlydue to lower skill levels in immigrants admitted in recent decades. See, e.g. , George J.
Borjas, Assimilation, Changes in Colw1t Quality, a n d the Earnings of Immigrants, 3 J. L-\B. EcoN.
463, 465 (1985) (arguing that declining skill levels among immigrants arriving since 1950
partly explain slow rates of e arnings growth among recent immigrants): George J. Borjas,
The Economics of Immigration, 32.J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1667, 1713 (1994) (''The relative skills
of successive immigrant waves declined over much of the postwar period . . . . ). RoBERT F.
ScHOEN! ET AI.., THE MrxEo E co :--: o MI C PROGREss OF IMMIGR.·\0-"TS 8, 24-25 (1996), studies
California and segments immigrants by countries of origin using data from the 1970, 1980,
and 1990 censuses. The study shows that convergence trends depend on the group-the
wage gap in California was eliminated across the 20 years for Japanese, Korean, and Chi
nese immigrants; for Filipinos it was reduced from 64% to 74%; for Mexicans it increased
from 60% to 50%. See id. at 24 tbl. 3. 7. For more on these statistics, see infra Part II. C. l.
4
The immigrant groups' patterns of fertility, language, residence, and socioeco
nomic status increasingly would resemble those of the natives. See Douglas S. Massey, The
New Im m igra tion and Eth.nicity in the United States, 21 PoPL:L-\TIO:--i & DEv. REv. 631, 640-41
(1995). Intermarriage also becomes more common as the generations pass and income
and education levels incrementally rise. See id.
5
Noting that an assimilation norm has been held out through American history, this
Article should not be taken to imply that American history stands alone in this respect.
Indeed, by holding out the very possibility of assimilation on the part of new arrivals, the
United States has displayed a commendable and comparatively rare pluralism that con
trasts with stronger strains of ethnic exclusivity, marring the records of other countries.
s·ee, e.g. , F. H. Buckley, The Political Economy of hnmigmtion Policies, 16 1:--:T'L REv. L. & Eco:--:.
81, 90-92, 96 (1996) (showing that Canada admits higher skilled immigrants due to more
restrictive screening for skills and money to invest); Turliish Gennans.2, Eco:"'cniiST, Jan. 9,
1997, at 17 (discussing proposed legislation changing a 1913 citizenship law that makes it
difficult to become a citizen without a German bloodline).
"
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cess of more recent arrivals. This usage of the early twen tieth-century
pattern , not coincidentally, has accompanied a thirty-year decline in
the proportion of immigrants coming from Europe and a concomi
tant increase i n immigration fro m Latin America and Asia. 6 Critics
argue that new arrivals of Latin American origin, hereinafter "Latino s
and Latinas ," or in abbreviated form, "Latinos/as," 7 in particular have
fallen short of this standard because too many have remained in a
handful of large , Spanish-speaking enclave communities and have.
.
failed to disperse across the continent. 8 Critics contend that the resuiting concentration of non-English speech and other incidents of
foreignness pose a threat to the nation ' s social , economic, and p olit
ical cohesion. 9 Among other remedies, 10 proponents advocate regula
tion to protect and enhance the s tatus of the E nglish language and
6

The watershed events i n modern immigration law were the repeal of the Chinese

Exclusion Acts by th e Act of Dec. 17, 1943, c h . 344, 57 Stat. 600, a n d the Act of O c t. 3,

1965, Pub. L. N o . 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. These e n ded the ban on Asian immigration, shifted
e n try requirements to favor members o f families of presen t residen ts, and imposed annual
limits o n the number of people admitted from both the Western and Eastern H emi

See

spheres. The l imits on en tries from the V\Testern Hemisphere were th e first in h istory.

supra n o te 4, at 637-38. E n tries from Mexico were n o t
however. See id. a t 635-36. Although they were n o t subje c t to a
had to satisfy substan tial visa qualification requirements. See id.
Massey,

previously u n regulated,
numerical cap, e n trants
There were, as a result,

hundreds of thousands o f illegal Mexican e n trants during the 1950s and 1960s.

See G REG

ORY D EFREIT.-'I.s, INEQUALITY AT WoRK: HISPANics IN THE U.S. LABOR FoRcE 17 (1991).
7

test.

Latin os/as are not iden tifiable by application of a ge n e rally accepted bright-line
For the purposes o f this Article, the c a tegory will i nclude persons born i n or de

scended from Americans born in Spanish-speakin g countries in North and South America,

in addition to the descendents of the M e xicans native to the southwestern states. vVe dis

tinguish "Latin os/as" from "Anglos," by which we mean native-born, Engl ish-speaking
U n i ted States c i tizens. Within the category o f Anglos we distinguish "white Anglos" when
the con text demands.

In our usage, Latin os/as and Anglos are all Ame rican, whatever

th eir c i tizenship or residence. Ideally, we would h ave a system of more particular refer
ence to country of origin .
W e use "Latinos and Latinas" and t h e abbreviated form "Latin os/as" t o avoid t h e ge
n e ri c masculine.

For use of a similar abbreviated form, see, for example, E l i zabeth M .

MIAMI INTER-AivL L. REv.
177 (1996-1997). We n o te that most of th e Latin writers we rely on throughout this Article
Iglesias,

International Law, Human Rights, and LatCrit Theory, 2 8 U.

still use "Latinos." But anyone wh o is a feminist must analyze that usage. Luce Irigaray has
been one of the most eloque n t critics o f th e designation of human beings (as well as ob
jec ts) through the diffe re n tiation of the masculine and the feminine in Romance lan
guages.

See

LucE I RICARAY, I LoVE To You 79-95 (Alison Martin trans., 1996).

The

language, she tells us, differen tiates in such a way as to perpetuate fan tasies of the mascu
l i n e and the feminine and thereby has the masculin e stand in for the universal huma n .

See

id.
vVe do not, however, take the furth e r step of coining a word "Angla" to c o rrespond to
"Latina," even though this causes one of us to disappear in the descripti o n "Anglo."
8
See infra Part II.B.l.

9
See, e.g. , Economic and Demographic Consequences of Immigration: Hearings Before the Sub
comrn. on Econ. Resources, Competitiveness, and Sec. Econ. of the joint Econ. Comm., 99th Con g.

359 (1986) (stateme n t of Gov. Richard Lamm) ("English [is] one of the common threads
that h old us together. We should be color blind, but we can't be linguistically deaf").
10
One advocated remedy is revision o f the immigration laws. See, e.g. , Juan F. Perea,

Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official Eng-
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th ereby hasten ( or force ) the assimilation of Latinos/ as and other for
eign-born and foreign-language residents.
The American public has heard similar "scare talk" before. Nativ
i stsl1 have been characterizing foreign-language speech as a threat for
as long as non-English speakers have been settling in this country in
large numbers .l 2 Despite American civilization's unscathed survival,
the nativist impulse powerfully continues to influence law and pol
icy, 1 3 even in sophisticated quarters where skepticism usually greets
such predictions of social disaster.
Nativism derives part of its power from the negative reactions that
some English-speaking Americans ( "Anglos " ) experience upon en
countering foreigners in traditionally Anglo neighborhoods. 1 4 Its re
maining power derives from the widely held assimilation norm . The
assimilation story ties the English language to American national iden
tity, asserts the primacy of both, and implies a concomitant duty of
submission for this country's n on-English speakers.
The assimilation story also asserts that two factors-cost and voli
tion-strictly delimit the permissible scope of non-English speakers '
claims for equality of treatment. As to cost, there is a broad zone of
economically j ustified discrimination against non-English speakers.
Since communication is costly, an otherwise qualified immigrant who
speaks no or little English lacks a legal claim to equal consideration
for most j obs in the United States. Similarly, cost considerations dic
tate that foreign-language taxpayers have no general claim of right to
public services in their own languages, even though they receive less
!ish, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 332-47 ( 1 992) (discussing the history of and advocating reforms
for the current literacy requirement of immigration laws) .
ll
The use of the term "nativism " implies a normative repudiation of the point of view
denoted thereby. See Linda S. Bosniak, "Nativism " the Concept: Some Reflections, in I MMI
GRANTS OuT! 279, 290-9 1 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1 997) .
1 2 The notion that common language defined the nation and its people, substituting
for a common culture and histo ry, gained curren cy during the Colonial and Early I nde
pendence eras. See DENNIS BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QuESTION 28-46 ( 1 990) . Benjamin
Franklin provides an example, expressing concern i n 1 75 1 about the number of German
immigrants in Pennsylvania and their failure to adopt "our Language or Customs." 4 BEN
J.>uvllN FRr\NKLI!", Observations Concerning the Increase of lvfankind, in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN
FRANKLIN 234 ( Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1 96 1 ) .
The mid-1 990s have seen a resurgence of nativist sentiment. Thomas M uller, Nativ
13
ism in the i\!Iid-1990s: Why Now ?, in lrviMIGRA.NTs OuT!, supra note 1 1 , at 1 05 , 1 06-1 4, attrib
utes this resurgence to economic and job insecurity among natives, cultural and social
disparities, and conti nued infl ows of i mmigrants. For a well-known text that expresses con
tem porary nativist sentiment and quite expli citly focuses on race and e thnicity, see P E:T ER
BRr:\rELOW, AuE:-.: NATION: Co�·I:I·ION SENSE ABOUT AMERICA's IMMIGRATION D I SA STE R at xvii,
1 0, 57, 1 1 7, 129 ( 1 995) . Daniel Kanstroom, Dangerous Undertones of the New Nativism: Peter
Brirnelow and the Decline of the West, in h·Ii'vliGRA1'iTS OuT!, supra note 11 , at 300, provides a
useful discussion of Brimelow's work, reviewing the dangerous history of racist discourse.
1 4 For a recounting of the history of nativist animus, see Joe R. Feagi n, Old Poison in
New Bottles: The Deep Roots of iVIodem Nativism, in IMMIGRANTS OuT!, supra note 1 1, at 1 3, 1 334.
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value for the same tax contribution because the services are inaccessi
ble . As to volition, the assimilation story argues that foreign-language
speakers who suffer discrimination have a self-help cure that is un
available to victims of race and gender discrimination . Like previous
generations of immigrants, they can learn English and cannot deny
that they were aware of the desirability of doing so upon entry to this
country.
Together, these two factors suggest a general bar to all language
related claims of right for non-English or bilingual speakers: the
claims' very existence signals a failure of diligence and threatens to
impose an avoidable cost. The full-blown nativist expedient of p rohib
itive legislation is a short step away. Regulations that create English
only zones ("English Only") that exclude newcomers encourage
non-English speakers to "get with the program. "
In this Article, w e challenge the assimilation norm's economic,
cultural, and ethical presuppositions, 1 5 marshaling a new case for in
validating English Only regulations. We take up two classes of regula
tion that the assimilation norm supports, one from public law and the
other from private law. On the public side lie statutes, widespread i n
the states and n ow often proposed at the federal level, that elevate
English to "official" status as the language of government (" Offi cial
English") .16 On the private side lie employer regulations, widespread
i n American workplaces and sustained by federal courts, that mandate
English speech at all times on pain of termination ( "Workplace Eng-

15
We join a distinguished body of race critical l iterature in doing so. See, e.g. , Bill
Ong Hing, Beyond the Rl1etoric of Assimilation and Cultural Pluralism: A ddTessing the Tension of
Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven JVIultiracial Society, 8 1 CAL L. REv. 863
( 1 99 3) ; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: A ccent, A ntidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 1 00 YALE LJ. 1 329 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Yxta M aya Murray, The Latina-American
Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. D.-w1s L. REv. 503 ( 1 998) ; Perea, supra note 1 0; Juan F. Perea,
Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 V\';-..r. & iVLR
\ Y
L. REv. 5 7 1 ( 1 995 ) ; Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of
Spanish, 2 1 HOFSTRA. L. REv. 1 ( 1 99 2 ) ; Juan F . Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisi
ble Peoj;le, 70 N.Y.U. L REv. 965 ( 1 995 ) ; Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, DeconstructingHomo[geneous}
A mericanus: The Plhite Ethnic Immigrant Nanative and Its Exclusiona�y J..fcfe t, 72 TeL. L. REv.
1 493 ( 1 998 ) .
16
For antecedent treatments in the legal literature, see, for example, jose Roberto
Juarez, Jr., The Ameriwn Tradition of Language Rights: The Fmgotten Right to Government in a
"Known Tongue," 1 3 L-\W & lNEQ. J. 443 ( 1 995 ) ; Perea, supra note 1 0; Leila Sadat Wexler,
Official English, Nationalism. and Linguistic Tenor: A French Lesson, 7 1 Wr\SH . L. REv. 285
( 1996) . These articles question the legitimacy of these statutes.
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lish") . 1 7 We focus throughout this Article on Latinos/ as, 1 8 who com
prise the largest foreign-language group among the recent generation
of immigrants. l9 As such, they are the m ost promin ent nativist
targets. 20
1 7 For antecedent treatments i n the literature, see Mark L. Adams, Fear of Fo reigners:
Nativism and WoTkplace Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849 ( 1 995) ; Alfredo Mira nde,
''En La Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey" ("In the Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is
King"): Bilingualism as a Disability, 26 N . M . L. REv. 75 ( 1 996) ; Cara D . Helper, Comment,
Enforcing the Equal Employment 0pp01tunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
National 01igin: The Overextension of English-Only Rules in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 79 MIN:-.:.
L. REv. 391 (1994) ; Jeanne M. Jorgensen, Comment, "English-Only " in the W01kplace and Title
VII Disparate Impact: The Ninth CiTcuit 's Misplaced Application of "Ability To Comply" Should Be
Rejected in FavOT of the EEOC's Business Necessity Test, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 407 ( 1 996) ; jeffrey D.
Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII Claims, 73 TEx. L. REv.
871 (1995) . These authors advocate the application of Titl e VII to English Only workplace
regulations. We join them i n doing so, offering an expanded theoretical basis of support.
1 8 This simplifying limitation also enables us to cast the starkest possible l ight on the
assimilation n01m's invidious nature. vVe show that the refrain of threat, cost, and voli tion
permits legislators andjudges to avoid confronting the fact of persistent economic discrim
i nation against Latinos/as based not on English-language disability but ethnic, and in
many cases, racial origin .
\11/e note that the limitation also carries t h e i mportan t cost o f omission o f t h e particu
lar experience of Asian immigranL�.
1 9 Massey shows the trend by comparing the region of origin of immigrants for the
period 1983- 1 993 , based on U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service sources. See Mas
sey, supra note 4, at 634 tbl.l. Of the n early 9.3 million arrivin g, 5 4.0% came from the
Americas, 32.7% from Asia, and 10. 2% from Europe. See id. A comparison of the percent
ages for the period 1960-1970 is instructive. At that time, of the roughly 3.3 million arriv
ing, 5 1 . 7% came from the Americas, 12.9% from Asia, and 33.8% from Europe. See id.
This comparison shows an increase in absolute numbers of Americans and Asians in the
latter period as well as a notable increase in th e percentage of Asians i n the latter period.
See id.
20
There are several prominent issues regarding language and Latino/a citize ns and
residen ts that we do not consider in this Article. The language of primary and secondarv
education is the most prominent. See, e.g., Alberto T. Fernandez & Sarah WJ Pel! , The
Right To Receive Bilingual Special Education, 53 Eouc. L. REP. 1 067, 1067 ( 1 989) (arguing that
students with limi ted English skills have a right to bilingual education because all students
in the United States have a "right to a meaningful and appropriate education") . The con
duct of criminal trials i nvolving bilingual witnesses and jurors also has raised prominent
questions. See, e.g. , Hernandez v. New York, 500 U .S. 352 , 370-72 (199 1 ) (opinion of Ken
nedy, j . ) (upholding peremptory strikes of bilingual jurors at a trial at which several wit
nesses were to testify in Spanish ) .
Questions also arise respecting the tort law duty to warn. ComjJa·1-e Stanley Indus. v.
W.M. Barr & Co . , 784 F. Supp. 1 570, 1 575-76 (S.D. Fla. 1992 ) ( noting that English lan
guage warnings might be i nsufficient when manufacturer uses non-English media to adver
tise) , with Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P . 2d 167, 177 ( Cal. 1993) ( holdin g that providing
warnings only in English is sufficient as a matter of law) . Special protection provisions can
be found in consumer protection legislation in a number of states. See, e.g., N.J. ST.\T. As:-.:.
§ 17:16C-6 1 . 6 (cl) (West 1 984) ( requiring retailers who do business in a language other
than English to provide customers speaking that language with a copy of the receipt in that
language ) .
Nor do we take up immigration policy , whether regarding numbers admitted, stan
dards for admission, or the treatment of undocumented entrants. v\'e note only that the
prominence of iVIexican border-crossers among undocum ented entrants tends to be over
stated. Sixty percent of illegal entrants come from coun tries other than lviexico, and one-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

602

[Vol. 84:595

Our case against English Only regulations centers o n the value of
linguistic and cultural identifications to the individual p erson. It
shows that English Only regulations violate the basic right of pers o n al
ity of non-English-speaking and bilingual Americans without yieldin g
any cognizable benefits to Am erican society as a whole. Our case ha.s
two phases. The first approaches value from the point of view of the
person as modeled in economic theory. It thereby highlights infirmi
ties in all three foundations-threat, cost, and volition-of the nativist
policy construct. 2 1 The second phase approaches value from the
point of view of the person as modeled in Kantian moral and political
..
theory. It centers on the right of personality requiring that each of us
receive the legally protected freedom to represent and evaluate our
basic identifications. This general theory of right leads to a theory of
lan guage righ ts that weighs against state-imposed n o rms of
assimilation.
This Article has three parts. Part I provides a more p articular
description of the problem-the nativist response to Latino and La
tina immigration during the last four decades and its manifestation in
Official English and Workplace English.
Part II sets forth our economic analysis. vVe demonstrate that
economic theory both undercuts the cost justification for state English
Only mandates and permits legal intervention against Workplace Eng
lish . First, we draw on the economics of language, which teaches that
language difference is costly and that the cost of acquiring the domi
nant language falls on minority-language speakers. Second, we draw
on the economics of discrimination, which teaches that cultural differ
ences of any kind can increase the cost of p roduction and that the
costs of difference fall on members of minority groups.
The economics of language and of discrimination imply a com
plex description of Latino/a immigrants' incentives. On the one
hand, every reason remains to apply the traditional view that market
incentives sufficiently assure that immigrants learn English with a view
toward participating in the mainstream economy. 22 This application
of economic theory rebuts the nativist characterization of a threat to
American civilization-spontaneous order appears adequate to do the
j ob here. 2 3 That being the case , public choice theory invites us to
h alf of the total undocumented populatio n originally e n tered under visas and t h e n re
m ained after their expiratio n . See Kevin R. Johnson, Pttblic Benefits and Immigration: The
Intersection of Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCU-\ L. REv. 1 509, 15 1 7,
1 546 (1995 ) .
21
We expand on Andre Sole, Official English: A Socmtic Dialogue/Law and Economics
A nalysis, 45 FL-\. L. REv. 803 ( 1 993) .
22
See Perea, supra note 10, at 348 (noting the "ovenvh elming social and econ o1nic
ince ntives to learn English").

23

See infra
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ac c ount for Official English as Jim Crow legislation in fact if not in
2
n am e-a self-protective move by rent-seeking Anglos. 4 O n the other
hand, the economics of language and of discrimination p rovide no
basis for predicting that the economic opportunities the market offers
to Latinos/as provide incentives to disperse across the continent. Dis
c rimination by whi te Anglos limits Latino/a returns on human capital
investment and thereby lessens their incentive to assimilate. 25 More
over, the economic theory of discrimination fails to support a p redic
tion that free markets necessarily will cause this problem to disappear
over time . Instead, it teaches that in a free market, suboptimal em
ployment discrimination against minorities can persist indefinitely.
This flawed economic incentive structure effectively undercuts
any rational basis for applying the assimilation norm. If Latinos/ as
fac e persistent employment discrimination due to ethnicity or race,
then for many of them, returns on investment in assimilatio n will fall
off long before the point implied in the assimilation story. At the
same time, the phenomena that support the nativist claims-enclave
settlement patterns and refractory Spanish speech-are explainable
in rational expectations terms. Given limited returns on investment
in English, it makes perfect cost sense to live in a Spanish-speaking
enclave. At the same time , volitional faul t shifts to white Anglos: ab
sent the Anglos' continued practice of ethnic and racial discrimina
tion, Latinos/as would share previous immigrant generations' high
powered incentive to disperse.
Finally, Workplace English in this analysis is indistinguishable
from other discriminatory c onduct that Title VII bars. 26 Title VII cov
erage , however, may be costly. Discriminatory employer p ractices may
be cost reductive, and enforcement increases employer operating
costs. This cost evaluation does not end the discussion, however, be
cause in legal contexts the ultimate cost-benefit result can depend on
who bears the costs. We project that Latinos/as themselves will bear
these modest costs. Thus, the question is: Would Latinos/as willingly
bear the costs of a Title VII bar to Workplace English? We presume to
answer in th e affirmative because we see no reason to distinguish Lati
nos/ as from other Americans with respect to their willingness to bear
the costs of life in a free and equal society.
Part III sets forth a theory of right that compels the law to accord
suspect status to discrimi nation based on language . We connect the
Kantian ideal of the free person to the contemporary notion that
identifications play a constitutive role in each person's life . Our the
ory of right follows from an interpretation of what it means to treat
24
26

infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See 42 U.S. C. § 2000e ( 1 994) .

See
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each individu al as a free person with equal dignity-an interpretatio n
grounded in a description and defense of the ideal of the imaginary
domain. This theory of right demands that each individual receive
the moral and psychic space to evaluate , to represent, and ultimately,
to integrate th e complex realities of culture , linguistic origi n , national
affiliation, ethnic identity, and religious heritage. Two points logically
follow from our theory of right. First, the legal system should treat
language as a fundamental identification encompassed by each per
son 's right of personhood. Second, a legal system that treats Latinos/
as as equals�2 7 recognizes and respects the value they bestow on the
Spanish language. In contrast, an English Only regime designed to
force Latin os/as to speak the maj ority tongue in public life or in the
workplace treats Latinos/as as something less than fre e persons,
thereby degrading them and violating their imaginary domains.
While articulating this position, Part III addresses recent, general
debates on cultural rights. This discourse teaches that identifications
are both constitutive of the person and, to some extent, embedded
human beings cannot j ust step out of their identifications. This teach
ing in turn destabilizes assumptions basic to the traditional metaphysi
cal defense of the fully auton omous subj ect. \/'le accept this result,2 8
but nevertheless define our proj ect as Kantian because it focuses on
freedom. To understand the subject as symbolically or socially con
structed is to imply that freedom is fragile. If who we are is pro
foundly rooted in our identifications, then we cannot know for certain
wh ether any of our judgments, evaluations, or actions are truly self
determined . A need to thematize anew what freedom can m ean for
us arises from this uncertainty.
The ideal of the imaginary domain renders this th ematization
consistent with the Kantian ideal that the individual person , as op
posed to the state , must be legally designated as the respo nsible
source of j udgments and evaluations. This approach makes no at
tempt to claim in the strong Kantian sense that we can make our eval27

\Ne write of " treatm e n t as an equal" rath e r than " equal treatmen t , " b o rrowing this

disti n c ti o n from Ro'.:ALD DwoRKI :--.: , TAKJ:--.:c

RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 ( 1 977) . Treatm e n t as an

equal is fu ndamental, c o nsisti n g of the righ t to b e treated wi th respect a n d c o n c e rn equal

to anyo n e else.

See

id. Equ:1l tre a tm en t , in c o n trast, is t h e equal righ t to a n o p p o rtun i ty,

resource, or burde n . See id.

�s

\·\'e accept this result \vith o u t j o i n i n g th e discussants in debating t h e

t ruth about the

constitution of the modern or postmodern subj e c t. O u r argum e n t does n o t r e q u i re us to
answer the question of who we really are as subj e c ts .

I ts cen tral poin t i s that s u c h basic

decisions about the m e a n i n g of i d e n tifi cation m u s t remain with i ndividuals t h e mselves.
I ndee d , i n our 1 ie1,·, the focus of legal debates about m i n ori ty rights and m u l t i c u l tu ralism
s h ould s h i ft away from t h e question of th e truth of the su�j e c t and instead ask how and
why state recogn i ti o n of th e person demands the
the imagi nan· domai n .

right

of p e rson hood-the righ t we call

This n e e d to c h ange the question is n o t solelv o f p h ilosophical

i n terest. I t all ows us to rethi n k the e th i c a l stakes i n pol i t i ca l debates about iden ti ty without
attac h i n g ourseh·es

to

a simp listic or, worse yet, n a turalized con ception o f i d e n titY.
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ua tion s and j udgments freely and solely in accordance with the moral
law. 29 It nevertheless insists that our actions and j udgments inevitably
engage us in the practice of self-responsibility. Even though our own
his tories profoundly determine our decisions, we still make them and,
in so doing, make ourselves who we are. Self-responsibility re-emerges
on this interpretation as a practice by which we constitute ourselves as
unique beings who over time shape identities indissociable from the
evaluative designs we give to our identifications. On this view, our
value as free persons is independent of both our particular value and
of the uses we make of our judgments and evaluations. This approach
thus maintains the distinction, central in Kant, between the worth of
our freedom and personhood and the value we make of them in par
ticular cases. It offers, in sum, Kant with an existential twist. 30
Our conclusion applies the idea, which George Fletcher devel
oped, that a culture or a nation can have a right to linguistic self
defense, which j ustifies protective measures to ensure the survival of
its majority language, i ncluding in extreme circumstances regulation
like Official English. 3 1 We conclude that the conditions for this right
do not exist in the United S tates at this time . Indeed, if here and now
any group could make a case for such a right, it would be Latinos/ as
in the Southwest.
We note that our treatmen t couples two approaches that scholars
usually deem mutually exclusive 3 2-consequentialist economic analy
sis and th e defense of a basic right of personality. 3 3 We caution that
29

Some thinkers that psychoanalysis h as influenced have redefi ned autonomy to
make it consistent with the recogni tion that we are constntcted through and by a symbolic
Other with which we inevitably engage in defining a self. Cornelius Castoriadis, for exam
ple, clefmes autonomy as follows:
Autonomy then appears as: my discourse must take the place of th e dis
course of the Other, of a foreign discourse that is in me, ruling over me:
speaking through myself. This clarification immediately indicates the socinl
dimension of the problem ( little matter that the Other in question at the
start is the 'narrow' paren tal other; through a series of obvious connec tions,
the parental couple finally refers to society as a whole and to i ts h istory) .
CoRNELIUS G.\STORIADIS, T HE I rvlAGINARY I NSTITUTION OF S o C I E"IY 1 02 ( Kathleen Blamey
trans. , MIT Press eel. 1 987) ( 1 975) .
3 0 See generally lVL-\.RTI"i HEIDEGGER, K-\NT A.."\ D THE PROBLE\·1 oF METAPHYSICS ( Richard
Taft trans., Ind. Univ. Press 5 th ed. 1 990) ( 1 973) ( examining Kantian idealism in light of
existentialism and hermeneutic phenomenology) .
3 1 See George Fletcher, The Case fo-r Linguistic Self-Defense, in THE MoRALITY OF NATI0'-1ALIS\I 324, 333-35 ( Robert McKim & Jeff McMahan eels. , 1997) .
3 2 The convention that separates the m follows from the deeply held view that rights,
by their nature, transcend cost concerns.
3 :1
Any theory of deontological right begins with Immanuel Kant. See I:vr�L-\N CEL K-\NT,

On the Common Saying: 'This 1Hay Be True in Themy, but It Does Not Apply in Practice, in K-\;-..�T :
61 ( Hans Reiss eel. & H . B . Nisbet trans. , 2cl eel. 1 99 1 ) . For a succinct
'

PouTJ Cc\l.. vVRJTINGS

discussion of the difference between the use of cleontological and consequentialist theory
in recent political philosophy, see Thomas Nagel, Ju.stire and Nature, 1 7 OxFORD J. LEG.-\L
STUD.

303 ( 1 997) .
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our treatmen t does not thereby purport to offer a theoretical formula
that locates and resolves all tensions between these two approaches;
rather, we identify two intrinsic sources of tension between them.
First, we defend a right to personality, which limits the means open to
a society in pursuit of general economic welfare or other utilitarian
goals. Second, we defend the ideal of the person as the legally author
itative source of her own identifications against any theory that vests
such evaluation in some prior analysis (welfarist or otherwise) and
that gives the State the p ower to impose that evaluatio n.
A t the same time, however, this basic right o f personality recog
nizes the legitimacy of consequentialist considerations. This recogni
tion makes it possible to synchronize the approaches and thereby to
mediate the tensions. At a minimum, a theory of right must take con
sequences into account when evaluating the instituti onal and legal
means that protect the right to p ersonality in practice. With lan guage
rights, economic consequences must play a still larger role because
righ ts and costs operate as necessary complements in this context. To
see the element of complementarity, posit an ideal world in which
language acquisition is costless and each p erson strives to guarantee
maximum respect for each other person. In this ideal world, multiple
languages present no practical problem because each person ' s respect
for the other leads each to learn all languages.
The problem develops when we relax these heroic assump tions
and look at a more realistic world of interpersonal frictions, communi
cative breakdowns, and finite resources. In this world, we cannot real
ize the ideal of complete respect for the means of communication
closest to the other's identi ty; instead, we see a need to p rivilege one
language to facilitate communication by reducing its cost. A concomi
tant need to protect minority-language speakers with rights to per
sonhood arises. 3 4 The question that results is wh ether society feasibly
can bestow these rights in practice. We demonstrate in this Article
that it can . Although our imperfect world cannot realize the ideal of
complete respect for others ' means of communication, this i deal still
can inform the rules of the game.
Our approach, while admitting consequentialist considerations,
strives to assure that they remain reasonably faithful to the person we
defend. This concern leads us to depart from the tradition al methods
of law and economics. For others , economic theory, properly applied,
automatically yields a single, morally defensible result. 35 For us, eco34

35

See infra
See, e.g. ,

Part

III.

RIC HARD A. PosNER, EcoNO M I C A.t'IALYSIS OF

L\W 284-89

( 5 th ed.

1 998)

(describing the interaction of economic effi c i e n cy and moral i ty ) . For a disc ussio n o n the
relati onship between economics and morality, see Annalise E. Acorn, Valuing Vi1tue: !VIoral

ity and Productivity in Posner 's Theory of Wealth lvlaximization, 28

VAL. U. L. REv. 1 67

(1 99 3) .
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no mic theory, properly applied, describes a range of possible con se
quen ces, each of which is open to further moral evaluatio n .36 Our
coupling of economic analysis with the defense of a basic right of per
son ality serves an additional obj ective : advancing the proposition that
economic analysis can coexist with the lessons of race critical theory. 37
We anticipate skepticism on this point from the race critical commu
nity. The skepticism is j ustified because economic analysis has the in
trinsically offensive property38 of treating the fundamental rights of
minorities as contingencies open to legitimate n egation in a rarefied
world of formal welfare analysis. 39 Despite this p ossibility, we are con
fident that economic analysis has practical p o tential for race critical
36 See AIV1AKIYA SEN, I NEQUALriY REEXAMINED 1 6- 1 9 ( 1 99 2 ) , for a broad discussion of
ways in which deontology and consequentialist economic theory could seiYe each other.
37 O thers have advanced similar propositions. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailo-ring, 43
UCLA L. REv. 1 78 1 , 1 786-1 800 ( 1 996) (showing, assuming a compelling interest to remedy
past discrimination, that the n arrow tailoring principle should not bar racial classifications
that tailor the size of the preference to the remedial need) ; john ]. Donohue III, Is Title VII
E.jficient ?, 1 3 4 U. PA. L. REv. 1 4 1 1 , 1 4 1 1 - 1 2 ( 1 986) (commenting that the n eoclassical eco
nomic model, with its stress on the desirability of aggregating market preferences, has long
grounded an argument against antidiscrimination l egislation ) .
38
CJ Richard D elgado, Rodrigo 's Second Ch-ronicle: The Economics and Politics of Race, 9 1
MICH. L . REv. 1 1 83, 1 1 95 ( 1 99 3 ) ( reviewing RicHARD A . EPSTEIN, FoRBI DDEN GROUNDS: THE
CAsE A GAI NST EMPLOYMENT DrscRJMINATION LAws ( 1 99 2 ) ) ( commenting that the m e thod
ological individualism of economics creates a disciplinary bias that causes a systematic mis
perception of racism's essence ) .
39 I n addition, prominent exemplars o f law and economics purport to undermine the
policy assumptions supporting the body of rights that make up core accomplishments of
the civil rights movement. See gene-rally EPSTEIN, supra note 38 ( arguing that Title VII need
lessly i nfringes upon the freedom of compe ti tive employment markets) .
Delgado makes a series of criticisms of economic methodology that provide a useful
basis for demonstrating this unexplored potential. See D elgado, supra n o te 38. All of the
criticisms, detailed below, are justifiable in the context of a discussion of Epstein 's book.
We nonetheless think it is worth confron ting them as a way of opening an avenue of com
munication and demonstrating that economic theory holds out a flexible mode of inquiry.
Delgado 's discussants make the follmving charges, in addition to that mentioned supra
note 38:
( 1 ) Economics fails to "take i n to account the inte n tional, interest-serving dimension
of white-over-black prejudice." D elgado, sup-ra note 38, at 1 1 89 . Actually, subsequen t exer
cises in law and economics confron t this point. See Robert Cooter, Ma-rket Affirmative Ac
tion, 3 1 SAN D IEGO L. REv. 1 33 , 1 50 ( 1 994) (describing discriminatory economic regimes as
cartels) ; cf Richard H . McAdams, Coope-ration and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 1 OS HARv . L. REv. 1 003, 1 007-27, 1 0 70 ( 1 99 5 ) ( describ
ing discriminatory economic regimes as spontaneous orders that status compe ti tion
drives) .
( 2 ) Economics needs to explain why competitive pressures do not eliminate racism in
the market. See Delgado, sup-ra note 38, passim. Not only is this the endeavor of statistical
discrimination theory, see infra notes 2 2 1 -33 and accompanying text, but it also is a topic of
in creasing prominence in the field. See Symposium, Discrimination in P-roduct, C-redit and
Labor lviarkets, 1 2 ]. EcoN. PERSP. 2 3- 1 26 ( 1 998) .
( 3 ) Economics tends to assume peli"ect knowledge while the stigmatic picture that
whites have of blacks limits their level of knowledge. See D elgado, supra note 38, passim.
Information asymmetries and their contribution to racist economic behavior is what statis
tical discrimination theory is all about. See infra notes 2 6 6-68 and accompanying text.
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scholars and believe that an analysis grounded in an unequivocal affir
mation of the individual 's right to treatment as an equal can usefully
demonstrate this potential.

I
LATINO AND LATINA IMMIGRANTS AND ENGLISH
LANGUAGE MANDATES

A.

Latino and Latina Settlement and Speech

Nativists point to three aspects of the lives of Latino/a immi
grants when they claim to identify a pattern of resistance to assimila
tion. First, Latinos/as have gravitated to a small number of e nclave
communities rather than dispersing across the continent. Nothing
about immigrant enclaves, of course, is new. Like turn-of-the-century
arrivals, many Latino/a immigrants have settled in enclaves because
they have arrived with a family or network connection that provides a
j ob or a place to stay.40 Nativists charge that the enclave-settlement
tendency is m ore pronounced among Latinos/as than with earlier im
migrant groups. For example, a recent study found that today's top
five receiving states take in 78. 2 % of arrivals, and today's top five re
ceiving metropolitan areas take in 47. 9 % of arrivals.4 1 By contrast,
1 9 1 0 ' s top five receiving states took in 54 . 0 % of arrivin g immigrants,
and 1 9 1 0 ' s top five receiving cities took in 35 . 6 % of arrivals.42
Second, inflows of Latinos/as and other new "visible" immigrants,
which began in the 1 95 0s and 1 9 60s, promise to continue indefinitely
and without abatement. Nativists contrast current immigration pat
terns with the turn-of-the-century immigration wave, which Congress
ended abruptly when it imposed entry quotas in the 1 9 20s.4 3 Entry
quotas resulted in a substantial reduction in both immigrant visibility
and concentration of immigrant p opulations in enclave communities
( 4) Racial mythologies are firmly believed and interest promoting; images become
realities that reinforce the images. See D elgado, supra n o te 38, passim. For a model that
captures this dynamic, see Bradford Cornell & lvo Welch, Culture, Information, and Screening
Discrimination, 1 04 J . PoL Eco;-.;. 542, 558-59 ( 1 996) , discussed infra n o tes 250-68 and ac
companying text.
40
The existence of enclave communi ties also implies that the new arrivals are not
taking j obs from American citizens. See D EFREITAS, supra n ote 6, at 234; MICHAEL J. P I ORE,
B I RDS OF PASSAGE: MIGRANT L>..B OR AND lNo usTRL-\ L S oci ETI E S 1 20-23 ( 1 979) ( discussing
labor-market segmentation) .

4 1 See Massey, supra note 4, at 647 tbl. 2 . For additional evidence of clumping, see
'N.A.V. Clark, Scale Effects in International Migration to the United States, 30 REGIO:--Jc\L STUD.
589, 591 tbl. l ( 1 996) ( noting that 70.3% of new arrivals between 1 985 and 1 990 settled in
California, New York, Texas, Florida, or Illinois) .
4 :-2

43

See Massey, supra note 4, at 64 7 tbl . 2 .
See Immigration Act of 1 924, ch. 1 90, 43 Stat. 1 53; Massey, supra n o te 4, at 635.
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as immigrants assimilated over subsequent decades.44 Due to contin
ued in-migration, Latinos/as will continue to be visible, and enclave
communities will indefinitely persist.45 Thus, even if assimilation pro
ceeds at the same rate as it did at the turn of the century, enclaves will
no t disappear.46
Third, many Latinos/as speak Spanish among themselves. In
fact, 48.0 % of Latino/a households predominantly speak Spanish,
33.0 % predominantly speak English , and the remainder alternately
speak both languages.47 Nativists interpret these statistics to indicate
that new arrivals to the enclave communities take advantage of Span
ish-language infrastructures to avoid incurring the cost of E nglish-lan
guage education.48 Moreover, unlike turn-of-the-century immigrants,
who crossed an ocean and practically had to cut ties with their home
country, today's Latinos/as enj oy easy access to their home countries
and cultures and consequently have a diminished incentive to assimi
late .49 With the proportion of Latinos/as in the overall population
rising and proj ected to continue-from 9 . 0 % in 1 990 to a proj ected
2 2 . 5 % in 205 050-nativists argue that this refractory behavior imposes

44 See Massey, supra note 4, at 641 -4 3 ( noting the pattern of Europeans' assimilation as
their numbers declined) .
45
One of the reasons for European immigrants' assimilation is "a long hiatus when
few additional Europeans arrived." Id. at 642. Therefore, Latin Americans will have diffi
culty leaving their e nclave communities because they "can expect to have their numbers
conti nuously augmented by a steady supply of fresh arrivals from abroad." Id. at 643.
46 See id. at 642-43; Pones & Schauffle r, supra n o te 2 , at 645-46.
47
See Andrew Pollack, The Fight for Hispanic Viewers: Univision s Success Story Attracts New
Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1 9 , 1 998, at D l .
48
See Massey, supra note 4, at 647. However, he offers n o additional supporting evi
dence. Moreover, if his argument is true, i t is nothing new because widespread h ome
language speech within the enclave lowers the immediate cost of assimilation for new arriv
als. See Buckley, supra note 5, at 85 ( asserting that n ew immigrants are likely to settle i n
areas already settled b y immigrants t o find compatriots a n d a more toleran t community) .
49
See Hispanics: More People than Powe1; EcoNOMIST, Sept. 1 7, 1 988, at 32, 33 ( citing no
data) . Latinos/as have repeated this point themselves. See Pollack, supra n ote 47 ( quoting
the head of the Telemundo television network) ; cf THO IIAS SowE LL, E TH N I C A..vJERJCA 243,
276 ( 1 9 8 1 ) (suggesting that Puerto Ricans' and Mexicans' tendency periodically to return
home explains their income levels ) . For a definitive statistical refutation of this suggestion ,
see D EFREITAS, supra n ote 6, at 7 1 -73.
so
"Between 1 970 and 1 990, the population of the United States i ncreased 2 2 . 4 % . "
Hing, sujJra note 1 5 , at 865. During that time the Latino/ a population increased by 1 4 1 %
to reach 9 % of the total U.S. population. See id. a t 865-66. According t o the Census Bu
reau, the relative percentage had increased to 1 0 . 2 % by 1995. See H ISPANIC A..viERICANS: A
STATISTIC\L SouRCEBOOK 1 1 ( Louise L. H ornor ed., 1 996) ( drawing on the Uni ted States
Census Bureau' s Current Population Reports) . The Bureau predicts an increase to 1 1 . 3 % by
2000 and to 2 2 . 5 % by 2050. See id.
.-
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a cost burden 5 1 and threatens national cohesion.52 We are , say nativ
ists, facing the chaos of the Biblical Tower of Babel.5 3
The facts just cited, h owever, at best suggest a possibility that Lati
nos/as will assimilate at a slower pace than turn-of-the-ce ntury immi
grants. They do not support a Tower of Babel proj ection. Indeed,
because Latino/a immigrants do learn English, the facts p oint to the
contrary conclusion . Just like immigrants at the turn of the century,
first-generation Latino/a immigrants incur the special cost of acquir
ing English as a second language. They tend to read fluently within
ten years and speak fluently within fifteen years .54 Also , as with past
groups, the second generation speaks English fluently,5 5 and studies
show that settlement in enclaves does not inhibit the acquisition of
English skills.56 The third generation of Latino/a immigrants, re
mammg consistent with historical patterns, ten ds to be
monolingual. 57
51 See Joseph Tones, The Language Crusade: What 's Really Behind the Campaign for "Offi
cial English "?, HtsPANIC, June 1 996, at 50, 52 (noting that nativists want English Only "for
the sake of cost-effectiveness and unity") .

52 The findings of the proposed Language of Government Act of 1 99 7 , S. 323, 1 05 th
Cong. § 2, summarize this perspective. The United States, they state, has a h istory of rich
diversity, but the common thread is a common language. " [T] o preserve u n i ty in diversity
and to prevent division along linguistic lines, the United States should maintain a language
common to all people." Id. § 2 (4 ) . Furthermore, a single language for federal govern
ment operations will promote "efficiency and fairness to all people," id. § 2 ( 8 ) , and "help
immigrants better assimilate," id. § 2 ( 6) ; see also H ing, supra note 1 5 , at 874 ( describing the
belief of many assimilationists that Latino/ a and Asian immigration increases bilingualism ,
creating problems for the educational system and leading to unwelcome changes in our
national identity) .
53 See Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 640 ( qu o ting from the policy statement of
U . S. English , a political action organization prominent in the so-called " English Only
Movement," the warning that without linguistic unity, " [s] ociety as we know it can fade into
noisy babel and then chaos" (italics omitted) ) . Even prominent liberal Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr. reportedly fears that a Tower of Babel may resul t from multiculturalism. See Muller,
supra note 1 3, at 1 1 3 .
54 See Hing, supra note 1 5, a t 8 7 7 . James Crawford reports that during the last half
century, there has been a four percent to five percen t increase in the anglicization rate
among Latino/a immigrants. SeeJAMES CRAWFORD, HoLD YouR ToNGUE: BILI NGUALISM AND
THE PoLITICS OF "ENGLISH O NLY 1 27 ( 1 99 2 ) . I m migrants from different countries angli
cize at different rates-with age, ties to the homeland, educational level, and economic
prospects explaining, in large part, the differen tials. See id. at 1 27-28.
'

H igh demand has caused a large language-education infrastructure to spring up
within Latino/a communities. English-as-a-second-language classes have long waiting lists
in both N ew York and Los Angeles. See Torres, supra note 5 1 , at 54.
55

See Hing, supra n ote 1 5, at 877.

56

See id. at 863 app. b ( describing Asian immigrants who both live in e n claves ancl
learn English ) .

5 7 See id. Even within the enclaves, Latino/ a parents who want their children to have
the cul tural and economic advantages of bilingualism report having trouble getting th e
children to speak Spanish. See Mireya Navarro, Pop Cultu-re Blunts Immigrant Children 's Taste
for Spanish, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 3 1 , 1 996, at 1 6.
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The langu a ?� qu �stion fo : Latinos /as, t h en, is n ot o n e of English
_
l anguage acqu!Sl twn; mste ad, 1t conc erns th e degree to which En glish
_
_
an d asso Ciated cultural traits completel y rep la ce Latino / a antecedents
i n the second and third generations . E n clave settle men t does have an
i m pac t at this level because second-generation E n glish mono lingual
ism increas es as immigrants disperse geographically an d as the length
of their residence in the United States increases. 58 But fundam en
tally, Latino/a families face the same cultural problems of e arlier im
m igran ts-ameliorating the generational loss of the p aren tal
lan guage to preserve the resource of bilingualism. 59 The loss can
com e violently. In her n ovel, The House on Mango Street, Sandra Cis
neros described a Latina mother who tries to surround her family,
living in the h eart of a Spanish enclave, with the beauty of Spanish in
their home. Television does not respect her boundary, and to her
horror she cannot keep her baby from speaking English:
And then to break her h eart forever, the baby boy who has begun to
talk, starts to sing the Pepsi commercial he heard o n T.V.
No speak English, she says to the child who is singing i n the lan
guage that sounds like tin . No speak English, no speak English, and
bubbles i nto tears. No, no, n o as if she can ' t believe her ears . 5°

B.

Official English

Under the assimilation norm, it is not Latino/a immigrants who
need legal protection, but the English language. 6 1 Assimilationists ar
gue that Latinos/ as, instead of complaining about their rights , should
take the path to equal status by extinguishing their Latino/a identities
5 8 See Portes & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 644-45. Pones and Schauffler studied
eighth- and ninth-grade students in Miami who were either born here of at least one for
eign paren t or born abroad and a residen t in this country for at least five years. See id. at
646. Nearly 99% spoke English at least "well , " and close to 73% spoke "very well"; more
than 80% preferred to speak English. See id. a t 649 .
59 See id. at 65 1 .
60
SANDRA CisNEROS, THE HousE ON M-·\.NCO STRE ET 74-75 ( 1 989) . Compare the well
publicized case of a county j udge in Texas who, in the context of a child-custody dispute,
ordered a mother who spoke only Spanish to her child to speak both languages, declaring
her to be engaged in "child abuse" that would relegate the child to the status of a house
maid. Clay Robison, Judge Defends His Order That i'VIorn Speak English, Hous. CHRON., Aug.
30, 1 995, at l A; Luis Wilmot, RepmtJudicial Abuse to State Commission, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS
NEws, Sept. 1 1 , 1 995, at l OA.
61
If the agenda of the English Only Movement can be taken as a guide, the two
provisions with the highest profile are Spanish-language ballots and Spanish-language edu
cation. It is not, say movement leaders, that Latino/a immigrants fail to share the aspira
tions of their European predecessors, but that their political leaders have m isguided them.
See Linda Chavez, Hispanics vs. Their Leaders, CoMMENTARY, Oct. 1 99 1 , at 47, 48; see also
Hiram Puig-Lugo, Freedom To Speak One Language: Free Speech and the English Language
Amendment, l l CI-IICAJ'\Io-L\TINO L. REv. 35, 43 ( 1 9� 1 ) (no ting that proponents of the Eng
lish Language Amendment advocate termination of bilingual education ) .
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and becoming fully American. 62 Treatment as equals will follow in
due course.
This assimilationist analysis, carried to its logical conclusion, im
plies that everyone in American society, including Latinos/as them
selves, would be better off if Spanish speech were suppressed. The
First Amendm ent's free speech guarantee blocks the achievement of
this goal through direct legislative prohibition.63 But indirect m eans
to the end of Spanish-language suppression prominently figure on na-.
tivist agendas. Nativists h ave asked both the national and many state
governments to correct what they see as an oversight of the Founding
Fathers64 by privileging the English language with official status. Sen
ator S.I. Hayakawa made the first request when he introduced an Eng
lish Language Amendment ( "ELA" ) to the Constitution in 1 9 8 1 .65
62 See Chavez, supra note 61 , at 4 7 ( noting that H ispanics, "like millions of immigran ts
before them, see their best opportunity for success i n assim ilating to the common culture of
America" ( emphasis added) ) .
6 3 See U.S. CaNST. amend. I .
64
The Constitution does not declare English to be the national government's official
language, although an early Congress did reject requests from the German-speaking popu
lation to publish laws in German . See Perea, supra note 1 0 , at 303-09. Federal level Official
English legislation thereafter was sporadic. The New Mexico statehood legislation, i tself
delayed until the territory had an Anglo maj o ri ty, required the state to provide English
language education and made English li teracy a required skill for state officials. See id. at
321-23. In Puerto Rico, taken by force in 1 898, the provision for English-language i nstruc
tion in the schools was declared soon thereafter to be feasible and desirable by Major
General Guy Henry, the second military governor. See D avid Rodriguez En carnacion,
Evolucion del Derecho a la Educacion Consagrado en la Constitucion del 1 952 y su Desarrollo Jwis
prudencial, 32 REV1STA j uRIDICA DE LA U N IVERSJDAD I NTERAMERIC.ANA DE PuERTo Rrco 423,

426 ( 1 998 ) . I mposition of mandatory English-language education was attempted by the
colonial government in 1 909, see Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a
Colonized People: The Case ofPuerto Rico, 1 8 B . C. THIRD WoRLD LJ. 1 59, 1 83 ( 1 998) , and most
classes were conducted in English and u n ti l 1 948, see Ennio M . Colon Garcia et al., The
Linguistic Factor, 32 REvrsTA j uRJDICA DE LA U N IVERSIDAD INTERAiviERICANA DE P li ERTO Rico
3 1 0, 3 1 4 ( 1 998) . An Act to provide a civil government for Puerto Rico, and for other
purposes, ch. 1 45 , 39 Stat. 9 5 1 ( 1 9 1 7) , anglicized the spelling of th e colony's name to
"Porto Rico." Congress later reinstated the Spanish spelling. See Ac t of M ay 1 7, 1932, ch.
1 90, 47 Stat. 1 58 ( codified at 48 U.S.C. § 7 3 1 a ( 1 994) ) . For an economic h istory of Puerto
Rican colonization, see DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 26-36. Puerto Rico is now officially
bilingual. See P . R. Lnvs A'IN. tit. 3, § 941 ( 1 992) ( added 1 902) ( requiring all government
reports published i n English also to be published in Spanish ) . The issue remains a hot one
in Congress. V\-'hen, in March 1 998, a bill authorizing a refe rendum on statehood among
the Puerto Rican voters was presented to and approved by the House of Representatives,
an amendment conditioning statehood on English Only in federal offices and public edu
cation was only narrowly defeated. See Lizette Alvarez, Senate Is Lukewarm, but Some Seek Vote
on Puerto Rico, NY Tr:vrEs, Mar. 6, 1 998, at A 1 8.
I n the states there has been a sporadic h istory ofj uridical bilingualism. Pennsylvania,
California, and Louisiana each had periods of official bilingualism. See Perea, sujJra note
1 0, at 3 1 0-26. New Mexico remains officially bilingual, see id. at 323, as does H awaii, see
H Aw . REv. Sn.T. ANN. § 1-1 3 ( Michie 1 998) (Engl ish and Hawaiian ) . For Texas 's bilingual
h istory, see Juarez, s1tpra note 1 6.
65
See S]. Res. 72, 97th Cong. ( 1 9 8 1 ) . O thers haYe reintroduced it many times since.
See, e.g. , H .RJ Res. 37, 1 05th Cong. ( 1 997) (adding that English shall be used for all gov-
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Wh en Congress balked at adopting the E lA, the movement' s politi cal
fo cus shifted to the states. 66 Twenty-one state s responde d with Official
English statutes, in some cases at the legislature ' s instan ce an d i n
o the r cases by popular initiative . 6 7 Some of thes e statute s , which es
sen tially are mark-ups of the ELA, ambiguously68 declare "official sta
tus" for English and accord an open-ended enfo rcement p ower to the
ernment documents and official proceedings) ; H.R.J. Res. 1 3, 1 00th Cong. ( 1 987) ( adding
that " [ n ] either U nited States nor any [s] tate shall require . . . the use . . . of any language
other than English" ) ; S.J. Res. 1 67, 98th Cong. ( 1 983) ( declaring English to be the "official
language of the U ni ted States" and grantin g Congress power to enforce that declaration
through "appropriate legislati o n" ) .
According to i ts proponents, the ElA would "establish English as the official language
of federal, state, and l ocal governments; eliminate bilingual [election] ballots; and permit
bilingual" instruction i n public schools only for the purpose of effecting assimilation. Wex
ler, supra note 1 6, at 354-55. More generally, " [ i ] t would establish a national consensus
that a common language is necessary to preserve th e basic i nternal unity that is required
for a stable and growing nation." The English Language Amendment: Hearing on SJ Res. 1 6 7
BejoTe the Subcornm. o n the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judicimy, 98th C o ng . 23
( 1984) (statement of Sen. Huddlesto n ) [hereinafter The English A mendment] . For further
discussion, see Wexler, supra n ote 1 6, at 354-55.
66
Senator H ayakawa founded U.S. English in 1 983. See \Nexler, s upra n ote 1 6, at 352
n.287; Torres, supra note 51, at 52.
67
A twenty-second state, Nebraska, has Official E n gl ish legislatio n datin g back to
1 920. See NEB. Col"\ ST. art. I, § 27 ( coverin g all official proceedings, publications, and
records, and all education-public, private, and parochial ) . A predecessor of this p rovi
sion was struck down i n 1\tleyer v. Ne&raska, 262 U .S. 390 ( 1 923). For a politi cal analysis of
the state legislation, see Raymond Tatalovich, Official English as Nativist Backlash, in l:v!�II
GRANTS OuT ! , supra note 11 , at 78, 80-9 1 .
68
Courts can narrowly i n terpret a simple declaration of "official status" so as not to
carry negative implications for government activities i n other languages. Some of the j udi
cial opinions interpreting these statutes take this n arrow approach. See Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, 42 F.3d 1 2 1 7, 1 22 &-27 (rejecting the State ' s i n terpretation
of a facially restrictive statute to permit use of other languages to facilitate the provision of
services) , ajj d, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1 995) (en bane) , vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans
for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 ( 1997) ; Puerto Rican Org. for Politi cal Action v.
Kusper, 490 F.2d 575, 577 ( 7th Cir. l 973) ( noting that an I llinois statute making English
the official language does not " prevent publication of offi cial materials in other lan
guages") ; Martin v. Metropolitan Dade Cou n ty, 637 So. 2d 3 1 3 (Fla. D ist. Ct. App. 1 994)
( holding that a l ocal ordinance repealing an antibilingual ordinance passed one year ear
l ier did not violate the state constitutional provision declaring Engl ish to be the official
language) ; see also The English Amendment, supra note 65, at 32 (statement of legislative
attorney Charles V. Dale) (arguing that ElA alone would have little practical effect without
an effective enforcement mechanism, which is not specifically defined by the EIA) .
English Only activists take a more aggressive view of the statutes' meaning. After en
actment i n California, U .S. Engl ish set up a center to police implementation ; in Dade
County, Florida an English O nly ordinance was held to bar bilingual signs at the zoo. See
Sole, supra note 2 1 , at 8 1 0-11 .
Th e Dade Coun ty experience reflects political tensions between Anglos and members
of the region 's Cuban encla\·e. The County Commissioners voted th e countv bili ngual in
1 9 73. A.n initiati\·e ·'stipulatin g that public funds could not be used to teach languages
.
other than English or to ' promote a cultu re other than the culture of the United States' ,
revoked this designation in 1 980. Pones & Schauffler, supra note 2, at 645. The Dade
County Commission rescinded that initiative in 1 993. See irl. iHartin was an attempt to
trump the Commissioners ' action with the state constitution 's English O nly provision. See
i'vlartin, 637 So. 2d at 3 1 3.
'
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legislature. 69 Other Official English enactments are more specific, ex
plicitly restricting the language of government business.70
Federal English Only activity revived with the election of a Repub
lican Congress in 1 994. 7 1 Since then, members of Congress have in
troduced a number of Official English prop osals in each house. The
least restrictive proposals m andate English for federal government op69 See AL>.. CoNsT. amend. 509 ( ratified 1 990) ( declaring English the official language, authorizing the legislature to take all "steps necessary" to "preserve [ ] and en
hance [ ] English, and prohibiting any law to "diminish [ ] or ignore [ ] the role of English
as the common language") ; CAL. CaNsT. art. I I I , § 6 ( added by initiative 1 986) ( declaring
English the official language and authorizing the legislature to take all steps n ecessary to
preserve and enhance it) ; CoLo. CaNST. art. I I , § 30a (added by ini tiative 1 98 8 ) ( declaring
English the official language and auth o rizing the assembly to implement) ; Fu. CoNST. art.
I I , § 9 ( added by initiative 1 988) ( establishing English as the official language and utilizing
substantially the same language as Colorado) .
Other states have provisions that make the declaration without granting enforcement
power explici tly. See ARK. CoDE ANN. 1 -4-1 1 7 ( Michie 1 996) ( enacted 1 98 7 ) ; 5 ILL CoMP.
STAT. 460/20 (West 1 993) ( enacted 1 99 1 , with prior laws dating back to 1 923) ; I N D . CoDE
AN"! . § 1-2-10-1 ( Michie 1 998) (added 1 984) ; Kv. REv. STAT. A'1N. § 2 . 0 1 3 ( Banks-Bald,vin
1 995 ) (added 1 984) ; M1ss. CoDE A'1N. § 3-3-31 ( 1 99 1 ) ( enacted 1 987) ; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1 45-1 2 ( 1 994) (enac ted 1 987) ; N . D . CENT. CoDE § 54-02-1 3 ( 1 989) ( added 1 987) ; VA.
CoDE AN N . § 7 . 1 -42 ( Michie Supp. 1 998) ( added 1 996) ( declaring English to be the official
language and stating that "no state agency or local government shall be required to pro
vide . . . [or] prohibited from providing" other language documents " [ e ] xcept as provided
by law" ) .
Many states also have incidental provisions concerning the language o f j u dicial pro
cess, record keeping, and o ther government functi ons. See Wexler, supra n o te 1 6, at 348.
For an example of a statute, see TEx. PRoP. CoDE A'1N . § 1 1 .002 (West 1 995) (enacted
1 983) (specifying that no real property documents shall be filed in a language o ther than
English ) .
7 0 See ARlz. Cot-:sT. art. XXVIII ( added by referendum 1 988) (declaring E nglish as the
official language of ballot, public schools, and all government functions and actions and
authorizing the legislature to take all reasonable enforcement steps) ; NEB. C a NST . art. I ,
§ 27 (adopted 1 920) ( covering official proceedings, publications, records, a n d all educa
tion ) ; GA. CoDE 1\,"\IN. § 50-3-1 00 ( 1 998) ( added 1 996) ( declaring English the official lan
guage for acts of gove rnment and public meetings and perm i tting official filings of other
language documents only with an English translation ) ; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 1 - 1 -5 1 0 ( 1 997)
(declaring English the official language for acts of government officers and employees) ;
N . H . REv. STAT. A'-' N . § 3-C: 1 to :2 ( Supp. 1 998) ( mandating English for all public docu
ments, records, and proceedings i n which excepting cases the "public good" requires use
of other languages) ; S.C. CoDE ANN. § 1 -1 -696 ( Law. Co-op. Supp. 1 997) ( added 1 987) ;
S.D. CoDIFIED L<\ws § 1 -27-20 ( Michie Supp. 1 998) ( declaring English the offical language
and designating as language for public documents and meetings) ; TENN . CoDE A"\I N . § 4-1404 ( 1 998) (added 1 984) ( mandating English for all "communications and publications"
of governmental en tities) ; Wvo . STAT . ANN. § 8-6- 1 0 1 ( Michie 1 997) (added 1 996) ( apply
ing to documents and written materials and stating that no state agency or political subdivi
sion "shall be required to provide" such documents and materials in any language other
than English, but excepting oral information provided to individuals in the course of deliv
ery of a public service) .
Courts struck down the Arizona statute on First Amendment grounds in Yniguez, 42
F . 3d at 1 24 1 -42, and in Ruiz v . Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1 998) ( en bane ) , wt. denied, 67
U .S.L.W. 3436 ( 1 999) .
71
Senator Dole endorsed federal-level Official English legislation in his 1 996 campaign. See Torres, sujJTa note 5 1 , at 52.
"
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erations and services and declare a " right" to government services in
E nglish. 72 M ore restrictive versions repeal federal laws that require
Sp anish-language election ballots and that encourage Spanish-lan
guage primary and secondary education. 7 3 Congress has not, to date ,
enacted any of the proposals.
7 2 See Language of Government Act of 1 997, S. 323, 1 05th Cong. § 2; Bill Emerson
English Language Empowerment Act of 1 997, H . R. 1 23, 1 05 th Cong.; English Language
Empowerment Act of 1 996, H.R. 3850, 1 04th Cong. § 3 ( adding § 1 63 to 4 U . S . C. ) ; Lan
guage of Government Act of 1 995, H.R. 1 23, 1 04th Con g. § 3 (same) ; Language of Govern
ment Act of 1 995, H.R. 345, 1 04th Cong. § 3 (sam e ) ; Language of Government Act of
1 995, S. 356, 1 04th Cong. § 3 (same) . The Language of Government Act of 1 997 provides,
inter alia, ( 1 ) that " [ t] he [g] overnment shall conduct its official business in English, " S.
323, 1 05 th Cong. § 3 ( adding § 1 63 (a) to 4 U.S.C. ) ; ( 2 ) that the government has an "af
firmative obligation to preserve and enhance the role of English as the official language of
the . . . government," id. (adding § 1 62 to 4 U.S.C. ) ; ( 3 ) that " [ n ] o person shall be denied
services, assistance, or facilities, directly or indirectly provided by [g] overnment solely be
cause the person communicates in English ," id. ( adding § 1 63 (b ) to 4 U .S.C. ) ; and ( 4) that
" [e ] very person . . . is entitled to . . . communicate with the [g] overnment in English; . . .
[ to] receive information from or contribute information to the [g] overnment in English ;
and . . . [ to] be informed of or be subject to official orders in English," id. ( adding § 1 63 ( c)
to 4 U.S.C. ) . Savings clauses go on to state that the statute is "not intended . . . to discrimi
nate against or restrict the rights of any individual," id. § 2 (b) ( 1 ) , and "not i n tended to
discourage or prevent the use of languages o ther than English in any nonofficial capacity,"
id. § 2 (b) ( 2 ) .
For a variant proposal, see the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1 997, H.R. 622,
1 05 th Cong. , and the Declaration of Official Language Act of 1 995, H . R. 739, 1 04th Cong.
These proposed bills ( 1 ) declare English to be the official language, see H . R. 622 § 2 (ad
ding § 1 61 to 4 U . S. C. ) ; ( 2 ) state that English is the "preferred language of communication
among citizens of the United States, " id. (adding § 1 62 to 4 U.S.C. ) ; (3) encourage citizens
to use English in a section labeled "Duti es of citizenship," id. (adding § 1 64 to 4 U.S.C. ) ;
and ( 4) command the INS to enforce the English-language proficiency standard, see id.
(adding § 1 65 to 4 U.S.C. ) .
7 3 See National Language Act o f 1 997, H . R. 1 005, 1 05 th Cong.; National Language Act
of 1 995, H . R. 1 005, 1 04th Cong. These proposals limit the Official E nglish declaration by
exceptions only for religious purposes, foreign-language training, and persons over 62. See
H.R. 1 005, 1 05 th Cong. § 2 (addin g § 1 63 to 4 U.S.C. ) ; H.R. 1 005, 1 04th Cong. § 2 (same) .
I n addition, they repeal Bilingual Education Programs and Bilingual Election Require
ments and require English in new citizen admission ceremonies. See H . R. 1 005, 1 05 th
Cong. §§ 3-5; H . R. 1005, l 04th Cong. §§ 3-5.
Guam delegate Robert Underwood has introduced an English Only School Prayer
Bill. According to Representative Underwood, " [w] e should not tolerate p rayers in dead
languages like Latin, nor unfamiliar prayers in Hebrew, Greek, Arabic or Spanish ." English
Only Prayers, PL\lN DEALER ( Cleveland ) , Aug. 1 2, 1 996, at 1 0D .
Finally, there i s a counterproposal. See H . R. C o n . Res. 4 , 1 05 th Cong. ( 1 997) ; H . R .
Con. Res. 8 3 , 1 04th Con g . ( 1 995 ) . These resolutions recognize t h e importance o f English,
but resolve to continue the provision of services in languages other than English to facili
tate access to essen tial government fun c tions. See H.R. Con. Res. 4; H.R. Con. Res. 83. The
declaration neatly summarizes several policy coun ters to the English Only Movement:
\'Vh ereas there is no threat to the status of English in the United States,
a language that is spoken by 94 percent of United States residents, accord
ing to the 1 990 United States Census, and there is no need to designate any
official United States language or to adopt similar restrictionist legislation;
'vVhereas "English-only" measures, or ?roposals to designate English as
the sole official language of the U n i ted States, would violate traditions of
cultural pluralism, divide communities along ethnic lines, jeopardize the
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Constitutional litigation has followed enactments of these laws in
the states. The Ninth Circuit struck down an Arizona p rovision that
mandated English as the exclusive language of public services as
facially overbroad and violative of the First Amendment's free speech
guarantee. 74 The Supreme Court took the case only to vacate the
lower court j udgment as moot.7 5 Subsequently, in Ruiz v. Hull, 7 6 the
Supreme Court of Arizona reached the same result as the Ninth Cir
cuit, offering both a more expansive reading of the First Amend
ment77 and a parallel equal p rotection ground for invalidation. 78
Pending a definitive federal court ruling, however, the constitu tional
ity of restrictive Official English statutes remains an open question. 79
provision of law enforcement, public health, education, and other vital serv
ices to those whose English is l i mi ted, impair government efficiency, and
undercut the national i n terest by h indering the development of language
skills needed to enhance i n ternati onal competi tiveness and conduct diplo
macy; and
vVhereas such "English-only" measures would represent an unwar
ranted Federal regulation of self-expression, abrogate constitutional rights
to freedom of expression and equal protection of the laws, violate i n terna
tional human rights treaties to which the United States is a signatory, and
con tradic t the spirit of the 1 92 3 Supreme Court case Meyer v. Nebraska,
wherein the Court declared that "The protection of the Constitution ex
tends to all; to those who speak other languages as well as to those born
with English on the tongue" . . . .
H . R. Con. Res. 4.
74
See Yni gu e z v. Arizonans for Official English , 42 F.3d 1 2 1 7, 1 24 1 -42, ajj'd, 69 F.3d
9 20 (9th Cir. 1995) (en bane ) , vacated as moot sub nom. Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 ( 1 997) . The opinion holds, i n ter alia, ( l ) that the statute is facially
overbroad because it chills the speech of all Arizona public employees and officials and
burdens their interest i n receiving i nformation of non-English-speaking citizens; and ( 2 )
that speech in a foreign language is n o t unpro tected expressive conduct. See id. a t 1 229-30,
1 2 32.
7 '0
See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 43.
7 6 957 P . 2d 984 (Ariz. 1 998) ( en bane ) , cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3436 ( 1 999) .
77
R uiz j oins Yniguez i n focusing on a violation of the right of elected officials and
public employees to communicate with constituents and the public. See 9 5 7 P . 2d at 998.
But i t also finds a violation of the First Amendment rights of "limited- and non-English
speaking persons [ to ] access . . . information about the government when multilingual
access may be available and may be necessary to ensure fair and effective delivery of gov
ernmen tal services to non-English-speaking persons." !d. at 997.
78 The court applied stric t scrutiny on the ground that the provision impinged on the
First Am endment righ t to petition for redress of grievances. See id. at 1 000. B ecause the
State failed to establish a compelling state i n terest, th e court held the provisi o n violative of
the Equal Protection Clause "because it impinges upon both the fundamental right to
participate equally in the poli tical process and the righ t to peti tion the government for
redress." !d. at 1 002.
79
We would expect the Supreme Court defini tively to hold such restric tive Official
English statutes unconsti tutional in line with Yn iquez rather than Ruiz, advancing a narrow
First Amendment ground and avoiding the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
Under the time-honored preference for the narrow ground, avoidance of constitu
tional challenges certainly would be sound litigation strategy. The First Amendment
framework allows only a tentative commitment to j uridical equal status for Latin os/ as. The
i m·alidating court need only accord Spanish equal status with English so far as it concerns
direct, governmental prohibition of the act of speech. Although this matter has important
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Workplace E nglish

Private institutions may use direc t mandate t o suppress Sp anish
.
wh en the F1rst Amendment prevents th e gove rnmen t fro m do in g so.
Em ployers often impose these language regulations o n an absolute
b asis, requiring English speech at all tim es and in all circumstance s
regardless of whether the conversatio n includ es custo mers, m o n ol
i ngual English supervisors , or fellow employe es. Employer justifica
tion s cite workplace safety, 8 0 simplicity, 8 1 transpar e n cy of
admin istration, 82 and professional appearances. 8 3 Yet Workplace Eng
lish regulations often lead to workplace conflicts, and numerous peo
ple have reported disputes in recent years. 84
implications for the Latino/a community's political rights, i t need not entail affi rmative
recognition of equal status. An equal protection theory of invalidation, in contrast, shifts
the focus to the prevention of Spanish-language access to political participation and im
plies an equal right to use political influence in the democratic process to secure Spanish
language services. Government in Spanish would by implication join government in Eng
lish in the universe of constitutionally sanctioned public goods. Even this limited recogni
tion of Latino/a equality may be difficult to extract in the present American context. Even
less likely is substantive due process recogni tion of a right to a zone of protection for
individual choice respecting language acquisition and usage.
This Article's analysis of costs and rights applies regardless of the doctrinal framework,
however. In an ideal world, the courts would endorse a right to cultural and linguistic
freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment, making reference to David Richards 's recenr
exhaustive interpretation. See DAYlD J . RicHARDS, WoMEN, GAYS, A i\: D T H E CoNSTITUTION
( 1 998) . U nder Richards's moral and legal i n terpretation, the Thirteenth An1endment in
cludes and forbids all forms of moral slavery. See id. at 5. The concept of suspect classifica
tion, as reconstructed by Richards, condem ns the "basis for law th at reflects the unj ust
degradation of a cul tural tradition ( moral slavery) with which a person reasonably iden ti
fies as cen tral to their conscientious sense of personal and moral iden ti ty." !d. Further
more, " [s] uch devaluation of identi ty is . . what unites on grounds of principle the
interlinked grounds for the suspectness of religion, race, gender, and sexual preference."
!d. This principle provides a powerful basis for constitutional condemnation of Official
English and, more generally , legal instantiations of the assimilation norm. Richards's i n
terpretation is the closest in the l iterature to our defense of the moral righ t of the person
to be recognized as the self:authenticating source of the evaluation of her origin.
80
See Carol Kleiman, Learning English Opens Doors for Ernj;loyees, CHI. TIU B . , July 9, 1 995,
§ 8 (Jobs) , at 1 ; David Poppe, Batchelor Defends English-Only Rule, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28,
1 997, at l C.
81
See Kleiman, supra note 80; Diane E. Lewis, 5 Hotel Workers Quit, Cite English-Only
Demand, BosTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1 997, at B 3 .
82 Employers have contended that Spanish-speaking employees can disrupt the work
place by belittling other employees in conversations among themselves. See Gutierrez v.
Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1 03 1 , 1 042 (9th Cir. 1 988) , vacated, 490 U.S. 1 0 1 6 ( 1 989 ) ; Long
v. First Union Corp . , 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 ( E . D . Va. 1 995 ) , ajf'd, 86 F.3d 1 1 51 ( 4th Cir.
1 996) ; D imaranan v. Pomona Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., 775 F. Supp. 338, 342 ( 1 99 1 ) , with
drawn, No. 89 4289 ER (JRX ) , 1 993 \NL 326559 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1 7 , 1 993) . Employers also
often mention the facilitation of supervision by non-Spanish-speaking supervisors. See G u
tierrez, 838 F.2d at 1 043; Garcia v. Gloor, 61 8 F.2cl 264, 267 ( 5 th Cir. 1 980) ; Dimaranan, 775
F. Supp. at 342-43.
83 See Garcia, 6 1 8 F.2d at 267 ( explaining the employer's claim that English-speaking
customers object to hearing conversations they cannot understand) ; Lewis, sujHa note 8 1 .
8 4 A t l east one ACLU lawyer alleges that incr<>ased reports could reflect increased
employer usage of Workplace English. See Lewis, supra note 8 1 . In the alternative, it could
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Meanwhile, the legal environment has turned markedly in the
employers ' favor. Ten years ago, both the E qual Employment Oppor
tunity Commission ( "EEOC ") and the federal courts appeared to be
in accord on the Title VII status of Workplace English. The EEOC
Guidelines on Discrimination 8 5 formally declared Workplace English
a burdensome term and a condition of employment that disparately
impacts a protected group and therefore p resumptively violates Title
VII 's prohibition of national origin discrimination. 86 Under this anal
ysis, Workplace English regulations are sustainable only if an em
ployer can make a showing of business necessity. 8 7 Although leading
federal cases initially adopted this p osition, 8 8 the courts changed their
view, rej ecting the EEOC Guidelines and holding that broad Work
place English rules do not automatically raise a prima facie case of
reflect decreased tolerance on the part of Latinos/ as and o thers whose contacts the regula
tions constrain (or perhaps an increased interest on the part of the press) . The Mexican
American Legal D efense and Educational Fund and the ACLU have set up h o t-lines to
receive complaints. See Torres, supra n o te 5 1 , at 56. Protests n ow are common. See, e.g.,
Aly Colon, A OL Drops English-Only Policy, SEATTLE TIMES, July 25, 1 996, at A5 ( reporting a
customer protest against English Only computer bulletin board) ; Ray D elgado & Julian
Gu thrie, Day Care Language Barrier: Spanish-Speaking Workers Claim They 're Forced To Use Eng
lish on the Job, or Else, S.F. EXfuVIINER, Sept. 20, 1 996, a t A4 ( reporting a worker protest) ;
Lewis, supra note 8 1 (same ) . On a related fro n t, there have been recent instances of pro
tests by government employees in bilingual service situations who are fed up with doing
much more work than similarly situated monolingual Anglos for the same pay. See William
Booth , Growth in Bilingualjobs Brings Demands for lvlore Pay, WASI-L P osT , Jan. 1 9, 1 996, at A3;
Clemence Fiagome, Bilingual job, Higher Pay, CHRJSTLA..N SCI. MoNITOR, Jan. 26, 1 996, at 3;
Charles Strouse, Big Lang·uage Debate Pits English-Only vs. Bilingual, FRESNO BEE, Jan . 2 1 ,
1 996, a t Al l .
85
Guidelines on D iscrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § l 606.7 (a)
(b) ( 1 998) .
8 6 See id § l 606. 7 ( a) .
8 7 See Yee v. Runyan, No. 0 1 942 1 85, 1 995 WL 441 49 (E.E.O.C. ) Uan. 27, 1 995) ( apply
ing Guidelines) ; Decision 83-7, 3 1 Fair Empl. P rac. Cas. ( B NA) 1 86 1 , 1 862 ( 1 983) ( sus
taining limited English Only rule on safety grounds) ; D ecision 8 1 -25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. ( BNA) 1 820, 1 82 1-22 ( 1 98 1 ) (applying Guidelines against absolute rule ) ; D ecision 730479, 1 9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. ( BNA) 1 788, 1 804 ( 1 973) ( requiring business j ustifica tion
for absolute rule ) ; Decision 7 1 446, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. ( B NA) 1 1 27 , 1 1 28 ( 1 970)
(same ) .
8 8 See Gutierrez v . M unicipal Court, 838 F.2d 1 03 1 , 1 039-40 (9th Cir. 1 988) ( holding
that employee allegation of harm to identi ty sufficed to support preliminary i njunction
and c i ting EEOC Guidelines with approval) , vacated, 490 U.S. 1 0 1 6 ( 1 989 ) ; Saucedo v.
Brothers Well Serv. , I n c . , 464 F. Supp. 9 1 9, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1 979) ( ruling that an English
Only rule has disparate impac t and therefore raises the issue of business necessity) ; see also
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp . , 8 1 3 F.2d 1 406, 1 4 1 0- 1 1 (9th Cir. 1 987) (sustaining radio sta
tion order of English-language broadcasting format because the order was business re
lated) . But see Garcia, 6 1 8 F.2d at 270 ( holding that no discrimination is presen t when
employees can speak English but choose not to do so) .
Gutierrez makes the important point that bilingualism does not terminate the link be
tween language and cultural identity. See 838 F.2d at 1 039. For further discussion, see
Kenneth L . Karst, Paths to Belonging: 17le Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N . C . L. REv.
303, 361-69, 376-77 ( 1 986) ; Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Lan
guage, 23 Hous. L. REv. 885, 898-900 ( 1 986) .
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dis parate impact. 89 Under this approach , to make a prim a facie case,
th e plain tiff must prove the existe nce of a discriminatory im pact-that
th e adverse effect is significant and that the general employ ee popula
tio n is not affected to the same degre e.9 o
This judiciary change signals shifting concerns. Degradation car
ries decisiv e weight under the EEOC appro ach , resulting in findings
th at language prohibition is national origin discrimination. 9 1 Today,
c o urts reject this idea that expressions of ethnicity have Title VII sig
nifi cance . 9 2 Costs matter more in this analysis. Accordingly, courts
cite Title VII 's legislative history for the proposition that employer in
ternal affairs should be interfered with as little as possible.93 Ascrip
tions of fault also have shifted under the current approach. Courts
see complainants in these cases, who by definition are bilingual, as
possessing a choice about complying with Workplace English regula
tions. 94 Once the court concedes the legitimacy of the employer' s
forcing this choice, employee volition emerges as the determinant fac
tor in the case.9 5 In effect, courts believe that employees who can
speak English, who know the rule, and who choose to speak Spanish 96
get what is coming to them.
The cost and volition components of the assimilation norm have
found their way into Title VII case law. The third member of the nati
vist trio-the foreign language threat to American civilization-does
8 9 See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1 480, 1 490 ( 9 th Cir. 1 993) ; Long v. First
Union Corp ., 894 F. Supp. 933, 943-44 (E.D. Va. 1 995 ) , affd, 86 F.3d 1 1 5 1 ( 4th Cir. 1 996) ;
cf Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley H osp. Med. C tr . , 775 F. Supp. 338, 343-44 ( 1 99 1 ) ( finding
that an employer's administrative justification blocks inference of disparate treatmen t) ,
withdrawn, No. 89 4289 ER (JRX ) , 1 993 WL 326559 ( C . D . Cal. Mar. 1 7, 1 993) .
90 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 486.
9 1 See Adams, supra note 1 7, at 903-04; see also Jorgensen, supra note 1 7, at 4 1 4 ( discuss
ing cases that connect English Only and discrimination) ; Kinner, supra note 1 7, at 874-75
(arguing that English Only i m pacts non-English speakers ) .
9 2 Compare Gutienez, 838 F.2d at 1 039-40 ( adopting the EEOC's business necessity test
for evaluating Title VII claims) , with Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 487 ( noting that Title VI I does
not protect workplace expressions of cultural and ethnic identity) .
9 3 See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 489-90; see also Long, 894 F. Supp. at 9 4 1 ( characterizing
and rejecting the notion that the ability to converse in any language is a "p·rivilege of em
ployment" subject to employer control ( e mphasis added) ) .
94 See, e.g., Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1 487 ( "The bilingual employee can readily comply
with the English-only mle and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job." (emphasis
added) ) .
95
For challenges to the behavioral notion that bilingual speakers always have a
choice, see Adams, supra note 1 7, at 906-07; Mirande, supra note 1 7 , at 94-98. O thers chal
lenge the n otion that mutability of the characteristic should determine a Titl e VII case in
the defendant's favor. See Jorgensen, supra note 1 7 , at 4 1 9-20; Kinner, supra note 1 7, at
899 , 903. On the importance of mutability in Title VII cases, see Peter Brandon B ayer,
JV!utable Chamcteristics and the Definition of Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 769 ( 1 987) ; Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accom
modation Provision to Redeem Title VU, 76 TEx. L. REv. 3 1 7, 33 1-32 ( 1 99 7 ) .
96
See Spun Steak, 998 F . 2 d a t 1 487; Jurado v . !:: ! even-Fifty Corp . , 8 1 3 F.2d 1 406, 1 4 1 0
(9th Cir. 1 987) ; Garcia v. Gloor, 6 1 8 F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980 ) .
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not yet explicitly figure into the j urisprudence. But i t would be ras h
to predict its permanent absence.
II
THE EcoNOMICS OF AssiMILATION: LANGUAGE AcQU ISITION,
D ISCRIMINATION, AND SPONTAi'IEOUS ORDER

In this Part, we use economic theory to inspect the soundness of
the three concepts-threat, cost, and volition-that support E nglish
Only. 9 7
This inspection confirms that multiple languages do result in ad
ded costs for a given economy. But it also shows that these costs fall
most heavily on minority-language speakers themselves . As a result,
individual economic incentives should keep overall costs at a manage
able level, even given significant immigration. Moreover, enclave set
tlement and bilingualism-each of which nativists call a threat-are
rational ( and unthreatening) when viewed economically. The analysis
also shows that Official English does lend itself to a rational expecta
tions description, but not as a first-best means to the end of Latino/ a
assimilation. From a public choice perspective, Official English re
sembles Jim Crow legislation designed to advance the collective inter
ests of the Anglo m�j ority either by discouraging Latino/ a settlement
in the enacting state or by impeding the existing Latino/a commu
nity' s access to public services and employment.
The economic analysis , however, does not necessarily i mp ly fric
tionless repetition of the turn-of-the-century assimilatio n pattern. Ra
tional members of an ethnic minority will migrate fro m enclaves only
to the extent that the wider economy offers superior economic oppor
tunities.9B It is not at all clear that these opportunities exist for many
Latinos/as. Moreover, the economic theory of discrimination pro
vides no credible assurance that market forces will provide a solution
to this problem in either the short or long run . In fact, the empirical
evidence supports a prediction that Latinos/as will face m ore virulent
and persistent discrimination than that which their turn-of-the-cen
tury immigrant predecessors facecl . 9 9
9 7 I n doing so. we do n o t wish to claim that m icroecon omic theorv should provide the
exclusive meth odological framework for analysis of problems of assi milati o n and discrimi
nation. For criticisms with which we concur, see Glen n C . Loury, Discrim ination in the Post
Civil Rights Em: Beyoncl i'vlarket Interactions, 1 2 J. EcoN. PERSP. 1 1 7, 1 1 8-23 ( 1 998 ) . vVe draw
on mic roeconomics h ere because i t occupies a privileged role i n today's legal policy dis
course and comes to bear on the subj ec t matter with surprising results.
9 8 CJ Hing, supra n o te 1 5 , at 891 (" I n nw experience, immigrants who reside or work
in ethnic enclaYes do so less out of ideological reasons than out of comfort or afforclability
. . . . )
99
For a review of the empirical li terature o n Lati nos/ as, see s·1.pm note 3 a n d accom
panying text. v\'e h <n·e come across no e m pirical studies comparing th e experiences of the
di fferent immigran t gener a tions with discrimination .
''
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The character and intensity of Latino/a economic incentives to
assi m ilate 1 00 depend on the character and intensity of discriminatory
b ehavior by Anglos. If public policy problems arise because Latinos/
as m aintai n stronger home country ties than members of p revious im
migrant generations, Anglos can blame themselves. This analysis
reveals a clear message for legal policy: a legal regime seeking to en
courage assimilation should open opportunities for immigrants
through the subsidy of English-language education or through the
scrupulous enforcement of Title VII. English Only sticks are the tools
of segregationists.
Official English, Cost Economics, and Immigrant Incentives

A.

1.

Language Difference, Its Costs, and Their Allocation

Language differences make exchanges more expensive . Con
sider, for example, a prospective trade between t\-vo monolingual par
ties who speak different languages. Language acqms1t10n or
translation costs necessarily will accrue if th e parties consummate this
trade. Like costs of transportation, the parties typically will pass these
costs along to the parties' ultimate customers. 1 0 1 Compare the afore
mentioned trade with a situation in which producers in a small coun
try with its own language wish to enter the market in a big country
with a different language . Here, the big country's market will deter
mine the terms of trade, including the language . It follows that trad
ers in the small country bear all th e costs (and gain the benefits ) of
learning the big country' s language . 1 0 2
If we now take an additional step and consider international
trade in a world of multiple languages, we see that a transnational
lingua franca-presumably a big country' s language-will reduce
costs. The small country' s traders in particular will benefit from the
lingua franca's emergence because it gives them across-the-board ac
cess to multiple markets at the cost of learning only one additional
language. 1 03 The lingua franca is thus a public good. The distribu
tion of the c osts associated with the lingua franca, however, is une
qual. Those whose first language is not the lingua franca, such as the
small country's traders, bear the cost of learning it to reap the gains of
the transactions that a common language facilitates. Residents of the
big country ( or countries, as is the case with English today) for whom
1 00
IOl

See suj;m Pan

I. A.

See Albe n Breton

&

P e te r Mieszkowski, The Economics of Bilingualism., i n THE PouT-

IC-\L Eco :-;m·IY oF F1sC.-\L FEDER.-\LIS\1 261, 264 (vVallace E. Oates e d . ,
! 02
See id. at 264-65.
l 03

See id.

at

262

1 977) .

( n oting that i nvesting in a second language can be profi tabl e if the

coun trv can realize gain to offset the investm e n t ) . They save the cosl'> of investing in acqui
sition of multiple foreign languages.
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the lingua franca is their native tongue receive a free ride. Some have
referred to this premium that native lingua franca speakers enj oy rela
tive to other language speakers as the "seigniorage of language . " 1 04
The main points revealed by this pattern of costs and benefi ts and
of seigniorage and peonage also apply to foreign language speakers
within a national economy. The general currency of the native lan
guage, like the lingua franca of global trade, is a cost-reducing public
good because it lowers transaction costs for the population as a
whole . 1 0 5 Members of linguisti c minorities, like the small country' s
traders, must bear the cost o f learning the native language i f they wish
to access the benefits of full participation in the national economy.
2.

Public Policy Implications of Language Economics

A j ustification for Official English from a social engineering p er
spective follows from the above-described economics. If general flu
ency in the native language is a public good, then the pattern of usage
of English in the United States is a legitimate issue of state concern. A
large , geographically co ncentrated , Sp anish-speaking m i n ority
amounts to an internal trade barrier that increases transaction costs in
the wider economy. 1 06 In the long run, the mandatory provision of
public services in English reduces both trade frictions and the result
ing costs by encouraging Latinos/as ( and members of oth e r language
minorities) to learn English and by h astening the disapp earance of
minority languages. l07
This social welfare calculation needs unpacking. The calculation
begins with the economic assertion that linguistic sameness l owers
( and difference increases) costs. Supporters make two further asser
tions. First, mandated sameness enhances our economic welfare. Sec
ond, the polity as a whole therefore prefers mandated sameness. We
question and negate the first of these assertions in the subsection that
follows . 1 08 We address the second assertion in this subsection, asking
tw·o questions. First, we question the positive correlation the calcula
tion draws between cost-reductive homogeneity and real-world polit
ical preferences. Second, we question the safety of assuming that
sameness always lowers costs, suggesting that at some point one must
1 04

at 266-67, 270.
See id. at 268.
10 6
CJ Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Class: Linguistic Separatism
and National Unity, 41 EMORY LJ. 223, 262-63 ( 1 992) (noting that the linguisti c divisions
among Canadian provinces have become so intense that after NAFTA, "trade with the
Uni ted States [ might] becom e [ ] a more viable option than the economic integratior. of
the provinces" ) .
1 07 The argument in the text is a markup o f Donohue 's time-based defense of Title VII
against Becker's free market story of the inevitable disappearance of discrimination . See
infra notes 1 85-90 and accompanying text.
1 0 8 See infra Part I I .A.3.
1 os

Jd.
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concede the possibility that diversity can have positive consequences
for social welfare .
a.

Homogeneity and Preference Aggregation

The proposition that sameness lowers costs is not unique to the
eco nomics of language acquisition. This assumption also p rovides a
basis for the following disturbing proposition, 1 09 which is fun damen
tal to the economic theory of discrimination: 1 1 0 If sameness lowers
costs, then all other things being equal, segregation enhances social
welfare. Just as a common language lowers the cost of a discrete
trade, other common traits such as race, gender, ethnicity, and social
class lower costs and facilitate m ore complex, long-term cooperative
economic relationships. Accordingly, one can expect people of simi
lar types and tastes to sort themselves amon g different producing or
ganizations-the narrower the variance of preferences within the
firm, the cheaper the process of firm decision making. l 1 1 This sorting
may even appear within complex, h ierarchical organizations in which
the costs of group decision making do not loom large . Since such
organizations segment themselves into teams performing different
functions, we can expect to see segregation along lines of race, lan
guage , and gender. 1 12 It follows that mandated integration under Ti
tle VII is costly.
The same cost analysis that justifies government suppression of
Spanish also j ustifies the repeal of Title VII. 1 1 3 This Title VII analogy
1 09 The economics of this proposition stands apart from its questionable ethical pos
ture. This calculation seizes on a point of ethnic and cultural difference, finds it to be
mutable and costly, and concludes that a state-sponsored program of eradication advances
social welfare. The m aj ority trait automatically becomes the uniform standard in the cost
reductive homogeneous regime.
1 1 0 See infra Part I I.C.2.
1 1 1 See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 61-67; Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 42 .
1l2
See, e.g. , Finis Welch, LaboHVIarket Disoirnination: An Interpretation ofIncome Dijferences
in the Rural South, 75 J . PoL. EcoN. 225, 230-3 1 , 238 ( 1 967) (arguing that forced integration
of a multiracial workforce generates external inefficiencies, which decrease productivity) .
1 l3
This is the famous argument of Richard Epstein. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 617 0 , 76-77.

The arguments for the suppression of Spanish and for the repeal of Title VII are
distinguishable on the ground that education can change language whereas race, gender,
and ethnic origin are i mmutable characteristics. But the distinction loses much of its co
gency on closer inspection. Mutability, by i tself, does not disqualify a trait from state-spon
sored protection. Religion is m utable too, yet a cost-based state policy encouraging non
Christians to convert arguably would not advance social welfare. At the same time , lan
guage is only mutable to some extent. The economic l i terature of discrimination makes
reference to sociolinguistics to expand the definition of l inguistic difference. It is not just
the words one speaks, but one ' s verbal and nonverbal communicative apparatus-posture,
gesture, eye contact, and inflection-that counts. See Kevin Lang, A Language Theo·l)' of
Discrimination, 1 0 1 Q.J. Eco N . 363, 366-68 ( 1 986) . h America there is a majority " code,"
the native speakers of which are whi te , Anglo, middl e-class males. O thers-women, Afri
can Americans, Latinos/as, and other immigrants-all have to learn and use this code to
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highlights several factors that complicate and weaken the welfare cal
culation behind Spanish suppression. Repealing Title VII to reduce
transaction costs would have substantial distributive consequences
white men would win , and everyone else would lose. This redistribu
tion of wealth and privilege would not reflect the preferences of soci
ety as a whole, even if it were p ossible to prove that its cost reductive
effect would cause the gross national p roduct to rise. This dive rgence
between the e conomic optimum and the politically preferred result
probably would persist even if the proponent of repealing Title VII
shows that the benefit of a higher gross national product evenhan d
edly would trickle down among the losers , so the worst off would be,
in the aggregate, at least as economically well off as before. Since los
ing still hurts, it remains p lausible that the class of losers might p refer
to be less well off in a more equal society.
The numbers work differently, of course, with Spanish suppres
sion. The losers in this context are Latinos/as and other no n-En glish
speakers, for whom public services become less valuable. E nglish
speakers are the winners. Yet one still plausibly can posit a p refe rence
for sharing within the wider class of Title VI I beneficiaries. The ra
tionality for sharing is akin to the labor organizer's appeal to long-run
benefits of solidarity in the face of a short-run urge to give in to the
employer. Prisoners ' dilemma literature presents a formal economic
showing of this possibility. l 1 4 New evolutionary models illustrate the
rationality of such cooperation by p ositing, first, a class of p risoners'
dilemma players who over time have managed as a group to overcome
the temptation to defect and achieve optimal , collective ends, and sec
ond, another class of players who interact with the members of the
cooperative group, but who always favor defectio n. 1 1 5 With infinite
repeat plays, these models show that cooperation within the group is
possible despite the presence of the class of opponents who are ever
ready to divide and conquer. 1 1 6 In accordance with those models, in
tragroup cooperation may be benefit maximizing on an individual ba
sis across the various classes of Title VII beneficiaries. 1 1 7
succeed. Given the subtleties involved, it is n o t at all clear that a reconstructed m aj o rity
identity is within the reach of most of these outsiders.

1 14

See, e.g., BRIAN SKYRMS, Evou.!Tro:-.� OF THE SoCL'li. Co:-:TR.-\CT 58-59 ( 1 99 6 ) . Skyrms
offers a prisoners' dilemma analysis con trasting one cooperator in a universe of defectors
to an identifiable group of cooperators in a u n iverse of defectors. The solo cooperator is
eliminated by the defectors. The group of cooperators playin g with one a n o th e r wil l be
evolutionarily fit, however. Defectors wil l not be eliminated com pletely but will prey on
the edge of the group of cooperators.
11 5

116

See id. at 59.
See id. ( noting that although defectors "will persist as predictors on the p e riphery,"

cooperators will survive ) .

1 1 7 CJ id. (discussing the possible benefits of i n tragroup cooperation to i n crease "average fi tness" over defectors) .
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Homogeneity and Diversity as Tradeoffs

A second infirmity in the welfare calculatio n lies in its assump tion
tha t h omogeneity is absolutely cost-benefi cial. This supposition ne
glects the complex, real-world interrelation betwee n s amen ess and dif
ference. Within producing organizations, for exam ple, dive rsity of
traits and tastes makes available different p erspectives and talen ts that
inc rease the likelihood of solving complex problems. Any accompany
ing increases in communication costs accordingly may find j ustific a
tion in the improved quality of results. 1 1 8 More broadly, most people
have a taste for difference, albeit to widely varying degrees. Two p ref
erences operate-one for cost-reducing homogeneity and the other
for costly but stimulating difference 1 1 9-with the inevitable tradeoffs
between cost and varie ty depending on subjective tastes and differing
from individual to individual.
A second-best world presents no basis for predicting that the
tradeoffs emerging i n an environment of free individual interaction
will be optimal. Barriers including information asymmetries, free
rider problems, and strategic concealment will prevent optimal out
comes. 1 20 A number of possibilities result. One is that the assimila
tion story, despite its currency, describes a suboptimally homogenous
social result. In a dynamic environment, the societal whole could
emerge better off if Latinos/ as were left to make their own decisions
about learning Engl ish and acquiring Anglo cultural traits. If slow as
similation resulted from their decisions, Anglos would gain the spil
lover benefit of closer proximity to Latin American culture . Cultural
acquaintance in turn would generate valuable opportunities for An
glos in the markets of increasingly robust Latin American economies.
In this scenario, Official English perversely channels Anglos toward
costly insularity whereas investment in cross-cultural learning opportu
nities provides the more promising means to an optimal assimilation
equilibrium.
c.

Nonconvergent Preferences

A more complex outcome emerges if we take this line of reason
ing in a different direction and consider the possibility that an eco
nomic optimum with a multicultural inclination may no t be the
politically preferred result. Assume th e present equilibrium IS eco118

1 19

See Cooter,

sujJra n o te 39, at 1 42 .

Education about the incidents of other cul tures a n d languages lowers costs of cross

cultural communication and thus e n h ances an i n dividual ' s ability to e nj oy the d i tieren t
traits o f others. For a formal model suggesting this conclusi o n , see ·william Brei t

& Joh n

Horowitz, Discrim ination and Diversity: i'vlarket a n d No n-i'vfarket SP!tings, 8 4 P L IB. CI-I OICE

70 ( 1 995) .

1 20

See id. at

68.

B.

63, 65-
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n o rnically suboptimal due to h omogeneity. Under these Circum
stances, government inte rvention to move society toward a more
optimal level of interaction can find j ustification in theory. In prac
tice, however, a policymaker considering this intervention would e n
counter the enormous problems of ascertaining the location and
cause of the suboptimal equilibrium and of articulating a strategy for
shifting it to a point of greater p reference satisfactio n.
Suppose the policymaker undertakes a state-of-the-art study, con:
cluding that Americans have a deficient level of multicultural knowl
edge. In response, the policymaker proposes an extensive and
mandatory program of multicultural education for grades one
through twelve. 1 2 1 This program , by hypothesis, would make most
m embers of the majority economically b etter off in the long run . N ev
erth eless, it is likely that the program would be politically infeasible in
many American communities due to a perception (if not a reality) of
excessive governmental invasion of the in dividual ' s zone of choice
with respect to matters of acculturation. 1 22
Suppose we modify the program by employing a carrot-and-stick
approach. This approach could, for example, make eligible for fed
eral college loans only those students who have received th e approved
multicultural education. We suspect that critics would denounce as
coercive even this modified program . Without enfo rceable govern
ment action to the contrary, cultural preferences could continue to
diverge from the economic o ptimum . 1 23
The carrot-and-stick approach to multicultural education is diffi
cult to distinguish from Official English if one narrowly views it as a

1 2 1 A full exploration of multicultural programs in the schools is beyond the scope of
this Article. We note that particularly in New York City these programs have gained accept
ance as crucial for what it means to treat students from differen t cultural backgrounds as
equal. One curren t aspect of the debate around these programs in New York con ce rns the
point in time at which schools should teach Spanish to all students. This debate recognizes
that Anglo children can be economically disadvantaged in cities with a substantial Latino/ a
minori ty if they arc not fluent in Spanish. See generally NATH."'N GLAZER, vVE ARE ALL MuL
TICULTURALISTS N o w ( 1 997) ( discussing the changing face of America and h ow i t will infl u
ence our future) .
1 22 Cf Lisa D . Del pit, The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People 's
Children, in BEYOND SILENCED VoicEs: CL-\SS, R.\cE, At'JD GENDER IN U:-:rTED STA.TES ScHOOLS
1 1 9 , 1 2 2-23 (Lois Weiss & Michelle Fine eels. , 1 993) (asserting that issues of power are
enacted in classrooms and that school cul tures accordingly are based on the cul tures of the
middle and upper classes) .
123
Breit and H orowitz suggest that this sort of mandatory education could have the
proj ected effect of shifting cultural prefe rences to their economic optimum i n the small
numbers situation of a university curriculum. See Breit & Horowitz, sujna note 1 1 9, at 6870. They qualify the suggestion, however, by noting that " there is no certain ty that a con
sensus will arise over the optimal amount of 'familiarity' [with other cultures] to impose"
and no way to assure that a given policy assures th e intended results. !d. at 69-70.
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legal manipulation of a zone of choice for cultural freedom . 1 24 Like
the education program, Official E nglish manipulates tradeoffs be
tween cost incurrence and cultural attachment. By withh olding pub
lic services from Latinos/ as, Official E nglish i nduces a higher level of
English-language cost incurrence than otherwise would occur, making
it cheaper for Anglos to deal with Latinos/ as. Of course, Offi cial Eng
lish also could yield economic benefits to affected Latinos/ as . But be
cause Latinos/as would not have pursued these benefits voluntarily,
they would be indistinguishable from those yielded through man
dated multiculturalism.
d.

Summary

Thus far, our analysis does not preclude the possibility that Offi
cial English could be Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 1 2 5 This p ossibility follows
from the numbers: the majority gets the benefit of lower costs at the
minority's expense. But the questioning p rocess we have undertaken
does highlight some significant counterfactual possibilities. Rational
solidarity across society's many minority groups could lead an overall
maj ority to prefer forbearance of the economic benefit of state-im
posed monolingualism. In the alternative , monolingualism entails op
portunity costs that could alter the Kaldor-Hicks bottom line .

3.

Economic Incentives To Learn English

Let us assume that Anglo resistance to Spanish language and cul
ture is embedded and that the opportunity costs of monolingualism
L 24

This Article's analysis does signal a point of material distincti o n , h owever. One can
state the point b o th i n the economic terms of this Part I I and in terms of the ideal of the
free person we describe in Part I I I .
Economically, the difference lies i n asymmetric incentives. When Latinos/as have a
powerful economic incen tive to acculturate themselves as Americans, Anglos do n o t per
ceive immediate gains from multi cultural education, even if these gains accrue as a l ong
run proposition. One can defend from a welfare perspective mandatory multicul tural edu
cation, but cannot defend Official Engl ish .
From the poin t of view of the ideal of the free person , the difference between a mul
ticultural educational program, fairly designed and applied, and an E n glish O n ly regime is
that the first is inviting while the second is degrading. Part III indicates that groups and
individuals only are reasonable to the degree they recognize that they can n o t bind others
to n o rms to whi c h they themselves would not agree to be bound. See infra n otes 29 1 -9 4 and
accompanying text. This recogni tion implies a basis for defending multicultural education
as a means to the end of equal dignity, even when mandated. Although society must allow
to all groups cultural expression, there is always a danger that the m aj o ri ty culture simply
can assert its superiority, thus violating the conditions of reasonable cooperati o n . Mul
ticultural educati o n protects against this danger.
1 2 5 That is, i t results in most people being better off even as i t leaves some people
worse off, with the aggregate gai n outweighing the aggregate loss. See, e.g. , Ken n eth G.
D au-Sch midt, Smoking in the Washroom of the Chicago School: A Reply to Crespi, 22 LAw & Soc.
lNQ. 1 7 1 , 1 77-78 ( 1 997) ( "A policy is said to be Kaldor-Hicks efficient if those who are
made better off by the policy would pay more for adop ti on of the policy than those who are
hurt by the policy would pay to avoid adoption of the policy. " ) .
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appear to be low so Offi cial English seems to be welfare improving on
a Kaldor-Hicks analysis. The economic analysis is still not complete .
I t remains to b e seen whether the likely level o f Latino/ a acquisition
of E nglish is appreciably lower in a world of free choice than it would
be in a world in which the government wields a stick. If Latinos/as
are not less likely to acquire English skills by free choice, then Official
English with its intrinsic capacity for perverse effects may not b e worth
the trouble .
The analysis that ascribes desirable cost attributes t o a lingua
franca implies that members of linguistic minorities have a high-pow
ered incentive, which derives fro m the employment market, to learn
the majority language. 1 2 6 Since entry of members of the linguistic mi
nority into a given firm or workplace means additional communica
tion costs, all other things being equal , a majority-group employer
either will avoid h iring m embers of the linguistic minority or, if it
chooses to integrate, will pay minority employees less to compensate
for the resulting increase in costs (and decrease in profits ) not in
curred by competing segregated firms . 1 2 7 The monolingual members
of the minority group will "bear the cost of in tergroup communica
tion . " 1 28 Employment discrimination will persist while the communi
cation costs of integration persist. 1 2 9 Members of th e language
minority may solve the problem of employment discrimination by in
curring the cost of learning the maj o rity language. In effect, for any
given skill level the minority must make a greater human capital in
vestment than the maj ority . l 3 o
Despite their greater investment, members of the language mi
nority may encounter obstacles on the road to wage parity. Assume,
for example , that newly bilingual members of the minority seek the
same wage as members of the maj ority but that monolingual members
of the language minority offer the same labor for a lower wage . The
bilingual and maj ority language speakers now could find themselves
competing with minori ty monolinguals . Although the costs of com
munication dictate that a rational employer will prefer a mon olingual
workplace , they do not necessarily determine the language chosen.
An employer could invest in learning the minority language or in pay
ing a higher wage to a bilingual supervisor or supervisors , enabling
itself to employ a workforce monolingual in the minority language at
1 26
1 27

See

su

p ra

n o tes

1 0 2-04

and accompanying text.

Th is model assume s the absence of regulation successfully mandating equal pay for

e q ual work.
1 28
Lang,

sujmt n o te 1 1 3,

at 373;

see

also Wel c h , s upra n o te

1 1 2, at 2 3 1 ( a rguing that the

m i n oritY bears the cost of i n tegration i n the workplac e ) .
1 29
See Breit & Horowi tz, supra note 1 1 9 , at 7 1 -72 ( n o ti n g that as the transaction costs

of i n te racti on , such as communication problems, decrease, i n teraction wi l l i n c rease ) .
1 30
See Lang, s up m n o te 1 1 3, a t 376.
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the l ower wage. The higher the number of workers per bilingual su
p ervisor, the more viable this option becomes for the employer. 1 3 1
Despite this caveat, incentives to learn the majori ty language
sh oul d remain powerful. 1 32 The prevailing cost bias in favor of segre
gated, monolingual workplaces assures the strength of those i ncen
tives. The minority can retain its language and its e conomic
independence o nly by restricting itself to segregated workplaces and
to teams that are monolingual in the minority language . Segmenta
tion into certain occupations may result, along with overcrowding in
each . 1 33 Strati fication also will occur because highly verbal manage
rial and professional opportunities will be unavailable to members of
th e language minority. 1 34 Latinos/as understand this reality very
well. 1 35 In the words of the Dominican singer Juan Luis Guerra: "pues
n o hablamos ingles/ni a la Mitsubishi/ . . . ni a la Chevrolet. " 1 3 6
Official English, Sorting, and Rent Seeking

B.

1.

Latino and Latina Sorting

The economic factors that create a p owerful incentive for Eng
lish-language acquisition also explain immigrants ' tendency to settle
in enclave communities. A simple j urisdictional sorting model illus
trates this point. 1 3 7 Assume an English-speaking federation with ten
states of equal size, each with an international port of e ntry. At t=O a
Latino/a minori ty has immigrated into the federati o n , has settled
evenly across the ten states , and now constitutes ten percent of the
federation's population Y '� 8 Assume further that ( 1 ) movement within
the federation is costless, ( 2 ) it has unlimited j ob opportunities, ( 3 ) all
the Latinos/ as have become citizens, and ( 4) most Latinos/ as are bi1 3 1 The company wil l have to compensate the bilingual supervisor for her special skill ,
of course. See generally Booth, supra note 84 ( reponin g that bilingual and monolingual
supervisors have demanded higher pay to speak Spanish ) . Because the cost advan tage is
greatest with a l ow supervisor-to-worker ratio, one woul d expect this pattern, and any re
sul ting negative impact for English-acquisition incentives, to show up with respect to j obs at
lower skill levels. See Lang, supra note 1 1 3 , at 373-74.
1 3 2 Studies show that there is little labor-market substitution between n ew arrivals and
earlier immigrant generations. See infra n ote 270 and accompanying text.
1 33
See Breton & Mieszkowski, sujna note 1 0 1 , at 270; Lang, supra n o te 1 1 3 , at 73-74.
1 34 See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 1 0 1 , at 270.
1 35 A5 the above evidence on English-language education i ndicates. See supra n otes 5457 and accompanying text.
1 3 6 JuAN LUis GuERRA, El Costa de la Vida [ The Cost of Living] , on AREITO ( Polygram
Latino 1 99 2 ) ( translating as "Since we don't speak Engl ish , got no Mitsubishi, got no
Chevrolet" ) .
! 3 7 For a review of the sorting literature, see William W. Bratton & Joseph A. Me
Cabery, The New Economics ofjurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second
Best ·world, 86 Gw. L.J. 20 1 , 239-43 ( 1 997 ) .
1 :�s
Assume further that no state has a special geographic connection to the home
coun try and that each immigrant has made an i ndividual decision and had n o n e twork ties
to the federatio n .
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lingual but prefer to speak Spanish because doing so facilitates
cheaper communication. Given these assumptions, the model
predicts that between t=O and t=l the Latinos/as will resettle, concen
trating their population in a smaller number of states.
Geographical concentration of the Latino/a p opulatio n gener
ates additional opportunities for transacting business i n Spanish , cre
ating both employment and trade opportunities for which a relative
disability with English presents no barrier. As the Latino/a p opula
tion concentrates, some Anglos may respond by moving out of the
target states. 1 3 9 Eth nic and cultural bias p rovides one reason for such
a reaction-Anglos apparently prefer to live in areas populated exclu
sively by other Anglos. 1 40 Economics provides another reason for this
behavior. As an Anglo ' s immediate neighborhood populates with
Spanish speakers , the seigniorial value of English declines, even
though natio nal economic integration and dominant Anglo numbers
assure that it n ever completely disappears in any political subdivision.
This simple sorting model predicts, all other thi ngs being equal,
that Latino/ a concentration eventually will create a voting maj o rity in
one state . 1 4 1 This model depends o n heroic assumptio ns and accord
ingly is only suggestive . It noneth eless suffices to explain why Lati
n os/as have not settled evenly across the U nited States and, so long as
there continue to be substantial numbers of first-generatio n immi
grants , why they cannot be expected to disperse from enclave commu
nltles. For first-generation Latinos/as speaking limited E nglish,
opportunities i n enclaves will b e superior to those in Anglo communi
ties . 1 42 The model therefore requires us to qualify our description of
a high-powered incentive to learn English . But the qualification is mi
nor: an integrated national economy and an overwhelming Anglo ma
j ority ensure that English-language and bilingual employment
opportunities will outnumber Spanish-language opportunities, even
for those who live in enclaves .
Latino/a sorting results fro m both economic incentives and cul
tural preferences. Since sorting coexists with an independent incen
tive to learn English, it implies a long-term barrier to assimilation only
to the extent that the Anglo community takes actions that retard the
1 39

Cf David P. Kasakove, Note, New York State Association of Realtors, I nc. v. Shaffer:

When the Second Circuit Chooses Between Free Speech and Fair Housing, Who Wins ?, 61 B ROOK. L.

REv. 397, 422 ( 1 995) (discussing " tipping," which " is the sociol ogical term used to refer to
th e critical point at which whites . . . leave a c ommunity, because of black e ntry i nto the
n eighborhood"' ) .
1 40
The population-sorting literature p rovides ample empirical support for this point.
See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 37, at 242 & n . 1 69.
141
Concen tration in two of the ten states and a slight increase in the population of
Latinos/as could m ean a voting maj ority in two states.
142
CJ Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 3 7 0 ( noti n g that minori ty-language speakers likely will
experience "occupational segregation") .
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o rdi nary course o f population dispersion in pursuit o f e conomic op
portunity. The model suggests that English Only legislation conceiva
bly could serve j ust such a purpose.

2.

English Only as an Entry Barrier

Return to t=O in the original ten-state model. A state wishing to
discourage Latino/ a in-migration due to sorting can make itself mar
ginally less desirable by enacting a restrictive Official English statute.
If public services in Spanish remain available in the other states, 1 4 3
then the Official English state has erected an effective barrier against
Latino/a in-migration. Indeed, assuming costless movement, the state
can expect out-migration of its present Latino/a p opulation. Of
course, because the other states are free to copy the legislation, the
long-term efficacy of this strategy remains questionable . A "race to
the bottom" could result, with all states adopting Official E nglish stat
utes . 1 44 Ironically, in that event, the Latinos/as have a heightened
incentive to concentrate in enclave settlements . Once all states adopt
Official E nglish, each potential target state offers the same set of costs
and benefits to Latino/a citizens. Only a sorting process can differen
tiate the states again: a solid Latino/a majo rity in one state supplies
the means to remove even a consti tutional Official English mandate .

3.

English Only and Domestic Interest Groups

We can further modify this public choice analysis of Official Eng
lish to explain domestic politics in a state with a Latino/a minority
and a restrictive Official English statute . Hypothesize a single state
and assume the following: ( 1 ) a ten percent Latino/a minority, many
but not all of whom are bilingual, ( 2 ) an even distributio n across the
state of Latinos/ as, ( 3 ) no bilingual Anglos, ( 4 ) residents who all are
citizens and taxpayers, ( 5 ) no possibility of in-migration of Latinos/ as
from other states, (6) a monolingual provision of public goods and
services, and ( 7 ) a government operating in pursuit of the public in
terest, meaning it distributes the return of the highest p ossible supply
of public goods as equally as possible to all taxpaying citizens.
Keeping the aforementioned assumptions in mind, consider the
following scenario . The government concludes that the p rovision of
monolingual services is inconsistent with its notion of th e public inter
est and decides to provide bilingual public goods and services to the
H3 This conclusion rests on the assumption that complete information is available to
all sides.
1 44
This race to the bottom is analogous to the result that follows from applying j uris
dictional competition theory to welfare p rovisions for the poor. In the standard model,
wealth redistribution must proceed at the centralized, federal l evel because the states have
an incentive to encourage poor people to move out by lowering the level of the welfare
provision. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 37 , at 2 1 7-3 1 .
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extent feasible. An anti-Latino/a politi cal entrepreneur responds by
putting a restrictive Official English provision o n the ballot. The An
glos have a cost incentive to vote in favor of the initiative. To the
extent that bilingual government imposes additional c osts on all tax
payers solely for the purpose of providing Latinos/ as an effective p ro
rata return for taxes paid, self-interested Anglos have no reaso n to
support bilingual government.
Even if the marginal increase in cost that bilingual government .
causes is quite low, a discrete class of Anglos will have a h igh-powered
incentive to work to insure the measure 's success. This class will c on
sist of present and prospective Anglo public employees. If the state
provides bilingual public services, then bilingual Latinos/as will h ave
a qualification advantage with respect to j ob openings. The degree of
that advantage will depend on the scope of the decision to p rovide
bilingual services, the distribution of the Latino/a p opulatio n, and
the presence or absence of economies of scale in the p roviding of
services. If the population of Latinos/ as is evenly distributed and the
government provides all public services through small offices spread
thickly across the state, bilingual Latinos/as could have a qualification
advantage for virtually every public position. If the distribution of La
tinos/ as is uneven and economies of scale have encouraged the devel
opment of a small number of large government offices spread
unevenly across the state, then bilingual ability will not be a universal
qualification . Even so , the decision to provide bilingual services s till
c ould disrupt extremely the expectations of entrenched Anglo civil
servants.

4.

English Only and Local Politics

The two models presented thus far-the multijurisdictional-mi
gration modeP4 5 and the public-service provision modeP 46-can com
bine to thicken this rational expectations description of state politics .
For example, consider a state with multiple internal tiers of elected
government-counties, cities, and towns. Assume furthe r that the
state has a substantial Latino/a minority that remains well short of a
state-level voting majo rity, but through the ordinary process of settle
ment and sorting has gained voting majorities in several p olitical sub
divisions within the state . To the extent that officials in those political
subdivisions have discretion regarding the public-service provisio n ,
Anglo public employees in those districts will have an incentive to
work for Official English at the state level. There , Anglos still consti
tute a maj ority, even as the Latinos/as elect their own to the local city
hall, sheriff s office, and school board. A state-level statute, if restric1 45
1 46

See
See

supra P art
supra Part

II.B . l .
I I . B . 2-3.

-
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tively drafted, can hard-wire English language seigniorage at the local
level. 1 4 7

5.

Summary: The Multijurisdictional and Single-State Models

Official English emerges from this public choice analysis as the
functional equivalent of Jim Crow legislation. l 48 In the multijurisdic
tional-migration model, Official E nglish operates as a tariff that dis
courages in-migration of a minority that the maj ority deems
undesirable. To the extent that Latino/a in-migration implies (or is
perceived to imply) increased labor-market competition for certain
Anglos, 1 49 we find a textbook example of a privileged group using law
to perpetuate its economic dominance and to retard the operatio n of
market forces that impair its position. In the single-state model, Offi
cial English affects Latino/a subordination more directly, if only with
respect to access to public j obs and services. In this scenario, the ma
jority again uses its legislative power in the Jim Crow tradition to con
tain a minority's economic aspirations.
1 4 7 The back-and-forth experience of Dade County, Florida with Offi cial English re
flects this scenario. See supra note 68. But it is important to note that elected officials are
only beginning to feel Latino/ a voting power, even within the enclave states. See, e.g., Todd
S. Purdum, California G. O.P. Faces a Crisis as Hispanic Voters Tum A way, N .Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
1 997, at A1 ( noting that politicians are beginning to recognize the importance of appeal
ing to growing numbers of Latino/a voters) . The following chart catalogs the number of
Latino/ a elected offi cials at the state and local levels in 1 985 and 1 994:
Public Official

1 985

1 994

State executives and legislators
County and municipal officials
Judicial and law enforcement
Education and school boards
Total

119
1 ,3 1 6
517
1 , 1 85
3, 1 47

1 99
2, 1 97
65 1
2 ,4 1 2
5 ,459

SouRCE: HISPA!'>� IC ArviERJCA!"' S: A STATISTICAL SouRCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 97.

Some h ave attributed past electoral failures for Latinos/as to lmv levels of voter regis
tration and turnout. See, e.g. , Charles S. Bullock, III & Susan A. MacManus, Stmctuml Fea
tures of Municipalities and the Incidence of Hispanic Councilmernbers, 7 1 Soc. Sci . Q. 665, 678
( 1 990) (showing that given adequate voter participation, Latino/a representation on city
councils grows as the percentage of Latinos/ as in the population grows under a variety of
structural arrangements ) . In 1 992, the national Latino/a registration level was 35.0%,
compared with 70. 1 % for whites; turnout was 28. 9 % , compared with 63.6% for whites. See
HISPANIC AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL Sou RCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 98. Gerrymandering
also has occurred, most famously in Los Angeles. Compare Chavez, supra note 61 , at 47
(noting that a court order created a voting district to give Latinos/as a seat on the L.A.
County Board of Supervisors) , with Hiopanics: More People than Power, supra note 49, at 32
(discussing a justice Department suit alleging that voting districts were deliberately drawn
in L.A. County to exclude Latinos/ as and other minorities from power) .
1 48
See Sole, supra note 2 1 , at 828-29.
1 49
This proposition is controversial when advanced in th e context of Latino/a immi
grants. See generally DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 209-5 1 ( concluding that some j obs are lost,
but not nearly as many as advocates of closed borders allege ) .
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Admittedly, these public choice scenarios cannot afford an exclu
sive account of Official English . Nativist ideology has independent
and powerful causal force , particularly in a time when norms h ave
arisen to foreclose direct expression of racist impulses in public dis
course. 1 5 0 The scenarios show how neatly these impulses dovetail with
rent incentives.
C.

Employment Discrimination and Latino and Latin a Incentives

The assimilation story cannot plausibly be applied as a norm ab
sent a concomitant and credible promise of equal economic opportu
nity. It is, after all , economic opportunity that gives immigrants
incentives to disperse fro m enclaves and to complete the p ro cess of
Americanization . Without equal economic opportunity, it is not clear
why we should expect dispersion and full assimilation.
But why should discriminatio n block application o f the assimila
tion norm to today ' s Latinos/as when early twentieth-centu ry eastern
and southern European arrivals also suffered and overcame signifi
cant national origin and religious discrimination? We suggest two an
swers. First, two wrongs do not make a right. It is one thing to intone
that immigrants should "pay their dues" when the dues are the costs
of learning English to achieve equal economic opportunity. It is quite
another to require them to undergo a vicious hazing process of indefi
nite duration. Gloria Anzaldua describes a youth 's expe ri ence of An
glo linguistic terrorism:
I remember being caught speaking Spanish at recess-that was
good for three licks on the knuckles with a sharp ruler. I remember
being sent to the corner of the classroom fo r " talking back" to the
Anglo teacher when all I was trying to do was tell her how to pro
nounce my name. "If you wan t to be An1erican, speak 'An1erican . '
If you don ' t like it, go back to Mexico, where you belong. " 1 5 1

Anzaldua's experience is not unique. 1 5 2
Second, it is not at all clear that the concept of "national origin"
discrimination, closely tied to those early twentieth-ce ntury immi
grants, adequately describes the discrimination barrier c onfronting
Latinos/as. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans , Cubans, Dominicans, and Cen
tral and South Americans descend from Native Americans and Afri
cans as well as from Europeans. In their responses to the 1 980 census,
1 50
151

See Tatalovich, supra note 67, at 8 1 -82 ( making this point with admirable rigor) .
GLORIA fu'iZALDUA, BORDERLANDS/ L".. FRONTERA 5 3 ( 1 987) .

1 5 2 Rosa Rosales, a spokesperson for the League of U n i ted Mexican C i tizens, recalls
going to school under a regime that " threatened to have our mouths washed out with soap
and our knuckles hit with rulers when we spoke Spanish in the hallways. " Stefanie Soott &
Nicole Foy, Judge 's English Decision Rapped, SAN A'ITONIO Ex P RE SS-N Ews, Aug. 30, 1 995, avail
able in 1 995 v\'L 9500 1 54 .
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forty percent of Latinos/ as classified themselves as neither black nor
white but as "other . " 1 5 3 These responses suggest that for many Lati
nos/as, their "visibility" stems less from their lack of acculturation
than from their skin color. 1 54
Discrimination-whether ethnic, racial, or a combinatio n-pre
vents assimilation. 1 55 To the extent that Latinos/as face discrimina
tion, the appropriate analogy for the Latino/a enclave is not the turn
of-the-century immigrant community, but the Mrican American com
munity of the contemporary inner city. 1 5 6 Of course, an acknowledg
ment that Latinos/as are targets of discrimination requires further
examination of our description of a high-powered Latino/ a incentive
to acculturate as Americans. Discrimination reduces returns on
human-capital investments , and reduced proj ected returns lower the
present value of a proposed investment. A persistent residual income
differential due t o discrimination means that a rational Latino/a
makes a smaller human-capital i nvestment than a similarly situated
white Anglo. Accordingly, Latinos/as have a reduced incentive to ac
culturate. In addition, the Latino/a perception that heightened dis
crimination barriers exist outside of enclave communities lessens the
incentive to disperse in search of economic opportunity. 1 57 If maxi
mal assimilation is the objective , Official English is the wrong tool. A
vigorously enforced antidiscrimination law will be more successful.
1.

Evidence of Economic Discrimination

Statistical evidence strongly suggests that markets convert per
sonal skills into economic outcomes differently for Latinos/as than
for white Anglos. The studies we describe below detail adverse eco1 53

Forty-four percent answered white, and 3.9% said black. See Clara E. Rodriguez,
The Effect of Race on Puerto Rican Wages, in HISPANICS IN THE L>\BOR FoRCE 77, 77 ( Edwin
Melendez et a!. eels., 1991 ) .

1 5 4 Nativist regulation, viewed from this perspective, stems less from a need to see ac
tual assim ilati on and integration than from a racist n eed to ascribe fault.
1 55
For a discussion of racism as a motivating force i n contemporary debates about
immigration policy, see Kevin R. Johnso n , The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New,
Something Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMICRr\NTS OuT! , supra note 1 1 , at 1 65 , 1 73-8 1 .
1 56 See Clark, supra note 4 1 , a t 598-99 (showing considerable evidence of economic
segmen tation among immigrant.-; in d ifferent California counties and suggesting that local
ization of some Latino/a groups may be contributing to the creation of an immigrant
underclass similar to the existing l ocalized African American pattern ) .
The Latino/ a enclave, like the African American enclave, emerges as a place of safety
from the world outside: "All brown all around, we are safe. But watch us drive into a neigh
borhood of another color and our knees go shaki ty-shake and our car windows get rolled
up tight and our eyes look straight. Yeah. That is how i t goes and goes." CISNEROS, supra
note 60, at 29.
1 5 7 See H ing, supra note 1 5 , at 89 1 .
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nomic treatment of Latinos/ as through the use of varied data sets and
different methods of investigation. 1 58
Latinos/as consistently earn less than whites , and little progress
in closing the historic income differential has occurred during the last
thirty years. 1 59 The average family income of Latinos/ as was 69 . 2 % of
whites ' in 1 973, and it fell to 62.9% in 1 987. By 1 99 3 , h owever, it
climbed to 70.0% , 160 which was roughly the same as the 1 973 level .
Language barriers and other educational and skill differentials par
tially explain these figures. The studies yield various quantifications
of the impact of these differences. Scholars have found that language
abilities account for income differentials ranging fro m as little as four
percent to as much as thirty-three p ercent. 1 6 1 Differences in the par
ticular samples that the studies compare and in the m e th odologies
that the studies apply explain the variations.
But language barriers, skill differentials, and other productivity
factors do not completely explain the differential . Studies that adj ust
1 5 8 T h e text paraphrases Glenn Loury's description of t h e literature respecting African
Americans. See Loury, supra note 97, at 1 1 8 ; see also William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L.
Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 1 2 ]. EeoC\.
PERSP. 63, 63 ( 1 998) (surveying the l i terature as a whole and concluding that " [ t] he evi
dence is ubiquitous" that discriminatory treatment in the labor market contributes greatly
to the racial and gender disparity in the American economy ) .
1 59
See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 56-57 & tbl. 3. l .
1 60
See H ISPANI C AM ERIC<>u"ls: A STATISTICAL SouRcEBOOK, supra note 50, at 1 47. The
complete raw i ncomes for 1 980 and 1 993 are as follows:
Latino/a

V\1hite

22,59 1
22,88 6

30,92 1
32,960

27,594
30,291

36,264
43,285

Median
1 980
1 993

Mean
1 980
1 993

SouRcE: U.S. BuREAU OF THE CENsus, CuRRENT P oPuLATION REPoRTs: lNC01vi E,
POVEKIY, A.N D VALUATION OF NONCASH BENEFITS- 1 993 at 5 tbJ.2, reprin ted in
HISPANIC A:viERJC"u'JS: A STATISTICAL SouRCEBOOK, supra note 50, at 1 47.

1 61 See Gilles Grenier, The Effects of Language Characteristics on the Wages of Hispanic-Amnc
ican Males, 1 9 ]. HuM. REsouRCES 35, 50 ( 1 984) (concluding that "language attributes," like
speaking Spanish during childhood, may account for up to one-third of income differen
tials between Latino and non-Latino males) ; Cordelia vV. Reimers, Labor Niarket Discrimina
tion Against Hispanic and Black Nien, 65 REv. E co 0: . & STAT. 570, 576-77 ( 1 983) (finding that
poor E nglish accounts for 1 8 % lower earnings for Puerto Ricans and four percent to 1 4 %
for other main Latino/a groups) ; Cordelia Reimers, The Wage Structure of Hi;panic lvlen:
Implications for Policy, 65 Soc. Sc1. Q. 40 1 , 407-l l ( 1 984) [ hereinafter Reim ers, Wage Struc
ture] (estimating wage functions for Latinos) ; see also ScHOEN! ET AL. , s upra note 3, at 28-29
( finding that differences in completed education could explain one-half of the 1 990 wage
gap of Mexican immigrants in California and one-third of the wage gap of Central Ameri
can immigrants in California) .
One can infer that continued arrival of large numbers of non-English-speaki ng La
ti no/a immigrants retards the rate of closure of the Latino/a-\vhite Anglo income differen
tial , obscuring economic gains made by existing residents.

1

1
I
1
1
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for differentials in human capital find a residual gap . DeFreitas ' s
study, for example, compares the incomes of white , Puerto Rican, and
M exican males. 1 62 All of the men he sampled had been born in the
United States, were fluent in English, and had lived in the same met
rop olitan area for at least five years . 1 63 The study found that Puerto
Ricans ' income was 62.6% of whites ' , and Mexicans' income was
74. 7 % of whites' . 1 64 It also found that for college graduates, Puerto
Ricans earned 70 .0% of what whites earned, while for M exicans, the
perc entage was 74.5 % . 1 65 When the study controlled for age as well as
education, Mexicans fared better, earning 95 . 1 % as much, while Pu
erto Ricans earned 92.6% as muchJ66 Other studies have concluded
that the residual differential, an indirect measure of the impact of
discrimination on wages, for Puerto Ricans is 1 8 . 0 % . 1 67 The literature
offers a range from nine to fifteen percent for the residual differential
in income between Mexicans and whites. 1 68
Comparative figures o n "returns to sch ooling"-percent figures
representing the change in earnings associated with each additional
year of schooling-that Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez generated
point in a similar direction. 1 69 In 1 970, the figure for U nited States
natives was 7 . 9 % , and by 1 990 it had increased to 1 0 . 3 % . 1 7 0 The com1 62
1 63
1 64
1 65
1 66

See

DEFREITAS,

supra note 6 , a t 7 1 -73.

See id. at 7 1 .
See id. at 7'2 tbl . 3. 7.
See id.

See id. (showing the result> for persons with over 1 6 years of education who were
ages 30-34) .
1 67 See Reimers, Wage Structure, supra note 1 6 1 , at 407, 4 1 3 ( noting also a 1 '2 % differen
tial for other Latinos/as and a six percen t differential for Mexicans) .
1 6 8 Studies show h uman-capital, adj usted earnings differentials between white and
Mexican American males as fol lows: Jeremiah Cotton, Nlore on the "Cost" of Being a Black or
Mexican A merican Male Worker 66 Soc. SCI . Q. 867, 883 ( 1 985) ( reportin g a treatmen t dif
feren tial of 1 4. 6 % , using 1 980 data) ; J ames D . Gwartney & James E. Long, The Relative
Earnings of Blacks and Other Niinorities, 3 1 lNous. & L\B . Rn. REv. 336, 34'2-44 & tbl.4 ( 1 978)
( reporting a residual differential of nine percen t, using 1 970 data) ; Dudley L. Poston , Jr. et
al . , Earnings Differences Between A nglo and 1\.iexican American lvfale Worke�s in 1 960 and 1 970:
Changes in the "Cost " of Being Niexican American, 57 Soc. SCI. Q. 6 1 8 , 6'25 ( 1 976) ( reporting
1 3.46% to 1 6.57% depending on age , using 1 970 data) ; Patricia A. Taylor & Susan Walker
Shields, Nfexican A mericans and Employment Inequality the Federal Civil Service, 65 Soc. Scr. Q.
38 1 , 384, 386 ( 1 984) (finding a statistically significant difference in Mexican American and
Anglo salaries in the civil service, with only Gvo-thirds of the variance being explained by
employment characteristics) ; Naomi Turner Verdugo & Richard R. Verdugo, Earn ings Dif
ferentials A mong ivfexican A me1ican, Black, and White 1\!Jale Workers, 65 Soc. Scr . Q. 4 1 7, 4'24-'25
( 1 984) (noting that discrimination accounts for 1 9 % of the gap, using 1 98 1 data) . B u t see
Stephen J . Trejo, H'hy Do iVIexican Americans Earn Low Wages ?, ] 05 J . PoL EcoN. ] '235, 1 245
( 1 997) (showing that Mexican Americans earn l ow wages due to h uman-capital deficien
cies and not clue to smaller labor-market rewards) .
1 69 See ScHOEN! ET AL. , supra note 3, at 55-56 & tbl .4.6.
,

1 70

See id. at 56 tbl.4.6.
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parable 1 970 figure for M exican Americans educated in the United
States was 6 . 4 % , but by 1 990 it had decreased to 5 . 3 % . 1 7 1
These figures, which are the product of regression analyses of
census or personnel data, 1 72 fall short of affirmative proof of em ploy
ment discrimination because they do not foreclose the p ossibility that
other factors, such as secular changes in the relevant j o b base 1 7 3 or
i nformation problems concerning immigration status, 1 74 also contrib
ute to the residual income gap. 1 75 Therefore, at best they represent
an "upper bound" measure of discrimination's effects . 1 7 6 A different
and less well-developed line of empirical research , h owever, ap
proaches the problem fro m a different angle to produce affirmative
showings of discriminatory behavior. Audit studies of m atched white
and Latino/a job seekers reveal statistically significant differentials in
job search results for whites and Latinos/as. 177
1 7 1 See id. Meanwhile, the 1 990 figure for immigrants born in Canada and the U nited
Kingdom, as wel l as educated in the United States, was 8.3% and for immigrants born in
Japan, Korea, and China, as wel l as educated in the United States, was 1 3 . 1 %. See id. at 5657 & tb1 .4.6.
1 72 See id. app. at 69-74 (describing the data and regression analyses for the data we
reference) .
1 73 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 89.
1 74 See ScHOE"-'I ET AL. , supra note 3, at 58 (" [T]he wage penalty for being undocu
mented may be as high as 7-1 0 percent. " ) . Schoeni, McCarthy, and Vernez also mention a
special statistical discrimination factor-the difficulty of distinguishing l egal from illegal
immigrants. See id. To the extent that illegals present legal risks to the employer, one can
expect difficulty in effecting informational separation to depress wages for all Mexicans.
See id. at 57-58. Alberto Davila, Alok K. Bohara, and Rogelio Saenz make the same point.
See Alberto Davila et al., Accent Penalties and the Earnings of Jv[exican Americans, 74 Soc. SCI
Q. 902, 903-05 ( 1 993) . Their study finds that independent of English-speaking proficiency,
heavily-accented Mexican Americans earn significantly lower wages than nonaccented
Mexican Americans. See id. at 905. I n addition, they find that accen te d M exican Ameri
cans pay more for their accents than do accented Germans and I talians. See id. at 9 1 4.
1 75 For further discussion, see James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 1 2 J . EcoN.
PERSP. 1 0 1 , 1 03-07 ( 1 998) (warning against reading discrimination into the disparity in
hiring of whites over blacks when interpreting the residual wage gap ) .
1 7 6 For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies employed,
see Darity & Mason, supra note 1 58 , at 67-68.
1 77 See, e.g. , Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., JV[easuring Employment Discrimination Through Con
trolled Experiments, in NRJCA.N A.rviERJCANS AND P osT-lNDUSTRL;\1. l..ABoR iVlARKETS 77, 88-89 &
tbl . 3 (James B. Stewart ed. , 1 997) (finding a rate of discrimination in excess of 20% in
Latino/a-Anglo pairings, with Latinos being nearly three times more likely to experience
discrimination than Latinas) ; Michael Fix et al. , An Overview ofA uditingfor Discrimination, in
CLEAR AND Col'\'VI NCING EVI DENCE: MEASUREMENT OF DisCRJMINATI ON IN A M E RI CA l , 22
tbl . l . 3 (Michael Fix & Raymond J . Struyk eds., 1 993) ( finding that Latinos are three times
as likely as non-Latino whites to experience employment discrimination ) ; see also
Genevieve M. Kenney & Douglas A. Wissoker, An Analysis of the Con-elates of Discrimination
Facing Young Hispamc job-Seekers, 84 A.v l. EcoN. REv. 674, 676-77 ( 1 994) (finding that the
differential in response narrows as the Latinos go from the inquiry and preinterview stage
to the postimerview j ob-offer stage ) . The Latinos who get through the screening process
do better at the latter stage, although there still is a statistically significant differen tial in
job offers. See id. An inference of crude statistical discrimination arises-employers are
.
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An additional body of studies also warra nts mention . This body
investigates whether skin color contributes to the wider pat
work
of
tern of discrimination. One study, 17 8 whose findi ngs some have con
troverted, 1 79 looks for differences in earnings among gr oups of
Mexic an Americans divided according to their skin color-light, me
dium, and dark. The study adj usts for human-capi tal differentials
and concludes that the darkest, most Native American-looking group
members earn substantially less than their lighter-skinned counter
parts . 1 8 0 Another study compared the earnings of New York City Pu
erto Ricans who identify themselves as "other" in census reports with
those who identify themselves as "white . " 1 8 1 With everything else con
stant, males who identified themselves as nonwhite earned eight per
cent less than those who identified themselves as white . 1 8 2 Anzaldua
echoed the studies and the controversies they engender: "I am visi
ble-see this Indian face-yet I am invisible . I both blind them with

more accepting once they see that the Latin o applicant does n o t have expected u ndesir
able qualities.
Some have criticized audit s tudy methodology. See Heckman, supra note 1 7 5 , at 1 07- 1 1
(emphasizing that unobsen·ed variables can cause h i ring differen tials to be due to factors
other than discrimination ) . But see Kenneth J. Arrow, VVhat Has Economics to Say About Ra
cial Discrimination ?, 1 2 ]. Eco:--� . PERSP. 9 1 , 93 ( 1 998) (acknowledging the criti cism but con
cluding that " [ w] hile one can always invent hypotheses to explain away these results, there
is really n o reason not to draw the obvious conclusions " ) ; Darity & Mason , supra n o te 1 58,
at 79-81 (answeri ng Heckman and describing an audi t study designed to meet many of the
criticisms of the audit technique ) .
1 7 8 See Edward E . Telles & Edward Murguia, Phenotypic Discrimination and Income Differ�

ences Arnong J'viexican Americans, 7 1 Soc. SCI. Q. 682 ( 1 990) .
1 79 See A.lok K. Bohara & Alberto Davila, A Reassessment of the Phenotypic Discrimination
and Income Differences A mong iVIexican A mericans, 73 Soc. S c 1 . Q. l l 4 ( 1 99 2 ) (subj ecting the

same data to a different statistical methodology and finding n o support for the finding of
discrimination ) . But cf Edward E . Telles & Edward Murguia, The Continuing Significance of
Phenotype Among lviexican A mericans, 73 Soc. SCI. Q. 1 20 ( 1 99 2 ) ( concluding that a l inear
regression model is better suited to an analysis of Mexican American earn i n gs and that
Boharo and Davila's results do not alter the finding that dark phenotype translates i n to
lower earnings for Mexican Americans ) .
1 80 See Telles & Murguia, supra note 1 78, at 693. Telles and Marguia are surprised by
the lack of a significant differe ntial betwee n the light group and the m edium grou p . See id.
They suggest that the medium group members were heavily concentrated in both the con
struction industry and in unions, compensating for the greater labor-market e ndowment of
the light-skinned group members . See id. They also suggest that given the prevalence of
low skills across all three groups, the light and medium group m em bers did not face fur
ther discri m ination within their already circumscribed labor markets. See id. at 694; see also
Carlos H . Arce et a! . , Phenot_vpe and Life Chances A mong Chicanos, 9 HISPfu'liC J. BEH.W. SCI.
1 9, 25-30 ( 1 987) (dividing their sample i n to two phenotypical dimensions, skin color and
physical features, and finding that Chicanos with ligh ter skin and European features had
h igher socioeconomic status ) .
1 81
See Rodriguez, supra note 1 5 3 , at 86.
1 82
For females, th e differential was n o t statistically significant. See id. at 86-88. For
another study, see ·william Darity Jr. e t al., ExjJlaining Differences in Economic Performance
Among Racial and Ethnic Groups in the USA : The Data Examined, 55 AIVI . J . E co :--� . & Soc. 41 1 ,
422 ( 1 996) ( reporting, on basis of 1 980 and 1 990 census data, that black Latinos/ as suffer
proportionately more i ncome loss due to differential treatment than do white Latinos/ as) .
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my beak nose and am their blind spot. But I exist, we exist. They ' d
like to think I have melted i n the pot. But I haven ' t, we h ave n ' t. " 1 83

2.

The Economic Theory of Discrimination

The hypoth esis that discrimination negatively impacts Latino/a
incentives to assimilate also must endure testing in the framework of
the economic theory of discrimination. This theory poses three com
peting explanations for discriminatory behavior: taste, cost, and asymmetric information. 1 8 4 The three explanations in turn p rovide
conflicting long-term proj ections of the degree to which the market
will correct discriminatory behavior and therefore draw conflicting
conclusions about both Latino/a assimilation incentives and the need
for (and j ustifiable scope of) antidiscrimination legislatio n. The fol
lowing analysis shows that the asymmetric i nformati o n approach,
which projects that discrimination will persist over the long term ,
most accurately describes the situation of Latinos/ as and other immi
grant groups .
a.

Taste

Gary Becker's famous theory of discrimination1 85 as a p roduct of
a " taste for separation" is the foundation of the economics of discrimi
nation. Under Becker's theory, discriminatio n results from a taste for
segregation that employers and employees hold. 1 8 6 If this taste is
widespread, the target minority receives a lower wage i n the market
place and finds employment only with the least prej udiced employ
ers. 1 8 7 These employers benefit from a cost advan tage because
society's widespread taste for segregation depresses wages for minority
labor. In Becker's neoclassical setup , the nondiscriminatory employ
ers employ this cost advantage to drive discriminatory employers from
the market, and the wage differential falls over time. 1 88 The m arket's
eventual equilibrium always is n ondiscriminatory; hence, antidis1 83

supra note 1 5 1 , at 86.
the discussion will show, the cost and asymmetric information explanations are
closely related because asymmetric information implicates costs.
1 85 See GARY S. BECKER, THE EcoNOi'vliCS OF D ISCREvl!NATIOi': (2d eeL 1 97 1 ) .
1 8 6 See id. at l4.
1 87
See id. at 1 07.
1 8 8 See id. at 43-45; Kenneth J Arrow, 1Vfodels offob Discrimination, in RACIAL D ISCRIMINA
TlO:" 1 :--: Eco:-;o;-..II c LIFE 83, 86-87 (Anthony H . Pascal ed., 1972 ) . In a perfect market, a
person having a special preference must pay for i ts satisfaction, and any employee demand
ing special working conditions is paid less; thus, segregation is a higher cost mode of pro
duction. See Cooter, supm note 39, at 1 39-4 1 . We should note that discrimination
disappears in the Becker model " [ o] nly if the supply of en trepreneurship is perfectly elas
tic in the long run at zero price, so" that employers have no discretionary i ncome with
wh ich to enjoy their taste for discrimination. H eckman , supra note 1 75 , at 1 1 1 - 1 2 .
1 84
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crimination legislation is unnecessary 1 8 9 and is merely a transfer
mechanism that causes efficiency l osses. 1 9 0
b.

Cartels) Castes) and Dynamic Models

Subsequent variations on taste theory destabilize these emphatic
e
fre market conclusions . Becker's model left the economic commu
nity with two disquieting alternative possibilities. 1 9 1 On the one hand,
American histo ry thus far has falsified the prediction that market
forces will eliminate discrimination. 1 92 Indeed, under the model, "it
is unclear how [ a pattern of] discrimination could have arisen in the
first place." 1 93 In the alternative, an admission of p ervasive racism
among white Anglos could sustain the the o ry. 1 94 If the taste for dis
crimination is very widespread, its cost implications become trivial,
and the market corrective never operates. Unsurprisingly, the aca
demic literature has not m uch pursued the latter proposition. 1 9 5
1 8 9 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 1 42 1-22. Ironically, taste theory indirectly confirms
the above analysis of Official English. See supra Pan I I .A. l , 2 (a)-(b) . Just as labor-market
incentives assure that Latino/ a immigrants will learn English, price competi tio n in product
markets causes discrimination barriers to disappear over time. In addition, a strong n ega
tive implication arises for applications of Title VII to Workplace English: just as the free
economy eventually solves any assimilation problems, it also provides solutions for any
problems respecti n g employer-employee relations. If Workplace English is cost effective, it
will survive and redouble the Latino/a educational incentive; if it is not, Workplace English
employers will be driven out.
1 9 0 See Shelly J. Lundberg & Richard Startz, Private Discrimination and Social Intervention
in Competitive Labor l'viarhets, 73 A:v1. Eco1'. REv. 340, 340 ( 1 983) ( no ti n g the often-made
argument that antidiscrim ination l aws cause efficiency losses, but concluding that this leg
islation is desirable under some condi ti ons) ; see also Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 5 6 (arguing
that antidiscrimination laws can "benefit a social group by reducing competition from
others") . Note, h owever, that the assertion is not that "discrimination is efficient." As be
tween an economy without discrimination and an economy with discrimin ation, u tility and
income are comparable, but the ultimate question as to whether resources are being put to
their most productive uses is i ndeterm inable . Answering that question requires a moral
determination about th e appropriateness of facilitating the discriminatmy taste. See Stew
art Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination �jjicient ?, 76 AM . Eco"-:. REv. 228, 228 ( 1 98 6) .
1 9 1 Arrow objects to taste the01y from a different perspective. For him, it "under
mine [s] " rational choice themy by introducing a variable i n addition to profits for the
employers. Arrow, supra note 1 7 7, at 94-95 .
1 92 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 50 .
193 Lundberg & Startz, supra note 1 90, at 340; see also GEORGE A. i\J.;.ERLOF, The Econom
ics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, in AN E co N O M I C THEORisT's BooK OF
TALES 23, 34 ( 1 984) (" [ T ] here are a fair number of cases where opportunities have arisen
for deviants to break the caste code and make economic profits, with consequent rise in
their social position and erosion of the caste taboos. ") . A negative implication for the
robustness of n eoclassical microeconomic methodology also resulted. See Lang, supra note
1 1 3 , at 365.
1 9 4 See Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 364-()5.
1 9 5 The exception is Michael Selmi , Testing for Equalil)': Me1it, Efficien cy, and the Affinna
tive A ction Debate, 42 UClA L. REv. 1 25 1 , 1 284-89 ( 1 995) , which draws on psychological
literature to suggest that unconscious discrimination will be a persistent phenomenon and
will resist market correction. Selmi's analysis leads to a conclusion similar to that of Cor
nell & Welch, supra note 39, which we discuss infra text accompanying n otes 250-G8. Race
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Some have employed a cartel analogy to bring the model i nto
rough alignment with American history. 1 9 6 This analogy explains that
racial maj orities collaborated to exclude competition fro m other
groups and to shift the cost of discrimination to these groups, j ust as
producers often conspired to form cartels to escape the discipline of
price competition. 1 97 Since cartels are unstable, the m aj ority pro
cured legislation-Jim Crow legislation-to reduce the risk of defec
tion. 1 9 8 These discriminatory statutes provided a narrow j usti fication
for antidiscrimination legislation. This legislation legitimately can
serve the limited purpose of repealing or preempting Jim Crow con
straints on free markets. 1 99 Once the legal support of the discrimina
tory price conspiracy vanishes, however, p rice competiti o n will assure
due employment for qualified people. 2 00 According to this logi c ,
Congress should repeal Title VII .
Two additional lines o f analysis depart from this narrow view of
Title VII while adhering to the neoclassical proj ection of long-run
market elimination of discrimination . The first accepts the Becker
model, but recasts it in a stochastic time frame. The analysis asserts
that the market corrective requires an intolerably long time period to
operate successfully. Title VII is justified as an interim m easure be
cause it drives discriminators from the market more quickly than non
intervention by lowering their p rofits. 20 1
The second line of analysis expands on the cartel analogy. It
posits normatively sustained group solidarity in the racial mcy ority and
attempts to show how, assuming a spontaneous-order scenario, the
n orm can sustain discrimination in the face of cost pressures. A ques
tion arises about showing a spontaneous order: How can c ollusion
among millions of white employees who have no recourse to the legal
system enforce a segregationist norm that is contrary to the interest of
employers? 2 02 To answer this question, the leading model posits a
critical theory also predicts this result while suggesting that th e matter should be pursued.
See, e.g., Derrick Bell, After We 're Gone: Prudent Speculation on A merica in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34
ST. L o U i s U. L.J. 393, 402 ( 1 990) ( asserting that " the mass of whites . . . will accept large
disparities in economic opportunity in comparison to other whites as long as they [ retain]
a priority over blacks") .
1 9 6 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 50-57.
1 97

1 98

See id. at 1 50.
See id. at 1 5 6 ( " [S] outhern whites actively used the power of the state and local

government to reduce competi tion from blacks through the 'jim Crow' legislati o n . . . . ) .
1 99
See id. at 1 55-57. An tidiscrimination legislation also prohibits physical violence
against those who defect from discriminatory norms. See ErsTu:--: , supra note 38, at 246-47.
�oo
See ErsTErN, supra note 38, a t 76-7 7 .
2 0 1 See Donohue, supra note 37, at 1 426.
�0 2 AtTO\V e nters the neoclassicist' s obj ection to this rnove. See ArTO\V, supra n ote 1 77,
at 98-99. The description is, he says, contrary to r.he tradition of economics, which recog
nizes group interests only in l egally sustained form. Group solidari ty holds out benefits for
"
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cas te equilibrium. 2 0 3 Under a caste equilibrium , the norm against
d ealing with the minority leads to economic retaliation against defec
to rs, meaning those employers who h ire cheaper minority employees
face product-market boyco tts. Those employers who do not wish to
discriminate can escape the system only by creating an equilibrium
breaking coalition and by setting up their own subsector. 204 Since
they may incur substantial costs of searching out one another in the
process, it is possible for discrimination to persist even if most employ
ers would prefer to integrate and most customers are unprejudiced. 2 0 5
The caste equilibrium model leaves intact the neoclassical ac
count of a free market corrective while altering the description of the
normative environment in which it operates . In other words, but for
the normative barrier, cost pressures would eliminate discrimination.
Two alternative economic approaches-cost and statistical theory
con trovert this assertion and predict p ersistent discrimination regard
less of social norms.
c.

Cost Theory

Cost theory follows from the observation that workforce homoge
neity lowers production costs . Recall that th e cost story has p rovided
the basis for our simultaneous descriptions of high-powered Latino/a
incentives both to learn English and to settle in enclaves. 2 0 6 Re told in
the context of discrimination theory, the cost story provides a basis
both for predicting that discrimination will persist in the long run and
for attacking Title VII.
In the contexts in which taste-based discrimination increases costs
and is economically irrational, cost-based discrimination reduces costs
employees, but not for employers. Thus, the theory has to do the heroic j ob of making
collusion among hundreds of millions of white Americans plausible.
2 0 3 See AKERLOF, supra note 1 93, at 37-42. Akerlof s construct seems unsuited to explaining the persistence of discrimination in the post-Title VII economy. Given a shifting
normative pattern, n ondiscriminatory subsectors seemingly would proliferate with ease .
The "noncompeting groups hypothesis," that Darity and Mason describe, reaches an end
point similar to that Akerlof reaches. Darity & Mason, supra note 1 58, at 85.
The caste concept has been revived in the legal l iterature i n an expanded version that
draws on social theory. This analysis asserts that the pursuit of social status within discrete
communities provides an ongoing incentive for enforcement of the discriminatory norm.
See McAdams, supra note 39, at 1 007, 1 0 1 9, 1 027, 1 046-5 1 , 1 064. The advantage of this
approach is its depiction of society ·with antidiscrimination l aws and a large population
containing both those who follow the nondiscrimination norm and those who con tinue to
discriminate despite price pressures. The weaknesses, i n our view, are thinn ess i n the de
scription of the maj ority population 's normative constitution and a reliance on th e notion
of a robust spontaneous order that has no support in economics. For a presentation of the
latter point, see William W. Bratton et a!. , Repeated Games, Social Norms and Incomplete CorjJo
rate Contracts, in AsPECTS OF FAJ RNE.Ss I N CoNTRACT 1 6 1 , 1 68-78 (Chris Willett ed., 1 996) .
204
See AKERLOF, supra note 1 9 3 , at 37, 40-4 1 .
2 0 5 See id. at 44.
2 0 6 See supra Part II.A.3.
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and is economically rational. 20 7 As a result, the same free m arket as
sumptions that support a prediction that taste-based discrimination
disappears over time support a prediction that cost-based discrimina
tion can persist. Moreover, according to this view, any legal prohibi
tion of discrimination increases the costs of production ( even
assuming costless enforcement) ; 208 therefore, Congress should repeal
Title VII. 209
This cost story significantly overlaps with the assimilation story.
This overlap becomes apparent when one applies the message of the
cost story to Mrican Americans. Recall that according to the litera
ture, the list of human differences having negative production cost
implications is long, extending to all aspects of identity and personal
ity.:n o It includes not only language, but also accent and a range of
nonverbal codes that manifest themselves in posture and gesture. 2 1 1
Thus, cultural and ethnic identification, in addition to factors like the
number of years of school com pleted and other investments in techni
cal skills, determines individual e conomic opportunity sets. To
achieve economic parity with whites, Mrican Americans must mini
mize their cost implications to employers by shaping their behavior to
mimic white patterns to the fullest extent p ossible. "Assimilation" is
an appropriate term for this process of reinventing oneself to sur
mount the linguistic and cultural divides that separate a minori ty from
the maj ority group .
Cost theory therefore demands an added capital investment from
both Mrican Americans and immigrants: assimilation . Ideally, we
would read Title VII to mean that Mrican Americans should n o t have
to make this added investment to reconstitute themselves culturally as
whites. In a regime of equal economic opportunity, full qualification
207

See EPSTEI�, supra note 38, at 6 1 .
This is Epstein's argument. See id. at 6 1 -67, 76. It overstates the role of decision
making costs in the broader economy. Epstein depicts all producers as if they were law
firms with large n umbers of partners, each with an individual vote. See id. at 6 1 -67. On that
model, heterogeneity of personnel indeed might lead to decision-making costs approxi
mating those in political life. In the real world, however, h ierarchical organization ordina
rily solves that problem. One wonders what Epstein is talking about. Someth i n g like the
treatment in Pan II.A. 2 (b) would be more plausible. There may be a cost advantage to
homogeneity in large h ierarch ical organizations, but it is the lesser benefit s temming from
segregated teams. The cost is less impressive in the restated version-the U.S. Army, after
all , has become one of the nation's model in tegrated organizations.
2 09 The problem with this approach is the deterministic importance it accords to the
iden tification of costs of all sorts and the impoverished framework i t allows for the articula
tion of countervailing benefits. See, e.g. , Joh n J. Donohue I I I , Advocacy Venus A n alysis in
Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAX L. REv. 1 583 ( 1 992) ( reviewin g EPSTEI�,
supra note 38, and arguing that the early success of Title VII supports the contention that it
generates substantial benefits) .
210
See supra Part I I .A. 2 (a) .
21 I
See Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 366-68.
208
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sh ould follow upon successful investment i n technical skills. 2 1 2 Con
trariwise , proposing the repeal of Title VII endorses placing o n Mri
can Americans rather than on employing firms (and society as a
wh ole ) the burden of these assimilation costs. 2 1 3
T h e repeal proposition also raises questions concerning skills-ac
quisition incentives. On the surface, and particularly with widespread
and significant assimilation costs, 2 1 4 repealing Title VII diminishes
these incentives. Advocates of repeal controvert this prediction,
claiming that discrimination barriers create h eightened rather than
reduced incentives to invest in human capital. 2 1 5 Just as minority-lan
guage speakers must ( and do) invest more to reach skills parity, vic
tims of racial discrimination would have to invest heavily to develop
dem onstrable skills, including i ndicia of white acculturation . 2 1 6 The
incentive to do so derives from the j ob market payoff. Of course, if
integration remains costly, minority j ob seekers who make this invest
ment will not receive certain j obs until all qualified whites have found
employment. 2 1 7 Nonetheless, because of a proj ected exhaustion of
the supply of qualified whites, one can predict that minority appli
cants eventually will find work at the level for which they are
qualified. 2 1 8
This Horatio Alger-like description of incentives for racial minori
ties precisely parallels the assimilation story's description of self-reliant
immigrant success. Its application to Mrican Americans, an histori
cally disadvantaged group whose ancestors arrived in America as long
ago as those of the most advantaged white An glos, is ironic. The de
scription also makes problematic assump tions. First, we would argue
that it is inaccurate to assume that an inevitable exhaustion of the
supply of qualified whites guarantees equal opportunity for Mrican
Americans. We would modify this proj ection by recognizing a cogni
zable risk of a white surplus and would expect rational, risk-averse M
rican Americans investing in skills to do likewise. This modification
implies that the proj ected returns on Mrican American skills invest
ment will be less than the Horatio Alger story predicts. Second, the
story presupposes an absence of racial animus. We think rational Mri
can Americans would discount the predicted value of any returns for
21 2
21 3

In Part III we state an e th ical case supporting this proposition.
This argument assumes that Titl e VII successfully has shifted costs to firms. I t is, of
course, not at all clear that the level of Title VII enforcement is thorough-going enough to
shift these costs to fi rms i n the first place.
2 1 4 See sujn-a Part II.A. l .
2 1 5 See EPSTETN, supra note 38, at 40-4 1 .
2 1 6 See supra Part II.A. l .
2 1 7 See E rsTEJN, supra note 38, at 3 5 .
2!8
See id. a t 34-40 ( assuming that some employers invest i n adequate information
about the skills of minori ty applicants ) .
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the contrary possibility. We can restate this argument in co st terms by
stating that the costs of i ntegration may include significant residual
frictions, stemming from n egative white responses to dark skin
color-costs that investment in acculturation cannot reduce.219 This
residual animus means a rational Mrican American would no t p redict
that an i nvestment in skills would result in an equal opportunity to
achieve a return. Ex ante investment incentives accordingly de
crease. 220 Thus, an examination of the assumptions underlying the
Horatio Alger story casts doubt o n its motivational p ower.
Latinos/as, particularly those of color, receive the same m essage:
Persistent discrimination based o n the costs of difference means that
returns on investment in acculturation start to diminish at an earlier
point than the assimilatio n story predicts. A disturbing p roposition
thus arises for economic theory: discrimination can persist indefinitely
despite constant competi tive pressure to produce at the lowest p ossi
ble cost. A line of formal theory-the statistical theory of discrimina
tion, which draws o n the economics of asymmetric informatio n-also
suggests this proposition.
d.

Asymmetric Information: Statistical and Screening Theories

Statistical theory removes the economics of discrimination fro m
the neoclassical world, i n which i nformatio n is complete and costless,
to a second-best world, in which information is costly and incomplete.
In the second-best world, employers subj ec t to cost constrain ts h ave a
choice when they make h iring decisions. They can hire based o n a
limited number of easily observed but imperfec t signals, accepting the
attendant chance and cost of mistakes. 22 1 Alternatively, they can re
duce the number of mistakes by investing in the development of par
ticularized informatio n about candidates. If the cost of obtaining
accurate information exceeds the cost of mistakes that the imperfect
signals generate , the rati onal employer will use the cruder measure.
Furthermore, if the employer's experience makes minority group
membership a n egative signal, the employer will not give full effect in
the h iring process to a minori ty applicant's equal or greater skills . 222
21 9 Both cost and taste figure into white discriminatory preferences, and in a world
without Title VII, th e persistence of the costs in a free market economy would create a
space for the exercise of the taste. Because the two varieties of cost are not distinguishable
in the real world, shifting the cost of acculturation to African Americans through a Title
VI I repeal would only serve to m ake the world safe for exercise of the taste.
22 0 Loury takes the posi tion that the economic explanation of continuing racial ine
quality in the labor market should accord a central place to the "skills gap . " Loury, supra
note 9 7 , at 1 1 8. He points to a cluster of responsible social and cultural factors, each
having a racial quality-"geographic separation, deleterious social norms and peer i nflu
ences, and poor educational quali ty." ld.
2 2 1 See AKERLOF, supra note 1 93, a t 23-24.
222 See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 58.
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The formal model of statistical discrimination 22 3 assumes a no n
discriminatory but Bayesian employer who responds to greater mea
surement error respecting the performance of minorities. 22 4 The
employer evaluates workers by calculating a weighted average of the
particular worker' s directly observed productivity and the mean pro
ductivity of the group. 225 Greater measurement error stemming from
cultural difference indicates that the employer weights the mean fig
ure more heavily when evaluating minori ties. 22 6 The result is not dis
criminatory with respect to groups as a whole because both the
maj ority and the minori ty receive the same average compensation .
But heavier mean weighting yields underpayment for highly produc
tive minority group members and overpayment for unpro ductive mi
nority group members. 227
Discrimination results when this pattern continues across genera
tions. If employers cannot accurately identify good perform ance, in
centives to m ake productivity-enhancing i nvestme n ts lessen
accordingly. 22 8 Rational minority group m embers will reduce their
human-capital investments in skills that the employer cannot observe
directly. Over time , minority workers ' mean productivity will decline,
while whites will become relatively better skilled and receive higher
average compensation. This result is discriminatory, given equal ini
tial endowments between the two groups. 229 Therefore , legal prohibi
tion of discrimination improves labor-market allocations. 2 30
Statistical theory j ustifies Title VII despite the fact that it assumes
unprejudiced white employers. The theo ry's j ustification, h owever, is
qualified. Statistical theory, like cost theory, argues that discrimina
tion persists i n a free marke t because it stems from cost calculations,
and one may term it cost efficient. 2 3 1 Title VII implies costs too : the
opportunity cost of barring employers from using the cheapest means
223

See Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 6 2

Avt .

E co r-: .

REv.

659 ( 1 972 ) .

22 4 For a discussion of Bayesian theory, see, for example, Michael 0. Finkelstein &
William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489, 496505 ( 1 970) ; Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Verdical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabalistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CoRNELL L. REv. 24 7,
255-56 ( 1 990) .

225

See Phelps, supra note 223, at 659.
See id. at 660.
227
See id. at 660-6 1 .
2 2 8 See Paul Milgrom & Sharon Oster, job D iscrimination, l\tiarJ1et Forces, and the Invisibility
Hypothesis, 1 0 2 QJ. EcoN. 453, 456-57 ( 1 987) . This disincentive occurs because the mem
bers of the group enj oy the diffusion of the benefits of the investment. See Cooter, supra
note 39, at 1 58.
2 29 See Lundberg & Startz, supra note 1 90, at 341-42, 344-45.
230
See id. at 340 (showing formally that a policy forbidding separate wage schedules
between two types of workers forces an increase in allocative efficiency) .
2 3 1 See Schwab, sup-ra note 1 90, at 228.
226
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of e mploy ee evaluati o n. 2 32 On the other hand, extensions of the sta
tisti cal model have introduced the possibility that statistical evaluation
can lead to structural inefficiencies. 233 These extensions marginally
strengthen the case for Title VII.
The statistical model is not without i ts cnt1cs. One cnt1osm is
that the model is too crude. For example, it presumes that employers
cannot distinguish entry-level candidates based on the candidate ' s
number o f years o f education. 234 In the real world, c ri tics argu e, em
ployers cheap ly develop basic information workups , decreasing their

2 3 2 See id. This cost structure i n turn suggests that the more cost efficient way of curing
the problem is to i ncrease the flow of information to the market so that it no longer has to
rely on crude signals. See Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 59-60. The problem with this solution
is that an increased information set can magnify a discriminatory tendency. See infra notes
247-67 and accompanying text.
23 3 Schwab offers a model that draws on the idea of a market for lemons fi rst advanced
in George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Unwtainty and the JVIarket Mechanism,
84 QJ. EcoN. 488 ( 1 970) . See Schwab, supra note 1 90, 229. Schwab shows " that statistical
discrimination [ may] i ncrease [ th e ] efficiency of labor supply for the favored group but
decreases efficiency for the disfavored group." !d. The upshot is " that the n e t efficiency
effect cannot be determined a priori." !d.
More particularly, Schwab's model posits both a standardized employm e n t m arket in
which employers judge employees o n statistics and an individualized economy in which
each employee is self-employed and there are no information asymmetries. See id. Assum
ing that all workers look alike in the standardized market and that employers treat them
based on the averages, and further assuming that employees are drawn from the individu
alized market to the standardized market by higher wages, Schwab's model sh ows that an
un regulated economy may allocate too few workers to the standardized market. See id. at
229-30. Schwab then changes the assumptions so that firms in the standardized market get
information about employees i n the form of one true stereotype, by which employers
costlessly can divide workers into two groups: Group 1 workers are, on average, more pro
ductive than Group 2 workers, but all workers of ability a ( highly skilled m arginal workers)
have the same behavior whatever their group. See id. at 2 3 1 . Given the foregoing assump
tions, the efficiency of statistical discrimination depends on ( 1 ) the relative numbers of
type a workers; ( 2 ) the extent of the cross-market shift i n wages; and (3) th e net change in
output as workers go to standardized market and workers i n the standardized market go to
the individual market. See id. A legal ban on statistical discrimination means that wages of
Group 2 workers move "closer to a socially optimal incentive to work, but causes the wage
of [ G] roup 1 workers to diverge further from an efficient level." Id. at 232. "The net
efficiency effect depends on shape of ability functions of the two groups." Id. Further
more, " [ s] tatistical discrimination is most likely to be i nefficient when the disfavored group
has relatively large numbers of unskilled workers," "pulling down its average skill level,"
"while the skilled workers are more evenly distributed between [ the two] groups." Id. Sta
tistical discrimination becomes unambiguously inefficien t if the labor supply of Group l is
inelastic, so that all work in the standardized market, while the Group 2 supply is elastic, so
that more able members tend to stay in the individual market. See id. In this case the result
is that employers in the standardized market only see substandard Group 2 workers. See id.
at 232-33; see also Milgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 456-57 ( arguing that information
asymmetries create employer incentives to underpromote and underpay h ighly effective
min ority employees to avoid creating a credible marketplace signal of capability and
thereby capture minority's services for a low price ) .
2 34
See Lang, supra note 1 1 3, at 365.
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reliance on statistical generalities. 2 35 The model als o assumes that
employers continue to use statistical abstracts in the ir internal evalua
tions, but real world firms have an incentive to develop particularized
information to improve the quality of internal job assignments . 236 Fi
nally, critics cite statistics on returns for formal education that date
from the early 1 980s to show that young African Americans reap a
greater income increase than young whites for an additional year of
schooling. 237 Critics argue that these results refute the suggestion that
statistical practices have a negative incentive effect on minorities' skills
acquisition. 238 These critical arguments produce the tendency, partic
ularly in the legal literature, to dismiss as minimal the p o tential for
statistical discrimination. 2 39
This dismissal meri ts strict scrutiny. 24 0 Whatever the statistical
model' s methodological shortcomings , it is implausible to proclaim
2 35 See ErsTEIN, supra note 38, at 34; D arity & Mason, supra note 1 58 , at 83; see also John
J. D onohue I I I & James J. H eckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Policy, 79 GEO . LJ.
1 71 3, 1 725 ( 1 99 1 ) (noting that if employers can distinguish among African American em
ployees based on the number of years of schooling, then a statistical effect would result
only if all high-school graduates were treated equally, and that even in that event it might
be possible to develop information respecting performance in school) .
2 3 6 See Milgrom & Oster, supm note 228, at 455; see also J osEPH G. ALTONJI & CHARLES
R. P I E RRET , EMPLOYER LEAR.t'IING AND STATISTICAL DisCRIMINATION ( National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6279, 1 997) (using an information theory to argue that
employers discriminate based on easily observable variables, such as years of schooling and
race, in the first period of an employm e n t relationship, but that learning stemming from
noisy indicators of worker performance causes wages to become more closely tied to pro
ductivity in subsequent periods) .
237 See jAMES P. SMITH & FINIS R. WELCH, CLOSING THE GA.P: FoRTI YFARS OF EcoNOtviiC
PROGRESS FOR B LACKS 40, 1 1 3-1 6 ( 1 986) .
2 38 See EPsTEIN, supra note 3 8 , a t 40-4 1 ; Donohue & Heckman, supra note 235, at 1 725.
2 39 See E PSTEIN, supra note 38, at 40-41 ; D onohue & Heckman, supra note 235, at 1 725.
This dismissal is an essential link in Epstein 's story that qualified minority candidates even
tually get picked up in the free market hiring process. See EPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 34-37
( arguing that due to search costs the law only should encourage e mployers to develop
fuller information ) . But cf D onohue, supra note 209, at 1 609 (arguing that an effort to
reduce j ob search costs for minorities through freedom of con tract imposes a dignitary
harm on minorities and that the result of Epstein's approach is higher search costs for
minority job-seekers and more employer rejections of minority j ob-seekers) . D arity and
Mason comment that this point of view ultimately seeks to absolve market processes from a
causal role in the discriminatory results that are manifest in American society. See Darity &
Mason, supra note 1 58, at 83. I t follows that any deficiency must be with the victims them
selves-whether due to poor schooling or cul tural factors, or perhaps as the result of some
inherent quality.
240
Th e dismissal may to some extent reflect dissatisfaction with statistical enforcement
techniques. But misuse of statistical evidence in e mployment discrimination litigation is a
separate problem . In the litigation context, the use of averages to show a discriminatory
pattern can have the perverse effect of discouraging the developm e n t of particularized
information. See, e.g. , Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, Antidiscrimination Enforcement and the
Problem of Patronization, 83 A.rv1. EcoN. REv. 92, 92-93 ( 1 993) (using a formal model to ex
amine the perverse incentive effects of statistiC' ! enforcement) ; Robert S. Follett et a!. ,
Problems in Assessing Employment Discrimination, 8 3 A.M . Ecol'. REv. 7 3 , 73 ( 1 993) (analyzing
problems when using statistics in the unquantifable area of employment discrimination) ;
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that whites and Mrican Americans have equal skills-acquisition incen
tives. Scholars generally concede that although incidences of racial
discrimination markedly declined during the period 1 9 65-1 975 , the
movement toward e conomic racial equality has stagnated since the
mid- 1970s. 2 4 1 Along the same lines, the education gap between young
Mrican Americans and young whites, which in former decades had
narrowed steadily, b ecame a constant during the 1 980s. 2 42 This tren d
occurred while the aggregate wage gap between Mrican Americans
and whites widened from the low point it had reached in the 1 9 70s � 24 3
Moreover, whatever returns Mrican Americans receive o n investments
in schooling, the corresponding returns for Mexican Ameri cans do
not even approach those of whites and actually have deteriorated dur
ing the past two decades . 244
More importantly, statistical theory makes a broader point that
becomes obscured when we focus exclusively on formal problematics.
The model ' s basic insight originated with Arrow's touchstone discus
sion of information asymmetry and discrimination. 2 45 Arrow argued
that once experience has led employers to believe that minority group
members perform worse than majority group members, that belief
does not necessarily yield to hard information about a candidate ' s ed
ucation and experience. 246 As employers scrutinize candidates more
carefully, cultural difference begins to influence the m . 2 4 7 Qualitative
evaluations may turn on unverifiable or unobservable facto rs , such as
habits of thought, "steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness , and initia
tive"-factors employers more easily can access in own-group candi
dates. 248 What begins as statistical observation becomes a taste
prej udice that cognitive dissonance perpetuates. With an ethical code
condemning discrimination, cognitive beliefs become necessary so
cially to justify the discriminatory conduct. 2 49
Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing Employment Discrimination: From the SeminaT Room to the
Cotrrtmom, 83 �vi. EcoN . REv. 67, 7 1 ( 1 99 3 ) ( discussing the problems resulting when statis
tical studies are used in the courtroom) .
2 4 1 See John J . D onohue III & James H eckman , Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The
Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1 603, 1 604
( 1 99 1 ) .

2 42

The aggregate fall i n the education deficit during the 1 980s was one half as great as
that during the 1 970s. SeeJames P. Smith , Alfinnative Action and the Racial Wage Gap, 83 AM.
EcoN. REv. 79, 81 ( 1 993) . " [T] he schooling gap of black workers with 1 - 1 0 years of experi
ence has remained constant at about 0.5 years throughout the 1 9 80 ' s." Jd.
2 4 3 See id. at 80-8 1 . Wage parity for n ew college graduates was achieved i n 1 97 1 -1 972,
but wage gains at this level steadily eroded thereafter. See id. at 81 .
2 4 4 See supra notes 1 72-77 and accompanying text.
2 4 5 See rurow, supra note 1 88, at 95-97. For a recent reaffirmati o n , see Arrow, supra
note 1 77, at 96-97.
2 4 6 See Arrow, supra note 1 77, at 97.
2 4 7 See id. at 96.
248
Arrow, sujJTa note 1 88, at 97.
249
See Arrow, supra note 1 77 , at 97.
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Arrow's insights are formalized in a recent model o f screening
discrimination from Cornell and Welch . 25 0 The model posits that a
prospective employer will be i nterested in unverifiable, intangible
qualities that consti tute the candidate ' s character. 2 51 It draws on the
economics of language to assert that the employer can b etter j udge a
candidate ' s character type (high or low) when the employer shares
vrith the candidate a common cultural background, which enables the
employer to understand the full range of the candidate ' s verbal and
nonverbal communications. 252
More specifically, Cornell and Welch assume that employers hire
from a pool of candidates evenly distributed both between two cul
tural (or raciai) types and between good and bad types within each
cultural pool. 25 3 The Cornell-Welch employers are neutral, but do
have a cultural type and m ore readily can identify good and bad types
of their own cultural type because of better information. 25 4 Cornell
and Welch' s results parallel those of the statistical model-the more
information an employer develops about a group of candidates in a
given pool, the greater the pool's variance. 255 If the employer selects
only one candidate , the best candidate is likely to come from the
group with the widest distribution. 25 6 Since employers receive more
information about candidates in the pool that share their cultural
background, the probability that the chosen candidate will come from
that group increases as the number of candidates increases. 25 7 The
chances of same-group hiring are fifty percent with two candidates
( one from each group ) , are seventy-five percent with four candidates
( two from each group ) , and continue to rise as the number of candi
dates increases. 258 Recast in a generational framework, the model
predicts that in a universe of as few as forty candidates and five j obs, it
would take more than one million generations before the chances of
other-group hiring exceeds fifty percent. 259
250
25 1
252
25 3
25 4
255
256
25 7
25 8

See Cornell & Welch, supra note 39, at 543 n . l .
See id. at 543.
See id. at 543-44.
See id. at 549.
See id.
See id. at 548.
See id. at 549.
See id. at 552.
See id. at 544-45. Assuming both two possible types (good and bad) evenly distrib
uted in the population and an ability to distinguish between them only with own group
candidates, n eutrality results only when there are two candidates. In this case there is only
a 50% chance that the candidate from the same background is bad. As the number of
candidates increases, the probability of hiring a same group applicant approaches one.
This analysis derives from the "rank-order tournamen t [ ]" literature. Id. at 545 (in ternal
quotation marks omitted ) .
2 5 9 See id. at 546.
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Cornell and Welch recognize the p ossibility that with a concen
tration of employers from one group in the high-wage sector, the
model' s h iring dynamic implies the evolution of a caste sys te m . 260 If a
pool of favored-group candidates remains available, nothing exists to
trigger the market corrective of hiring from the growing pool of capa
ble candidates in the excluded group. 261 Employers have less incen
tive to hire from the disadvantaged pool b ecause by doing so they lose
the benefit of the screening device. 262 Segregated workplaces p rolif
erate accordingly, and the excluded group makes up the low-wage sec
tor of the labor market. Rational employers, relying o n m arket
information concerning h iring patterns, cease incurring the cost of
considering candidates from the excluded group. 263 Eventually, cog
nitive dissonance causes the advantaged group to develop the o ries to
explain and to j ustify the segregation in terms of the excluded group 's
inferiority. 264 The resulting discriminato ry equilibrium, h owever, is
not immobile. Either entry by excluded-group employers into the
high-wage sector or exhaustion of the supply of good types in the ad
vantaged group will break the equilibrium. 265
The Cornell-Welch screening model, like both the cost and the
statistical models, assumes that discrimination is cost efficient. But the
Cornell-Welch model works from that starting point to destabilize ad
ditional cost assumptions that have crept into the legal literature. It
demonstrates that information asymmetries can lead to discriminatory
results even when the employer invests in researching background in
formation and in interviewing candidates. 266 The model also projects
that discriminatory results, once repeated, become discriminatory
s chema, which can be perp etuated in a market economy. 26 7 It thus
260
261
262

See id. at 558-59 .
See id.
I f the supply of good types i n the favored pool is exhausted, however, d iscrimina
tion breaks down. See id. at 555. Thus, there is no direct conflict with Epstein's market
corrective. He presupposes that the pool of favored group candidates is exhausted and
that equal information either is available or can be developed. See EPSTEIN, supra n o te 38,
at 34-37. This analysis implies a descriptive question: How quickly, if ever, does the pool of
good white types at the high end of the United States employment marke t become
exhausted?
26 3 This result is a "cascade effect." See Cornell & Welch, supra note 3 9 , at 547.
264 See id. at 558-59. Note that to the extent that the discrimination has had the effect
of depressing the minority's skills-acquisition incentives, minority group members might
not be i n a position to take advantage of this opportunity. One can state the incentive
point in psychological as well as economic terms. See Bruce Elmslie & Stanley Sedo, Dis
crimination, Social Psychology, and Hysteresis in Labor Ma-rkets, 1 7 ]. Eco N . PsvcHOL. 465
( 1 996) . According to Elmslie and Sedo: "One initial bout of unemploym ent that is not
productivity based can lay the foundation for continued future unemployment and persist
en tly lower job status even if no future discrimination occurs." Jd. at 474.
265 See Cornell & Welch, mj:rra note 39, at 554-55.
266
See id. at 54 7-52.
267 See id. at 554-55.
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reaches the same end point as statistical theory, but takes a different
route, which completely avoids ( and even reverses) the obj ection that
commentators lodge in the legal literature . The model also suggests
that one cannot safely assume that market forces will correct an inher
ited pattern of discrimination , even though i t acknowledges the possi
bility of correction under the right conditi ons. 268 Finally, the model
controverts the notion that the economics of discrimination posits an
absolute assumptional choice between prej udiced whites ( taste the
ory) and unprej udiced whi tes ( cost theory) . "Neutral" cost-based be
havior can trigger the development of discriminatory tastes that add
to the costs of integration.
The screening model is particularly pertinent to Latinos/as be
cause its conceptual roots lie in language discriminatio n theory. 2 69 It
supports two predictions. First, discrimination against Latinos/ as may
persist for an extended period, even if one excludes phenotyp i c fac
tors. 270 The screening model asserts that English fluency alone does
not ensure equal opportunity-assimilation must be absolute. Lati
nos/as and other immigrants gain wealth at a correspondingly high
cultural cost. Second, since employers within the enclave economy
will best appreciate the skills of Latinos/ as who are not completely
assimilated, these Latinos/as intensively should pursue opportunities
within the enclave . As applied to Latinos/as, then, the information
asymmetries posited in the screening model imply an economic op
portunity barrier that separates the enclave and mainstream
econon1ies. 27 1

3.

Summary

Can we describe the incentives of a rational second-generation
Latino/a in l ight of the above economics? As illustrated above , the
literature offers contrasting incentive stories. In the maj ority view, dis2 6 8 See id. These ideal conditions, an exhaustion of the supply of qualified whites or an
adequate supply of minority employers, arguably wil l not arise in the real world.
2 6 9 See supra Part I . A-B.
2 70 The likelihood of phenotypi c discrimination complicates long-term projections. It
gives rise to the possibility of a separati n g assimilation equilibrium based on skin color. On
this model white Latinos/ as face lower barriers and eventually, upon acquisition of com
pletely American cultural identi ties and appearances, u ncover economic opportunities suf
ficient to prompt dispersion. Meanwhile, by analogy to the experience of African
Americans, Latinos/as of color face more substantial barriers and te nd to remain in en
clave communities. Cf M artha R. Mahoney, Segregation, 'vv7titeness, and Transformation, 1 43
U . PA. L. REv. 1 659, 1 670-71 ( 1 995 ) ( describing the phenomenon of racial tipping by
which neighborhoods become segregated due to white distaste for p eople of color) .
27 1 Previous immigrant generations faced similar barriers, of course . But because par
ticular barriers' heigh ts wil l depend on the totality of the economic and cultural circum
stances, racial attitudes could mean that those confronting Latinos/as are materially
higher.
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crimination has a depressive impact on skills investment, 272 thereby
contributing to its own perpetuation. A minority, grounded on the
legal side, describes a heightened incentive to take advan tage of edu
cational opportunity to overcome the barrier of discriminati o n. 27 3
Which incentive story should we incorp orate in the description of sec
ond-generation Latino/a incentives?
It is not clear to us that we can or should make an abso lu te choice
between the high- and low-incentive alternatives. Certainly, the l ow
incentive story is technically correct b ecause it inexorably follows from
the economics of investment; accordingly, aggregated Latino/a
choices should show a depressed level of skills investment. The aggre
gate result, however, does not capture an all-purpose desc ription of
rational choice. Just as different subj ective p references wi th respect to
risk determine the choices of investors, so too will Latino/a choices
turn on subj ective factors-talents, ambitions, familial and cultural
ties, and risk aversion. Thus, in our e conomic picture, Latinos/as
have a wide zone of rational choices for investments in human capital.
We would expect some Latinos/as to invest more heavily than others,
in the same manner as did yesterday ' s immigrants and as do today's
Anglos.
Although this economic description is capacious, it h as a power
ful normative implication . It emphatically negates the n ormative as
similation story. Latinos/as neither have broken past immigrant
patterns nor have failed to live up to some vague obligatio n to accul
turate . Instead, they rationally have responded to the problem of as
similation in the unique circumstances they confront. Moreover,
while the assimilation story focuses exclusively on immigrant choices,
the economics shows that Anglo choices also matter. Since Latino/a
cultural choices depend upon e conomic prospects, these choices de
pend in part on Anglo choices about Latino/a opportuni ties. Only
one moment of culpability o ccurs in this story-the moment when
Anglos convince themselves that their own Americanness implies su
perior capability.
D.

Workplace English and the Costs o f Title VII

Finally, we turn to the economic implications of requiring Work
place English to find j ustification in a showing of business necessity
under Title VII.
O n e easily may articulate an economic case against application of
Title VII to Workplace English . The absolute suppression of Spanish
in the workplace is cost-j ustifiable because communicatio n is costly,
272 See Coate & Loury, supra note 240, at 92-93; Cooter, supra note 39, at 1 58; Cornell &
Welch, supra note 39, at 555-56; M ilgrom & Oster, supra note 228, at 454-55 .
2 73
See supra Part I I .A.3.
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especially when the environment is not monolingual. 27 4 The resulting
transparency renders supervision cheaper and reduces frictions in in
tra-employee relations. 275 The employer, who bears the cost of inef
fective workplace rules, has a strong incentive to promulgate the
lowest cost set. Over time, employers and employees will sort them
selves between monolingual and multilingual environments . 276 Addi
tionally, Title VII enforcement is i tself costly. If the employer has a
goal of cost reduction, it should have Workplace English .
However forceful this cost case may be, it is not conclusive . The
identification of a set of costs alone does not conclude the determina
tion of social welfare. We must appraise costs in broader contexts
before concluding an i nquiry about any particular course of action.
The costs of applying Title VII to Workplace English fail to impress
when we examine them in this broader context.
First, this cost case does not differ in substance from the cost case
for a complete repeal of Title VII . Recall that according to the cost
theory of discrimination , all other things being equal, rational em
ployers have a high-powered incentive to operate segregated work
places. 2 77 Thus, the same social welfare judgment that activates Title
VII as a whole j ustifies the constraint on employer business j udgment
which is actualized as a qualified prohibition of Workplace English. It
would be anomalous to allow free rein to business judgment in the
limited context of Workplace English but not in other contexts gov
erned by Title VII .
Second, the economics provides no credible assurance that Work
place English reflects only cost concerns and bears no tain t of ethnic
or racial animus. The economics we reviewed above does not describe
any financial incentives that assuredly constrain such impulses, at least
as long as a robust market correction story is lacking. 2 78
2 7 4 Cj supra Part I I .A.l ( discussing the general economic costs associated with bilin
gual interactions) .
2 7 5 See supra notes 82-84.
276 See Breton & Mieszkowski, supra note 1 0 1 , at 2 62-63.
27 7 See supra Pan I I .C.2 (c) .
2 78 Indeed, Workplace Engl ish appears to be doubly attractive to many employers for
this reason . I t could be disruptive of employee relations yet still be cost reductive because
it offers a means to terminate e mployees that is unrelated to the more conventional and
work-related matters included in the notion of "good cause."
Anecdotal evidence does indicate that large firms have been wakin g up to the fact that
Latinos/as constitute 1 0% of the population and have been adjusting their business prac
tices to increase Latino/ a m arket share. For such a firm, the goal of good will in the
Latino/a community could lead to a decision against Workplace English despite a proj ec
tion that bilingualism increases management costs. But this story in the end only rein
forces our conclusion. In our view, large American firms h ave been remarkably slow in
their "discovery" of the Latino/a market. vVe suspect that Anglo myopia and prej udice
have long retarded pursuit of these ready p rofits .
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Third , although Title VII enforcement intrinsically is costly,2 7 9
the prohibition of Workplace English presents n o s ignificant addi
tional cost burden. The Workplace English cases h ave simple facts
most concern work rules with no arguable relationship to business ne
cessity. 2 80 The message to employers resembles a p e r se rule: do no t
fire employees for speaking Spanish t o each other in informal situa
tions. In a dynamic environment, such a message even could have a
transformative affect. To the extent that Workplace E nglish stems
from animus and fear, its prohibition prompts the rational employer
to suppress the taste for segregation without incurring further signifi
cant costs .
Thus, the economic case against Title VII for Workplace English
fails as an absolute assertion. But, because Title VII c overage and en
forcement still will be costly, we must answer one remaining question:
Who bears the cost?
To answer this question we consult, by analogy, economics that
predicts the effects of taxes on employment. Given static labor de
mand, a payroll tax can cause a reduction in employment or in
wages. 28 1 Since empirical studies of these taxes do not clearly eviIt is helpful to consider some examples. First, we note the recent performance of the
stock of U nivision, the larger of the two Spanish-language television n e tworks. A block of
stock purchased for $50 million in 1 992 recently was reported to be worth $700 million.
See Pollack, supra note 47. Part of the i ncrease i n value came at the expense of the net
work's competitor in the market. See id. But much of the value comes fro m perceptions of
an arbitrage profit opportunity created by Anglo myopia-a large gap between the net
work's audience share and ad share. See id. Apparently, the gap will be closed, and net
work revenues will increase as marketers discover the existence of the Latino/ a market.
For a second example, consider Sears. For about three years, Sears has been manag
ing 1 48 of its stores, all located i n or near Latino/ a communities, in a manner that would
appeal to Latina/a tastes. In so doing the company has reversed a cost-benefit decision
not to micromanage to reach geographical e thnic markets. Sears i s h appy; sales in the
effected stores are way up. SeeJennifer Steinhauer, A Minority Market with iVIajor Sales: Stores
Redo the iVIerchandise J'viix and the Hispanic Dolla-rs Flow, N .Y. TIMES, July 2, 1 997, at D l . 'vVhat
surprises us is not the result of this management decision, but the length of time it took
Sears to ascertain the existence of the opportunity-decades in the case of stores in places
like East Los Angeles, California and Hudson County, New Jersey, for example. We also
note that by definition the new policy entails the extension of managerial responsibility to
Latinos/as. See id.
A final example, in which an external shock led to sudden visibility i n the business
community, involves People magazin e . People started a quarterly Spanish-language issue af
ter a special issue on the singer Selena proved extremely successful. The people at People
had never heard of Selena before her murder was front page news. See O c tavia Emilio
Nuiry, iVIagazine Mania, HISPANIC, Dec. 1 996, at 53, 53-58. People En Espcn'iol n ow publishes
monthly.
279 See Donohue, supra note 209, at 1 602-03. H e estimates the total cost of Title VII
enforcement at $ 1 5 billion per year, or $200 per worker. See id. at 1 602. Given standard
estimates of elasticity of demand for labor, it follows that total employme n t is reduced by
one-fourth of one percent or 1 88 ,000 j obs. See id. at 1 603.
280
See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
281
See DA-'IIEL S . HA.vlERMESH, L>.BOR D Ei'vL<\..'ID 1 69-73 ( 1 993) .
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dence a proportionate effec t on levels of employment, an inference
that the burden falls on wages arises. 282 We can draw a more tailored
analogy to models that predict the effect of a tax on a particular group
of workers , again given static demand for labor. The impact of this
tax depends on the relative supply behavior of the affe cted workers
and on the ability of employers to substitute the taxed workers for
others. 283 Without relative supply elasticity between the affected
group of workers and other workers, a relative decline in the affected
group ' s wages again offsets the tax. 28 4 In that case, any impact on
employment levels additionally depends on relative supply within the
affected group . To the extent that employers can substitute workers
from other groups, a smaller aggregate impact on wages and employ
ment will result. Indeed, given high substitutability, members of the
affected group will have an incentive to take steps to realign them
selves with an untaxed group . 285
When reading these parameters together with the results of the
empirical literature on labor elasticities , 286 one can draw an inference
that bilingual Latinos/as themselves consequently would pay for spe
cial Title VII protection in the form of lower wages. The labor elastic
ity studies reveal only very small "elasticities of complementarity
between immigrants and natives, or between new immigrants and
older cohorts." 287
It is importan t to note that the predicted trade off between pro
tection and wages assumes imperfect enforcement of Title VII . Such a
wage adj ustment could be hard to realize in a world of perfect en
forcement. Given diverse workplaces, employers would have to pay
Latinos/as at the same level as members of other groups. 2 88 Even if
bilingual workplaces without Workplace English cost more than bilin
gual workplaces with Workplace English , employers could not pass on
the cost in the form of a reduced number of j obs for Latinos/ as, at
least to the extent that perfect enforcement of Title VII requires em282
283
28 4
285

286

287

See id.
See id. at 1 8 1 .
See id.
See id. at 1 78-8 1 .
See, e.g. , id. at 6 1-1 36.
!d. at 1 26; see D EFREITAS, supra note 6, at 232-34. Th e implication is that immigrant

flows have relatively little effect on th e wages of domestic workers. The wage studies con
tradict the neoclassical view, which suggests that the arrival of l ow-skilled immigrants de
presses wages and increases unemployment. See id. at 2 3 1 . They also support Piore 's
description of immigrant employment in a secon dary segment of l ow-wage jobs on the
industrial periphery. See id. DeFreitas concludes that Latino/a immigration has not af
fected significan tly the wages or employment of American-born Latinos/as, but that un
documented immigrants adversely have affected the employment of African American
males and wages of African American females. See 1:d. at 250.
28 8 See EPsTEI!"\, supra note 38, at 36 ( noting that perfect enforcement prevents workers
from discounting their servi ces) .
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ployers to hire a proportionate number of qualified bilingual Latinos/
as. This scenario yields an inference of cost shiftin g to the
employer. 289
But Latinos/ as still would bear significant costs even in this scena
rio. An employer who wishes to avoid the cost of bilingualism would
avoid locating in a region with a significant non-Anglo p opulation.
These employers, if located in regions with mixed Latino/ a and Anglo
populations, would tend to take up residence elsewhere. As a result,
Latinos/ as would have reduced job opportunities. The resultin g con
centration of m onolingual firms would h arm bilingual firms that did
not relocate to a monolingual region and abandon their bilingual s ta
tus. Those bilingual firms would suffer a long-term cost disadvantage,
and monolingual firms would drive them out of business, reducing
the stock of j ob opportunities available to Latinos/ as.
The imperfect enforcement scenario is the more plausible of the
two, and it holds out no significant h opes of cost sharing. But the case
for Title VII constraints on Workplace English remains compelling
even if cost sharing is very unlikely. As the next Part demonstrates,
choices respecting language implicate an individual ' s right to treat
ment as an equal. It is fundamental to Ameri can ideology that we
must make sacrifices to secure these freedoms. We have no doubt
that Latinos/as stand as ready as o ther Americans to incur this cost.
III
THE INTRINSIC WRONG OF LEGAL SuPPRESSION oF SPANISH:
LANGUAGE, FREEDOM, AND THE
IMAGINARY D o MAIN

Our economic analysis shows that English Only reinforces the sei
gniorage of the English language by increasing the cost of withdrawal
into a Spanish-language enclave and by prodding Latinos/ as to in
crease their investment in English-language acquisition . Our analysis
does not deny that linguistic sameness lowers costs under one promi
nent model of social welfare calculation. 290 But it does identify three
points that undermine that calculation's soundness as a basis for pub
lic policy. First, the analysis questions whether we safely can assume in
every case that the imposition of the English language ( o r any other
maj ority trait) effectively enhances welfare. 29 1 In our complex mul
ticultural world-characterized by growing trade, transnational con
tacts , and emerging communities of nations in Europe , Asia, and
South America-we must at least question the assumption that hom o2 89

CJ id. ( noting that because an antidiscrimination law would preven t free market
bargaining, employers would pay more for services) .
2 90 See supra notes 1 00-04, 1 08-l l , 207-1 2 and accompanying text.
2 9 1 See supra text accompanying note 2 7 1 .
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geneity is cost beneficial. Second, assuming that language homogene
ity enhances social welfare, economic theory suggests that free marke t
incentives suffi ce to assure language homogeneity's prompt evolution
in any society with a large linguistic majority. Third, whi te Anglos'
economic discrimination against Latinos/as presents the o nly signifi
cant barrier on that assimilationist evolutionary path. Our ultimate
conclusion is simple. Because legal suppressio n of language and legal
sanction of segregation follow from the same cost economics, both
Offi cial and Workplace English impose a form of peonage o n Lati
nos/ as that is discriminatory.
In this Part , we step outside the consequentialist framework of
economic theory to discuss the characteristics of right and wrong that
make it both intrinsically and extrinsically wrong to suppress Span
ish. 292 Proof of an intrinsic or extrinsic wrong cannot rest on eco
nomic analysis alone. We have shown, for example , that legal
suppression of Spanish is the functional equivalent ofjim Crow. Yet if
we are to complete our analysis, we must still go on to demonstrate
that something is deeply wrong with these laws. Without a reasonable
moral, political, or legal conception of the p erson coupled with an
interpretation of freedom and equality, the fact that legal suppression
of Spanish is the functional equivalent ofJim Crow is j ust a fact. What
makes it wrong is that legal imposi tion of peonage controverts the
2 9 2 Let me explain why we are arguing that the suppression of Spanish is both an
intrinsic and an extrinsic wrong. At least under a strict reading of Kant, the suppression of
Spanish simply can be understood as an extrinsic \Hong, i n the sense that i t is a violation of
the doctrine of Right. To quote Kant:
Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's free in accordance with a
universal Jaw, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist
with everyone's freedom in accordance with a u niversal law.
If then my action or my condition generally can coexist with the free
dom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, whoever hinders me i n
i t does m e wrong; for this hindrance ( resistance) cannot coexist with free
dom in accordance with a universal law.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs 56 ( Mary Gregor trans., 1 99 1 ) ( 1 797) .
Outer freedom is outer i n the sense that i t issues from an external source such as law.
But we are also making another point, as we will see shortly. Given our understanding of
personality, the development of one's poten tial to shape an identity can and should be
understood as inner virtue. Kant never would have spoken of potential. This reliance on
potential clearly has Hegelian overtones. See Cr-J.A.RLES TAYLOR, SouRcEs OF THE SELF
( 1 989) . But despite this difference, an internal virtue in Kant i ncludes respecting your
own person as an end in itself. For us, the development of the potential or capability to
shape an identi ty then can be grasped as internal virtue. H en ce, our argument that the
suppression of Spanish can be both an i n trinsic and an extrinsic wrong. If a Latina makes
Spanish-speaking into an end and this confers ethical value on her mother tongue, then it
clearly can be part of her respect for her own person that she speak her language. If she
fails to be true to the pursuit of her end, even if because of outward pressure that degrades
her language, then she can be understood to have degraded herself. Of course, this argu
ment turns on the Latina making Spanish-speaking an end in Kant's sense. Our point is
that she cannot be forced to do so. To coerce her to do so, in the sense of l egal coercion,
violates her external freedom.
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e qu al dignity of persons by legally imposing a form of m oral servitude
on Latinos/ as. 293
This Part begins by discussing the moral, ethical, and legal mean
ing of the free person pursuant to an existentialist interpretation of
the Kantian idea of equal worth . We then use the concept of the free
person of equal worth to locate the intrinsic wrong inherent i n the
suppression of Spanish . 294 In doing so we step outside the c onven
tional liberal framework, which has difficulty accommodating a com
plex understanding of individual identity, to discuss the formation of
identity out of basic identifications, one of which clearly is language .
To lay the groundwork for this discussion, we revisit the communitar
ian-liberal debate as well as the critique of the liberal p e rson that fem i
nist and race critical theory articulate. We ultimately hope to show
both that one can reconcile a more complex understanding of iden
tity with a concept of rights and that the ideal of the p e rson need not
rely on an individualistic anthropology. The mainstay of this case for
a revived ideal of the person is the aesthetic idea o f the imaginary
domain.
Mter establishing a right to personality at a general level , this Part
argues that the suppression of Spanish controverts the freedom of La
tinos/ as reasonably to design , by developing their own sense of cul
ture and heritage, unique lives. This argument does not rely o n
metaphysical or foundational notions of the subj ect. 295 Our assertions
depend instead on a simple, direct interpretation of the normative
organizational ideal of politi cal or ethical liberalism-the State and
our basic social institutions should treat everyone as free and equal
persons. 29 6 At the same time we contend that this interpretation sur
vives the contemporary critique of the autonomous subj e ct. We begin
our analysis by reconsidering the ideal of the person.

29 3 See RIC!-L\RDS, supra note 79, at 5 .
2 94 John Rawls has clarified t h e relationship betwee n the operati on o f wrong- and

right-making characteristics-the facts "cited in givin g reasons why an . . . institution is . . .
j ust or unj us t"-in Kantian constructivism . JoH N RAWLS, Po LITICAL LIBERALIS:VI 1 2 1 -25
( 1 99 3 ) . Although it is beyond the scope of this Article fully to explore this issue, we agree
with Rawls that some form of Kantian constructivism is the most philosophically j ustified
path to take in the j us tification of political and, we would add, moral ideals of right. See id.
2 9 5 For a discussion of the difference between a metaphysical conception of the subject
and our political and moral in terpretation of the free person, see D RUCI LLA CoR="ELL, AT
THE H EART Of FREEDOM : FEMINISM, SEx, A?\D EQUALITY 3-65 ( 1 998) [hereinafter CoRNELL,
AT THE H EART] ; D RL:CILL·\ CoRNELL, THE li\-LA.GINARY D oMr\1 '\i 3-27 ( 1 995) [he reinafter CoR
'\iELL, D o \ L\IN ] .
296

According to Hegel, the hallmark of moderni ty is the historical and n o rmative con
struction of the legal and moral person through a concept of right, which in turn legi ti
mates the State on the basis of whether or not the State allows for the ac tualization of this
construct. See H EGEL's PHI LOSOPHY Of RIGHT 1 5-24, (T.lvl. Knox trans., 1 967) ( 1 82 1 ) .
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The Ideal of the Free Person

A.

All forms of liberalism start with a simple premise: the State
sh ould treat us all as if we are free persons of equal worth . 29 7 Critics
of liberalism attack this moral, legal, and political ideal of the person,
charging that it is out of touch with reality. In real life , they contend,
we are not the abstract persons that the liberal model deploys; we are
no t beings who in any m eaningful sense actually can be self-determin
ing . 29 8 Some of these criticisms, however, fail to recognize the reason
why Kantian liberalism stresses the significance of justice of the free
person. Our interpretation of the Kantian ideal of the person is not
meant to be a full picture of the lives of actual human beings; rather,
it is tailored to enshrine our freedom as a practice of self-responsibility
for the lives we lead. 299

1.

The Kantian Idea of Equal Worth of Free Persons

If social benefits are not for p ersons, one may ask, who is the
beneficiary of any theory or practic e of an ethics of social organization
or of any theory of j ustice? 300 We (and many others 30 1 ) reject the
answer that the beneficiary should be society as a wh ole-or a maj or
ity of those within it-as an invitation to tyranny. Much political and
2 9 7 Almost all of the important debates in Western liberal jurisprudence and political
philosophy have been over what it means to treat people as free and equal persons. For an
excellent discussion of h ow widely this ideal is held, see Ronald Dworkin, Why We Are All
Liberals ( Oct. 1 9 & 27, 1 995) ( paper presented at the Program for the Study of Law, Phi
losophy, and Social Theory) (on file with authors) .
2 9 8 The most searing critique of the liberal ideal of the person remains that of Karl
Marx. See K\J<L MARX, CRITI QU E OF H EGEL's ' PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT' (An ne tte Jolin & Jo
seph O ' Malley trans., Joseph O ' M alley ed., 1 9 70) ( 1 964) The last hundre d years have
generated fierce dispute about what Marx's critique of the legal, moral, and political cri
tique of the person actually m eans: Was Marx arguing against this category altogether?
Was he instead arguing that it was "undialectical, " hence one-sided? \Ne cannot explore
the voluminous literature, let alone examine the history of the sweat and blood that has
been spilt because of the state enforcement of the position that there is no moral nor
political validity to the ideal of the person. We stand behind the i n terpretation that a
Marxist should believe in right and thus, the persons who have them.
299 Since the Kantian person is an idea that, by definition, must be i n the abstract, it
often has been thought to be inconsistent with any recognition of our phenomen ological
existence. I have tried to show, however , that we can use a philosophical anthropology that
can recognize certain aspects of our phenomenological existence, such as our sexuate be
ing, but recognize it in such a way that it does not con trovert the freedom that is main
tai ned in the abstract definition of the idea of the person. Of course, in this Article, we are
trying to make a similar argument about how we should grapple w·ith another crucial as
pect of our phenomenological existence, i . e . , language. See CoRNELL, Ar THE H EART, supra
note 295, at �7-39 ; CoRNELL, D otvLc\J'\', supra n ote 295, at 3-27.
3 00
For a discussion of how the person has to exist at least implici tly i n utilitarianism in
order for th e theory to be coherent, see GARY L. FR-\NCIO:--I E , R-\IN \NITHOUT T H U \! D ER: THE
.

IDEO LOGY O F THE A.,'-: IMAL RIGHTS MO\/EMENT

:�0 1

1 47-89 ( 1 996) .

See, for example, Ronald Dworkin 's distinction between constitutionalism and ma
joritarianism i n Rol':ALD D wO RKIN , The Nloral Reading and the lvlajoritarian Premise, in FREE

omr's

LAw

l-38 ( 1 996) .
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legal theory conceptualizes the p erson from this point of view to ex
amine what constitutes a legitimate relationship between the individ
ual and the State . 3 0 2 In our analysis, one can justify for reasons apart
from its value as a shield against tyranny the political and legal ideal of
the person. We pursue a second, alternative approach to understand
ing the person : interpreting the ideal of the free person that Kant
initially invoked in the context of cultural and linguistic choices.
Kant defended the simple idea that the State should treat all
human beings as "ends in themselves" b ecause as rational b eings they
are the ultimate source of the value they give to their ends. 303 This
idea is Kant' s Formula of Humanity. 30 4 For Kant, an end is an obj ect
of free choice. Ends are by definition at least partially "set" by p racti
cal reason. We want to stress partially because Kant does not m ean
that an "end" may not also be an obj ect of desire or inclination. But it
is reason that is responsible for the unique human characteristics that
translate an object of desire into an end. It is a misreading of Kant,
however, to argue that the Formula of Humanity demands respect
only for our capacity for choosing m orally obligatory ends. When we
take a rational interest in something, we do so by deeming it valuable
or important and, in that sense , good. In this sense, we do n o t value
our ends as objects of desire , but because they are good. It is this
capacity that the Formula of Humanity demands that we treat as an
end in each person. This is why it is completely illegitimate to force
someone to take up an end because to do so denies her dign i ty as
someone with this capacity. As beings who assume responsibility, in
cluding self-responsibility in the practice of moral and e thical j udg
ment, each is of equal worth because each bestows value on those
decisions. 3 05
30 2 For an excellent discussio n , however, of why an instrumental or u tilitarian account
of the person never can be an adequate accou n t of the worth of persons, see JoHN R�wLs,
A THEORY OF jUSTICE 22-27 ( 1 97 1 ) .
303

See THE MoRAL LAw: KANT's GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPI-NSIC oF MoRALs 6 1 -64

( H .J. Paton eel. & trans. , 1 9 6 1 ) [ hereinafter KANT's GROUNDWORK] . For an excellent dis
cussion of Kant's Formula of Humani ty, see CHRISTINE M. KoRSGAARD, CREATING THE Kl NG
DOM OF ENDS l 06-32 ( 1 996) .

304 The Formula of Humanity is Kant's second formulation of the universal law. The
first is the Categorical Imperative. For readers u nfamiliar with Kant, he states the Categori
cal Imperative as fol lows: "Act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal l aw. " KANT's GROUNDWORK, supra note 303, at 88 ( footnote
omitted and typeface altered) . The Formula of Humanity is stated as follows: "Act in such
a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means but at the same time as an end." Id. at 86.
305 One could term Kant's elaboration of our equal worth as persons as "metaphysical"
and thus philosophically outdated because it relies on ontological dualism. See KANT's
GROUNDWORK, sup ra note 303, at 1 04-08 . To defend free wil l , which is our capacity to set
our end by reason, Kan t understood dualism as the division of the "human being" i n to the
"noumenal" world of moral freedom and the "phenomenal" world of causal dete rm i n ation
by the laws of nature. See id.; see also KoRSGAr\RD , supra note 303, at 1 5 9-60 ( providing a
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Kant's argument for our equal worth is b ased on his argum ent
th at the good will-or our rational nature (whi ch , to Kant, is synony
m ous to the good will) -is the only thing that can hav e unco nditional
value, meaning it can be recognized as the source of all valu e . 306 For
Kan t, something h as unconditional value if it has intrinsic valu e under
all conditions, and the only " th ing" that can meet this conditio n i s the
go od will. 307 Even something like happiness and the search for it, at
least according to Kant, is conditional and not valuable in all conceiva
ble circumstances. 308 As beings who ultimately confer ethical value
around us through setting our ends at least partially by reason, we are
the source of what makes things important or deemed good. Obj ects
have value because they have value for individuals who bestow value
on objects rationally by making them their ends. It is this value-con
ferring capacity as rational beings that human beings recognize in one
another. This recognition creates the m andate that Kant claims is ba
sic to both morality and, in an impure form, p olitics . 309 An individual
summary of the relationship between Kant's noumenal world and the phenomenal world) .
For Kan t, we are free if we make ourselves a law unto ourselves; if we, in o ther words, are
self-legislating. We can only become self-legislating if we act solely in accordance with the
idea of law and not ·with any particular aspect of i ts substan tiation. The preeminent good,
which Kant calls moral, is the idea of law its el f and only that. Since the must of the moral
law is the idea of law that only a rational being can apprehend, when we act in accordance
with this law, we also are acting solely in accordance with our free will or with our rational
nature. We know that our maxims are rational and therefore freely chosen by subj ec ting
them to the test of universalizability-the test of the moral law. My maxim is rationally
chosen and thus freely chosen if i t can be understood as a ma.x im of all o ther rational
beings who subject themselves to the moral l aw. Because the must of the moral law is the
idea of law that only a rational being can approach, as free beings we become self�legislat
ing and act solely i n accordance with free wil l by following the Categorical Imperative. See
KANT's GROU!':DWORK, supra note 303, at 95-1 04. One may n o te the e thical irony of a the
ory of moral freedom that appears to incorporate an act of subj e ction to the moral law.
Kant's need to understand moral freedom in this way stems from his acceptance of the
proposi tion that all human action must be understood through laws of causality. See id. at
1 1 0- 1 3 . By making ourselves subject to the Categorical Imperative, it is our free will, our
capacity to set our ends by reason, that makes us the cause of the value we give to those
ends. Thus, by subj ecting ourselves to the idea of law, we can be self-legislating, rather
than legislated-to. See, for example, THEODOR ADoRNo & MAX HoRKHEIMER, D IALECTIC OF
ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cummings trans. , 1 944) , for an excellent discussion of the e thical
difficulty of a theory of moral freedom that seeks to render itself fully consistent ·with a
Newtonian conception of causality. For an excellent critique of the Kantian notion of
causality, with which Kant starts in his definition of the free will as causality, see C HARLES
SA.i'lDERS PEIRCE, Causation and Force, in REAsoNING AND THE LoGrc oF THINGS 1 97 ( Kenneth
Laine Ketner ed., 1 99 2 ) .
306 See K>..NT 's GRO U NDWORK, supra n ote 303, at 61-66.

307
30 8

See id.
See lM�'LJ\NUEL KANT, On the Relationshzp of Theory to Practice in iv1orality in General, in

KANT: PoLITI CAL WRITINGS, supra note 33, at 64, 67 ("The maxim of absolute obedience to

a categorically binding lmv of the free wil l . . . is good i n itself, but [happiness] is not. [ It]
may, if i t conflicts with duty, be thoroughly evil.") .

30 9 See IM:V!ANUEL KA.NT, Introduction to the Themy of Right, in KA;:-;T: POLITICAL vVRJTil'GS,
sujJra note 33, at 1 32; KANT's GRouNDWORK, supra note 303, at 96-98.
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respe cts the equal worth and dignity of all others because she shares
in the humanity that makes them the source of value they give to their
own ends. Hence, it is as fre e p ersons that we all have e qual worth,
and i t is this equal worth that law must recogn ize.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to rehearse all the criticisms
of Kantian moral theory or, alternatively, to review the efforts to
render his moral theory coherent without ontological dualism. 3 1 0 We
note only that we agree with those who argue that a stron g Kantianism .
offering a comprehensive view of the self i s i ndefensible because i t
relies o n a n outdated concept o f causality. 3 1 1 Yet we still want t o de
fend the Kantian con ception of our equal worth as fre e persons who
possess a value-conferring capacity, partially setting our e nds by rea
son. We do so by adding an existentialist twist to Kant ' s i nsight into
the assertiveness of our value-conferring capacity whenever we j udge
an obj ect of desire to be an end.
In his book o n Kant, Heidegger argues that the factual dimension
of lived experience makes j udgmen t and evaluation inevitable . 3 1 2
Moral freedom i s a praxis of self-responsibility that we must assume as
part of our moral awakening to the inevitable reality that we do make
judgments and evaluations, bringing forth a moral self when making
those judgments and evaluations. Self-responsibility is a p ractice i n
and through which w e constantly are becoming who w e are a s w e indi
viduate ourselves by evaluating and re-evaluating our actions, evalua
tions, and j udgments as we make them our own ends. 3 1 3 In this
understanding, we exercise our freedom as a narration that makes the
value-conferring moment in our actions and judgments one that we
310

For an excellent discussion of why Kant's two standpoints need n o t rely o n o ntological dualism, see KoRSGAARD, supra n ote 303, at 1 59-87.
311
See PEIRCE, supra n ote 305, a t 1 97-2 1 7.
3 1 2 See HEIDEGGER, supra note 30, at 89-1 42.
3 1 3 See id. \Ne are well aware that one can read Heidegger to have dropped all linge r
ing aspects of his "humanism" i n his later writings. See REI NER ScHOR.J\-1ANN , H E IDEGGER O N
B E I N G AND AcTING ( Christine-Marie Gros trans., 1 987) . Our i n ten t is not to e n te r i n to the
debate about the meaning of H eidegger's "turn" for his understanding of action and more
specifically of self-assertion. We only argue that it is possible to maintain something close
to Kan t's understanding of our equal worth because we are value-bestowing creatures who
turn our actions i n to ends that we justify through reasons by giving moral or e thical narra
tions of our lives. The process of narrating a m oral or ethical story is how we bring forth
the moral self, which the n takes responsibility for her actions, valuations, and j udgments as
if they had been her e nds all along. This process we call the practice of self-responsibility.
Both Herbert Marcuse and Hannah Arendt took up the H eidegger-Kant dialogue and
made i t cen tral to their own thinking. See ti"..NNAH ARENDT, ON REvoLUTION 47-50 ( 1 963)
( elaborating on the Kantian ideal of freedom and the role i t has played in inspiring revolu
tions) . For an important discussion of Marcuse's appropriation of the ideal of moral free
dom as a practice of responsibility, see MARTI N J. B ECK iv1uusTiK, SPECTERS OF LIBERATTOi'
25-47 ( 1 998) . For an excellent discussion of the Kan t-Heidegger dialogue as Heidegger
conceived it, see IAN 'NARD, KANTL"..N ISM, PosTMODERNISM AND CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 3656 ( 1 997) .
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ourselves understand as called upon rationally or reasonably to justify
to others. This understanding of our moral freedom as a p ractice of
self-responsibility for our ends as moral beings suffices to defend the
idea of our equal worth , even though it temporalizes the way in which
the moral self is brought into being.
2.

The Kantian Standpoint of Practical Reason

As

persons with a life, which is ours alone to lead, we all ask the
question , "What should I do?" By posing this question, each one of us
takes up the stance of practical reason. From this standpoint, an indi
vidual cannot be the object of another b ecause each individual is exis
tentially positioned to ask and answer that question through moral
reflection only for herself; her actions still will be hers as she reflec
tively takes them on as such . Each of us has her own moral and ethi
cal options and reacts to her own set of external demands, although
some of us are much m ore constrained by law and circumstance than
others.
Liberal political philosophy, particularly when informed by the
tradition of critical idealism, 31 4 demands that any just societal order
begin with the treatment of each individual as an equal in th e sense
that we must view each as equally worthy to pursue her own answer to
that fundamental question, "What should I do?" The State should
treat each of us as if we are rational in a specific sense-as if we are
capable of assuming responsibility for our own ends. We are reasonable
in that we realize that we are capable of recognizing and harmonizing
our pursuit of the good with creatures who are like us in that they
have equal dignity. 3 1 5 Both notions, rationality and reasonableness,
must operate in the law. The law should recognize persons as the
source of ethical value that they give to their own life ' s decisions when
they take these up as ends through moral reflection . But it also
should accord individuals the capacity to decide that other human
creatures are , like themselves , worthy of that same reco gnition and
respect. We therefore are reasonable only when we recognize in
others their worthiness to pursue their own lives and recognize that
we must try to organize both our own lives and a system of social life
314

See, e.g. , J ORGEN

couRsE THEORY OF L<\w

H.�BER.\·1,\S, BETWEEN FACTS

AND

NoRMS: CoNTRJ BUTIONS TO A D I S

(William Rehg trans., 1 996) .
3 1 5 John Rawls's work, which profoundly has shaped the last two gen erations of liberal
political, ethical , and legal thought, develops his en tire theory from the initial recognition
of equal dignity in the sense that human beings must be politically recognizable as having
both of these capacities or capabilities; that is, they are both reasonable and rational . See
RAwLs , sufmt note 294, at 48-54. For the purposes of this essay, we wil l use capacity and
capability interchangeably.
AND
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and of p oli tical organization tha t is consiste nt with the e qual dignity
316
o f all p ers o ns.
The perso n as a legal and moral ideal must remain abstract if that
deal
is to de note the freedom o n which it is based. Because each
i
i ndividu al undertakes her own p ractice of self-responsibility, the State
must not impos e definitions of how one can or should realize that
potential fo r self-definition. Of course, we are m ore, much m o re ,
than this abstract free being. The political and m oral point o f ab
stracting the ideal of the person from the substance of any one indi
vidual ' s concrete life is to protect the freedom-th e p otential-of
forming ourselves into a unique being-a being immersed in a life to
be lived in all the relational complexity we associate with any actual
living human being.
3.

The Ideal of the Imaginary Domain

On this understanding, a p erson is not j ust a give n , but implicates
a practice in and through which the p erson is constantly engaged, a
process of assuming self-responsibility through moral refl e c tion on
31 6

We endorse John Rawls's definition of the reasonable:
If we ask how the reasonable is understood, we say: for our purposes h ere ,
the conten t of the reasonable is specified by the content of a reasonable
poli tical conception. The idea of the reasonable itself is given in pan, again
for our purposes, by the two aspects of persons' being reasonable: their
willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation among
equals and their recognition of and willingness to accept the consequen ces
of the burdens of judgmen t.
!d. at 94 (internal cross-reference omitted ) . We can highlight the moral and political sig
nificance of the reasonable by contrasting it to the unreasonable:
By con trast, people are unreasonable i n the same basic aspect when they
plan to engage in cooperative schemes but are unwilling to honor, or even
to propose, except as a necessary publi c pretense, any general principles or
standards for specifying fair terms of cooperatio n . They are ready to violate
such terms as suits their i n terests whe n circumstances allow.
Id. at 50.
We contrast the notion of rationality operative in our economic discussion. In eco
nomics a considerably narrower ideal of rationality operates, focused almost exclusively on
wealth ma.x imization as the expression of self-in terest. The Kantian-inspire d n otion of the
reasonable altogether disappears. See generally 1 KEN BINMORE, GAiviE THEORY AND THE So.
CIAL CoNTRACT 7-92 ( 1 994) ( proceeding under the title "DeKanting Rawls" to struggle with
the proposition that an expanded concept of economic rationality can encompass the rea
sonable) . The assertion instead is that people ' s free pursuit of rational self-interest leads to
a society that realizes the greatest possible wealth. This realization has obvious e thical
implications i n a world of scarcity and physical suffering. Sign ificantly, the Kantian ideal of
rationality permits the existence of the individual as economic actor. Recognizing rational
ity as a basic human capabili ty in politics and law necessarily concedes legitimacy to eco
n omic self i n terest; political philosophy must not foreclose it i n the name of an
overarching good, but i t must be allowed to play out as a pan of human freedom. At the
same time, however, i t cannot be accorded essentialist status. In Kant, rationality is always
a limit to self-interest because an end or a maxim is only freely chosen if i t is chosen i n
accordance with the universal law. Game theory does not understand rationality a s a limit
to self-in terest but rather as the means to its realization in the world.
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the question, "What should I do?" As persons, then, we inevitably are
implicated in the working through of personas. Since these are not
just given or imposed on us but have to be assumed, it also turns us
toward culture. In this sense, culture tends to be a condition of per
sonhood. The personas in and through which we come to ourselves
are both culturally expressed and a fundamental expression of
culture .
This understanding of the relationship between person and per
sona is crucial to our defense of the ethical, political, and legal ideal
of the person against the legitimate and powerful criticisms of this
ideal that both feminists and race critical theorists have made . In
crude summation, these critiques argue that the liberal ideal of the
person is too "thin" to provide political or legal insight into the em
bodied concrete concerns of everyday life. 3 1 7 Significantly, the criti
cisms do not rej ect the idea that all persons have equal worth. They
instead turn on an ethical mandate to provide a "th icker" and thus
truer conception of the self as the basis for legal refo rm . 3 1 8 We ad
dress these criticisms and simultaneously maintain as central to our
defense of language rights the ideal of the free person. 3 1 9 To do so,
we defend the ideal of the imaginary domain. 320
The imaginary domain is an aesthetic idea that illuminates what
freedom demands of creatures that inevitably are shaped by their own
identifications. We understand freedom as a practice of assuming re
sponsibility for our evaluations of our basic identifications as we make
them our own in the course of shaping our individual lives. 32 1 Kant
3 1 7 See, e.g. , SARA RuDDICK, ivL\TERNAL THINKJ1'G ( 1 989) (arguing that mothering gives
rise to a distinct mode of thinking and exploring the implications of this thought) .
3 1 8 For an example of a "thicker" conception of self, see RoBIN \NEST, NARRi\TIVE, Au
THORnY AND LAw 2 5 1 -63 ( 1 993) ( comparing her "literary woman" with Richard Posner's
"economic man" ) .
3 1 9 See CoRNELL, DoMAIN, supra note 295, at 3-27 and CoRNELL, AT THE HEART, supra
note 295, at 3-32, for a more elaborate defense of why scholars should maintain the ideal of
the person in political philosophy. For an example of a feminist who criticizes the abstract
ideal of the person, see RuDDICK, supra note 3 1 7.
32 0 Later we will defend the degradation prohibition as it is a limit o n the equal protec
tion of each person's imaginary domain implied by the way we define the ideal.
32 1 Ronald Dworkin uses a similar concept of the relationship between freedom and
responsibility to base the legal authorization of ourselves as the only legitimate source of
value for the evaluative design of our lives. To quote Dworkin's understanding of his own
second pri n ci ple of ethical individualism:
The second principle is not j ust a general principle assigning each person
major responsibility for what happens to him. It is more specific. It assigns
people for the evaluative design of their life; it assigns each person the re
sponsibility to shape his life to a conception of ethical value that is chosen
or endorsed by him rather than by any other person or group. vVe must
take considerable care not to misunderstand that assignment. I t assumes
and demands a kind of freedom but it is not metaphysical freedom-it is
not, that is, people's power by an act of free will to alter the chain of events
predetermined by physical or mental causation. The second principle is
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defines aesthetic ideas as i nterpretative in that they help us grasp the
perso nal significance of otherwise hopelessly abstract ideals. 3 22 The
expression of aesthetic ideas facilitates p olitical and moral reflection
and gives body to our interpretatio n of the meaning of the fre e and
equal person. 32 3 Aesthetic ideas con figure the moral dimension of
experience. 32 4 The moral dimension is crucial to articulating the con
struction of the wrong- and right-making characteristics o f any partic
ular social fact-in the present case, the legal suppression of Spanish .
More particularly, the aesthetic idea of the imaginary domain helps us
to imagine and to articulate the cross-references by which our case for
language rights follows from the liberal ideal of the fre e and equal
person.
The imaginary domain expresses an essential right of p ersonality
by recognizing both our equal dignity and our potential to assume our
special responsibility for ourselves . 3 25 We cannot assume this respon
sibility, however, unless the moral and psychic space is protected, al
lowing us to engage in the p ractice of self-responsibility through
which we come to terms with the ethics of our own identifications.
We may either embrace these identifications, keep them fluid, or
struggle to discard them altogether. These possibilities are what
makes way for our ethical respo nsibility for our identifications. When
we make an identification, such as being a Latina, a conscious end,
the n we clearly can see why respect for how that identification is ar
ticulated is crucial to the respect for the person . But even if we are
not so explicit in making an identification an end in Kant's sense, we
cannot entirely escape our responsibility for how we live with these
not offended or undermined in any way by a commitment to determinism,
because it neither demands nor presupposes what we may call relational
freedom: it insists that so far as your life is guided by convictions, assump
tions, or instincts about ethical value, tha t they must be your convic tions,
assumptions, or instincts. You rather than anyone else have the right and
responsibility to choose the ethical values that you will try to embody i n
your l ife.
Ronald Dworkin, The Roots ofjustice 29 (Aug. 28, 1 997) (unpublished manuscri p t, o n file
with authors) .
3 2 2 See lMivL,\NUEL K'\NT, CRITIQUE OF juDGMENT 1 83 (Werner S. Pluhar trans . , 1 987)
( 1 793 ) .

3 23 I n Kant's words, aesthetic ideas draw out a "concept's implications and its kinship
wi th other concepts." Jd.
3 24 I n particular, aesthetic ideas can draw out the moral dimension of experi en ce.
Although Kan t never directly would have connected aesthetic ideas with his conceptualiza
tion of the morally free person, I have argued that we can use such ideas to try to give body
to what would othenvise remain abstract. So, for example, when Rawls argues that the veil
of ignoranc e is a representative devise, I would argue that it is more precisely thought o f as
an aesthetic idea. For Rawls's most recent discussion of his understanding of the original
position or the veil of ignorance as a representational devise, see RAWLS, supra n ote 294, at
27-28. For a more elaborate discussion of my own use of the aesthetic idea of the i magi
nary domai n , see CoR:--I ELL, AT THE H EART, sujJra note 295.
3 25 See CoR:\ELL, AT THE HEART, s-upra note 295.
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i d enti fications because they always are being reshaped by us as we take
th em on, even if we think we only are doing so by followin g tradition .
As persons who can never entirely escape self-responsibi lity, we need
th e moral space i n which to exercise it. The imaginary domain man
dates that the moral community of persons include each of us and
provide us this space.
The imaginary domain operates o n two levels within th e moral
community of persons. At one level, the imaginary domain allows
each of us to demarcate a space for self-evaluation through moral re
flection. This space must have protection p rior to the beginning of a
conception of proceduralist j ustice , such as the one John Rawls de
fends. In a famous analogy, Rawls uses the representational device of
"the original position" and "the veil of ignorance" to engage in a hy
pothetical experiment in the imagination that guides our moral re
flection. 3 2 6 The veil of ignorance forecloses knowledge of our gender,
our ethnic identity, our linguistic o rigin, our race, o r our class posi
tion. Without this knowledge, the perpetuation of social hierarchies is
not rational because no one knows where in the world of social hierar
chies she would fall .
The veil of ignorance helps u s envision a procedure for moral
reflection that, by virtue of its very articulation, forces us to question
social hierarchies, and at the same time, challenges their h old on our
imaginations. But how does one take into account gender, race, na
tionality, and ethnic and linguistic background in the hypothetical ex
periment of the imagination? Certainly we should take into account
these fundamental aspects of each person's life. But th e solution is
not to assert that "facts" concerning the meaning of these realities
about ourselves should reside behind the veil of ignorance . 3 27 Be
cause these so-called facts are intertwined with basic social hierarchies
in the real ·world, placing them behind the veil of ignorance frustrates
the purpose of the exercise of imagining ourselves as free, equal, and
unbound by our hierarchical place in society. This difficulty, however,
does not mean that we should forget these realities; instead, we should
imagine ourselves as persons free to morally evaluate these hierar
chies. Behind the veil of ignorance, in o ther words, the idealized situ326
32 7

R"..WLS, supra note 302, at 304-09.
Critics of Rmvls wrongly have attacked the idealized representations behind the veil
of ignorance as if they were supposed to be real human beings. Thus, these critics argue
that Rawls gives us a h opelessly abstract ideal of the person that cannot guide our m oral
reflection in real life. Real life, of course, is infused with the hierarchies that corrupt our
thinking about equality. These critics n eglect the purpose of a hypothetical experiment in
the imagination, which demands that ;ve try to represen t the conditions for moral reflec
tion of free and equal persons. Such an experience does not start with real i ty, particularly
a social real ity that h ierarchies bind together, because the point of the representative de
vice is to imagine a basis for moral refl ec tion on tne moral legi timacy of the hierarchies.
How would we think about justice if we did not know h ow those hi erarchies would treat us?
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ation of the re pre s entative includes the postulatio n of the self as free
in the term s described earlier. The imaginary domai n , i n which we
conceptualize all persons in the moral community as p ossessed of the
right to represent and evaluate what these realities mean to them, pro
vides a space for that prior evaluation of our equal worth. 328
At a second level , the imaginary domain extends to each person a
right to self-representation-a right to establish herself as her own
representative of whom she is because she must take responsibility for
her own life .32 9 To be included in the moral community is to be rec
ognized as having the potential to shape and to reshape o n e ' s identifi
cations out of the symbolic material they present. This right to self
representation subsumes the right to privacy, at least when inter
preted as the demand to be left alone. This subsump ti o n is b ecause
the right to self-representation insists that each person must have the
psychic and moral space to experiment with the personas through
which culture is expressed so that she may have the chance to
resignify what culture means to her. By demandin g this psychic and
moral space for each of us, the right to the imaginary dom ai n takes us
beyond hierarchical definitions of the self, whether caste, class, race,
gender, national origin , or linguistic descent imposes it. Some have
thought that these socially and symbolically constructed identifica
tions determine the person.330 But as persons vvith th e right to self
representation, women, Mrican Americans, and Latinos/as cannot be
reduced to naturalized classes whose entitlements and duties flow
from their status positions. This right demands that the State and our
basic social institutions recognize the person as worthy of being who
she is as a member of the moral community of persons and, as such,
treat her as the legally authoritative source of any m oral or ethical
meaning she gives to her basic identifications.
B.

The Dynamic Nature of Identification and Our Disagreement
with the Communitarians

We now turn to a detailed response to the several critiques of the
liberal person that communitarians, feminists, and race critical theo
rists make . Our conceptualization of identifications as central to the
shaping of identity answers these divergent critiques of the liberal per
son. For us, a person ' s identi ty is inseparable from her iden tifications;
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For a more extensive discussion of the i maginary domain and Rawls' s hypothetical
experiment in the imagination, see CoRNELL, AT THE H EART, supra note 295, at 1 4-1 9.
3 29 See id. at 1 7- 1 8 .
3 3 0 For an excellent summation of the communitarian critique of the liberal person,
particularly as i t has been elaborated i n the work of John Rawls, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS or JusTICE (2d ed. 1 998) . For a rich analysis of the relationship
between race critical th eory and the liberal ideal of the person, see PATRJCIA WILLU\IviS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS ( 1 99 1 ) .
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as a result, the moral self is inseparable from a n ethics of identifica
tion through which the person engages the practice of self-responsi
bility. We have no quarrel with communitarians, feminists, and race
critical theorists when they criticize the phenomenology of the indi
vidual, often implicit in liberal thought.33 1 But we argue that they are
wrong to the extent that they denigrate the significance of freedom
due to its purported use in a m isguided phenomenology or anthro
pology in liberal theory.
Our basic identifications are fundamental aspects of our lives.
We internalize these basic identifications initially as essential to our
selves, often even without recognizing, let alone rationally assessing,
the fact that we do so. We cohere into a self only by making sense of
these basic identifications, whether we consciously question them as
contestable or not. \\Then an individual assumes an identity, this as
sumption implies that these basic identifications have received a sedi
mented m eaning or m eanings. We inevitably engage these
inheritances when we acknowledge ourselves, whether as a Jew, a
woman, an Mrican American , a Latino , or a Latina.33 2
"No one chooses her parents," goes the old saying, and indeed,
our parents ' identity is only one of an array of life circumstances we
do not choose. As soon as we are born, we are stamped with a sex.
Our racialized culture racially designates our parents ( or parent) and
us with them. We are placed in their arms and delivered into their
realities-their country, their culture, their class position, their reli
gion ( or lack of it) , their lived sexualities, and whatever o ther basic
identifications that have shaped them. We are immersed into a world
thick with meaning, meaning that is passed on to us in language . We
rely on this language to give ourselves form slowly to distinguish our
selves from our surroundings. We inherit a world that at least to some
extent comes to us framed by the language of those who engage us in
intimacy; they are the ones who first teach us, consciously and uncon
sciously, what it means for them and in turn for us to b e human .
Communitarians continually remind us that our inheritance of
language , our country, our culture, and our tradition constitute us. 3 3 3
3 3 1 See, e. g. , SAJ'iDEL, supra note 330, at 1 ("This is an essay about liberalism . . . . Against
the primacy of justice, I shall argue for the limits of justice and, by i mplication, for the
limits of liberalism as well.") .
332
See T>..YLO R, supra note 292, at 1 1 1 - 1 4 .
3 33
I t is important to remember that long before the "new" communi tarians, Hegel
made the same point about the consti tution of human identi ty. See HEGEL's P H ILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT, supra note 296, at 38-40. But Hegel also understood that people could draw differ
ent moral and ethical lessons from the recogni tion of how human identi ty is rooted in
history, language, and culture . I ndeed, Hegel argues that the modern person is distin
guishable from o ther legal and moral forms giw:: i1 to our humanity. See id. at 39-40. The
person of modernity is no l onger reducible to her social role in established hierarchy. Nor
is she identical wi th any of the final ends of her community or even with the State. Given
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We do not, they say, make ourselves up fro m scratch . This argument
is true e n ough . But it is just as true that we revise o urselves , even if
some of us experience ourselves as already imbued with an identity,
"man or "woman" ; "white" or "of color"; 'Jewish" or "Christian" ; " gay"
or "s traight" ; "Anglo , " "Latin American, " or "Asian . " As we stressed
before, when we take up these identifications, we become responsible
for them and for the ethical meanings they receive. 33 4 Some of us
may experience our identifications as if ancestral tradi ti o n , religious
conviction , national origin, or the nature of our sexuali ty carved them
out in certain forms . For people who experience themselves in this
way, it makes little or no sense to separate themselves fro m these basic
identifications. Who they are is for them identical to their consti tu
tion as Jewish, Mrican American , or Asian . But consciously or not,
they still exercise moral and ethical responsibility when they take up a
life associated with a particular identification .
For example, there are many meanings of what i t m e ans to be
Jewish . Anyone who simply claims that her Judaism mandates accept
ance of a particular institutionalized form of Judaism still must con
front responsibility for this associational decision. Clearly, members
of the Jewish community constantly exercise this responsibility or free
dom, as many different meanings of being Jewish have been both ex
pressed and institutionalized. Still, other p eople do no t experience
themselves as identical with their origins, whether national, ethnic, or
religious. Indeed, the entire immigrant story, particularly as i t empha
sizes battles between the generations, stems from what it m eans for
the members of the next generatio n to revise their sense of them
selves by re-evaluating for their own lives the basic identifications of
their parents .
Many believe the debate between the liberals and the com
munitarians to be over whether or not individuals can revise these
basic ends and identifications or for that matter rationally assess these
at all.335 As generation after generation of immigrants have shown,
"

the complexity of the modern state, the individual herself no longer can have a simple
identi ty. She must subjectively identify with the ends of her community-the nation state
in which she is a citizen . See id. at 1 5 5-59. This insistence on the split and complex nature
of modern individuality separates Hegel from modern communitarians such as Michael
Sandel who argues that because our communities' ends are constitutive of who we are, i t is
legi timate for the State to impose restrictions on people's ability to revise those ends. See
S ->.ND E L supra note 330, at 1 8 3 ( examining deontological l iberalism and concluding that i t
neglects the power o f politics t o achieve a level o f common good that i ndividuals alone
cannot achieve ) .
334 For a more extended articulation o f what I mean b y a n "ethics o f identification,"
see An ti-Racism, Multi-Culturalism, and the Eth ics of Identification , co-authored with Sara
M urphy (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) .
33 5
For an excellent response to the communitarian argument that we can revise our
own ideals, Ronald Dworkin , Foundations of Liberal Equality, in l l THE TA:--: N ER LECTURES o:--;
H c \-L-\0: V.-\LL'ES 1 , 66-7 1 ( Grethe B . Peterson eel., 1 990 ) .
.

,
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even the deepest identifications are open to both re-evaluation and
rerepresentation. 33 6 Thus, the communitarians clearly are wrong
about what people can do. The real debate is over what people
should do and should take responsibility for and, more specifically,
what the State should be allowed to do to enforce people ' s allegiances
to specific ends and identifications. If, as some communitarians have
argued, people ' s ends and identifications constitute and thus are
identical with them, 33 7 the State can enforce fidelity to these ends and
identifications without trampling on individual freedom and on the
practice of self-responsibility. The individual is the ends and iden tifi
cations; she only can be as free as those specific ends that already con
stitute her. As we already have suggested, this conception of the self
may indeed be a true description of how some people experience
their identities, but even then i t does not relieve them of responsibil
ity. It also suffers from overinclusion: the State still can trample on
other people 's freedom by reinfo rcing all people 's allegiances or by
limiting the space in which people ' s basic identifications can be re
evaluated and rerepresented.
What body should we recognize as the source of moral value for
these moral allegiances and identifications when they are defined as
ends? Can the State bestow value on them in its own name or even in
the name of the "true" interests of the individual? For a communitar
ian, if the individual truly knows who she is, she would understand
that the state-imposed allegiances are truly her own ends. 33 8 She
would exercise her practice of self-responsibility in the only way she
truly ethically can: by living a life in allegiance with her community. 3 39
We argue, on the contrary, that the person must be recognized as the
source of the ethical or moral value she gives to her basic identifica
tions. To make this argument in no way implies that human beings,
like persons shedding clothes, simply can detach themselves from the
ends and identifications that have shaped who they are as persons.
Our argument presupposes only that people can revise and readjust
ends and identifications and that even if we accept them as passed
down to us, we remain responsible for the form in which we accept
them . It emphasizes that the communitarian insight that human be
ings grow into individuals only in and through webs of relationships
also should remind us that freedom is fragile. Indeed, the degree to
which persons actually can revise identi fications and ends depends in
part on whether the State and basic social institutions p rovide them
�� 3 6
See, e. g. , supra notes 54-57 ( noting that i mmigrants use English as their prima ry
language within three generations) .
:>3 7 See SAND EL, supra note 330, at 59-65.

338

3 39

See id.
See id.
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with the moral and psychic space to do so. This responsibili ty is why
the equal protection of the imaginary domain is so important. Pro
tecting the imaginary domain ensures that the person and not the
State is the source of the evaluations and representations of her fun
damental ends and identifications. It is precisely because we initially do
n ot choose the primordial relationships and identifications through
which we pattern a self and become a person that we need morally
and legally provided psychic space to incorporate the m , to re-evaluate
them, or to contest them through the evaluations and m eanings we
give them. How one does so is inevitably a part of the exercise of self
responsibility.
Once we see that identifications are not just s tamp e d o n us, we
begin to comprehend the ideal or idealized element of identi fication.
This element often is made explicit as an ethical or p ol itical ideal.
This is the case with Latinos/as. The identification of Latino/a car
ries an ethical and political message due in part to the h istori cal basis
of its usage in the United States. The identi ficatio n implies that the
person can trace roots to a Latin Ameri can country and is ensconced
in the Spanish language, but is not trying to pass as Spanish-as a
white European . Identification as Latino/a also is relational-an his
torical interpretation of the Southwest, Puerto Rico , M exico , and
Cuba, as well as the significance of the economic and p oli ti cal domi
nation of South America for Latin culture and for the Spanish lan
guage, defines in part the meanings of Latino/a. 340 The definition of
what it means to be a Latino/a thus is partially an act of the p olitical
imagination . To enhan ce this identification can be to take it as an
end through moral reflection. In like manner, Gloria Anzaldua de
scribes the political and ethical process by which Chicanos/ as came to
imagine themselves as bound togeth er as a people:
Chicanos did not know we were a people until 1 965 when Ceasar
[sic] Chavez and the farmworkers united and I Am joaquin was pub
lished and la Raza Unida party was formed in Texas . With that rec
ogniti o n, we became a distinct peopl e . Something momen tous
happened to the Chicano soul-we became aware of our reality and
acquired a name and a language ( Chicano Spanish ) that refl ected
that reality. Now that we had a name, some of the fragm e n ted
p ieces began to fal l together-who we were, what we were , how we
had evolved. We began to ge t gli mpses of what we migh t even tually
become.341

3 40 For an excellent discussion of th e pol i tical demarcations that either create or rein
force identities, see Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming The Logic of GroujJ
Political Conflict, in T H E RIGHTS OF MINORITY C u LTURES 1 5 5 ('Will Kymlicka ed., 1 99 5 ) .
34 1
ANZALDUA, supra note 1 5 1 , at 63.

1 999 ]
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The D ifference Between Parameters and Limits

The fact that the boundaries of an identification h ave political
and ethical dimensions does not mean that anyone can take on any
identification. Neither of us is Latino/a, and if either of us were to
insist that we are , you would be right either gently to prod us to see a
psychiatrist or, once you had heard either of us speak Spanish, to
make reference to this Article and accuse us of moral hubris. The
communitarians are correct that the inheritance of language, culture ,
and country sets parameters for our lives. 3 42 But they are j ust that
parameters. They are not necessarily imposed limits that so rigidly
define us that we cannot develop a personal response to the full par
ticularity of our situation. 343 As Ronald Dworkin has argued, ulti
mately, each of us personally should make the distinction b etween
parameters and limits , even if the historical situation in which we find
ourselves in turn indexes it. 3 44
At this point, another important difference with the com
munitarians becomes manifest. It is a limit o n our lives that under the
above definition of Latino/a, we cannot embrace that identification
or gain acceptance as those who identify themselves as Latinos/as,
even if w e desperately se e k t o do so. 345 But what if one of us were to
marry a Mexican, move to Mexico, become a Mexican citizen , achieve
fluency in Spanish , and raise children of the marriage as Mexicans?
Assume that the one who took on that overwhelming proj ect of trans34 2
343

See Dworkin , supra note 335, at 67.
We borrow the distinction between parameters and limits from Ronald Dworkin.
See id. at 68.
344 As Dworkin explains:
The ideal life is always the same: it is a life creating as much independent
value-as powerful a pleasing of God or as much human happiness-as i t is
conceivable for a human being to create. Circumstances act as l i mits on
the degree to which the ideal can be achieved. Mortality, for example, is a
very important limit: most people could create more pleasure i f they lived
l onger. Talent, wealth, personality, language, technology, and culture pro
vide other limits, and their force as limits will be much greater for some
people, and in some times and places, than others. If we take an i ndexed
challenge view of ethics, however, and treat livi n g well as responding in the
right way to one's si tuation, then we must treat some of the circumstances
in which a particular person lives differently, as parameters that help define
what a good performance of l iving would be for him.
!d. at 66-67.
34 5 V\'hen a commentator argues that bilingualism in Spanish and English is a disability
in the U ni ted States, he is setting out Spanish as a limit on people's lives that must be
addressed in the name of equality. See Mirande, supra note 1 7 , at 1 03 . For this commenta
tor, it is only by addressing bilingualism as a disability that we can hope legally to interpre t
statutes that forbid the speaking of Spanish i n workplaces as discrimination . See id. at 1 020 3 . How an ability to speak two languages at hom<> sensibly could be rendered as a disabil
ity demands more discussion. See infra note 396.
Clearly, this conception of bilingualism in Spanish and English as a disability is insep
arable from the treatment of Latinos/ as in the U nited States.
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formation were later to tell the o ther, "At this point in my life I iden
tify myself more as a Mexican than as an American. " That individual 's
life parameters substantially would have changed. Identification as La
tino/a would no longer seem like simple craziness or hubris, despi te
the fact that many if not all Mexicans would continue to identify that
person as an Anglo.
Even though we cannot completely escape our Anglo context, we
certainly can change its meaning for ourselves-despite the fac t that
other members of society may not recognize the change .3 4 6 Freedom
demands that the individual should b e the only entity empowered to
set, ethically and politically, the divide between limits and parameters .
T h e imaginary domain gives the person the moral and psychic space
to determine which historical circumstances are limits and which are
parameters. Concomitantly, the imaginary domain gives the person
space within which to embrace the parameters of her life , thereby en
abling her practice of self-respo nsibility.
Language , Culture, and Identification Within the Parameters
of the Imaginary Domain

D.

l.

Language as a Parameter

In response to the question of whether or not he was "influ
enced" by the Spanish language, the great novelist jorge Luis Borges
exclaimed:
I am inseparable from th e Span ish language. My dreams, my aspira
ti ons as a wri ter are formed i n Spanish. It's no exaggeration to say
that the man I am wou ld not "be" wh o he is without Spanish. The
write r I have become is unthinkable without the shape it has been
given by the great traditions of Latin cul ture.34 7

For Borges, the Spanish language is a personal, ethical , and aes
thetic parameter of his life both as a man and as an artist. In Dwor
kin ' s sense , Borges makes judgments about whether or n o t he has met
his own standards for an effective life as an artist and as a p erson
within the parameters of Spanish language and of Latin American cul34fi

A-;

Dworkin articulates this point:
Anyone who reflects seriously on the question which of the various lives he
might lead is right for him will consciously or unconsciously discriminate
among these, treating some as limits and others as parameters. I might
treat the fac t that I am an American, for example, as j ust a fac t that i n some
cases m igh t hel p and in others h inder my leading the life I think best. Or I
must treat mv nationality as a paramete r and assume, whether or not self�
consciously, that bei ng an American is part of what makes a particular life
the right one for me.
D1vorki n , supra n o te 335, at 67.
34 7 In terview by Sonia Moria with Jorge Luis Borges, Buenos Aires, Argemin a ( May
1 985 ) .
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ture. 348 Spanish language and culture are, at least for this one writer,
wh at Dworkin calls "hard" parameters. 349 Borges can imagine himself
only within these parameters. The p erson outside those parameters
would no longer be the man or writer, Borges .
Toni Morrison makes a similar point when she writes :
The question of what consti tutes the art of a black writer, for whom
that modifier is more search than fact, has some urgency. In o ther
words, oth er than melanin a n d subj ect matter, what, i n fact, may
make me a black writer? Other than my own ethnicity-what is go
ing on in my work that makes me believe it is demonstrably insepa
rable from a cultural specifici ty that is Afro-American?350

Morrison answers her question through a careful analysis of the first
sentences of several of her novels, noting that one can find the answer
in "the ways in which I activate language and ways in which that lan
guage activates me." 3 5 1 The parameter of her writing that gives it the
specificity of the work of a black writer is a p ractice of language, "a
search for and deliberate posture of vulnerability to those aspects of
Mro-American culture that can info rm and position my work . " 35 2
Morrison ' s writing, in other words , is inseparable from her assump
tion of the identification of Mrican American in the form of a
search-a search conducted in part by her self-responsibility for the
articulation of the cultural difference of her people.
For Morrison, it is through language that we try to fathom cul
tural difference and try to give shape to "Unspeakable Things Unspo34 8
By using the term "Latin American culture," we isolate the culture of South
America from that of Spain .
3 49 See Dworkin , supra note 335, at 70. Dworkin elaborates:
vVe must distinguish between what I shall call hard and soft parameters.
Parameters, as I said, enter into the description of any challenge or assign
ment: they describe the conditions of successful performance. H ard param
eters state essential conditions: if they are violated the performance is a
total failure, no matter how successful in other respects. The formal struc
ture of a sonnet imposes hard parameters: we can not make a sonnet better
by adding an extra line, no matter how beautiful i t is. Soft parameters are
those aspects of assignment that, when violated, reduce the value of the
performance but do not annihilate i t: they act as standards of good per
formance that permit defects to be compensated by high success against
other standards. Compulsory figures in competitive ice skating are treated
as soft parameters. It is part of the assignment that the petformance exe
cute a particular figure, and any deviations, no matter how beautifully exe
cuted, count as faults. But deviations are not absolutely fatal to winning any
points at all, and a performance that includes a brilliant deviation may win
more overall than a lackluster but petfectly faithful one.
!d.
?.s o
Toni Morrison , U11.1peakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in A merican
L iterat ure, in 1 1 THE T.\:--.: ;-..: E R LEC:TL"RES o ;-..: Hu:-otA.c'-: VALUES, supra note 335, at 1 2 1 , 1 46.
%1
!d.
352 ld. at 1 62 .
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o
en. ,353 How d e s a writer tell the story of a young Mri can Ameri can
irl' s u nb ein g? How does one tell this and other horror stories that
th e " rememoration"-which is in turn a representation of the
p re vi o us ly unrepresented past? Writing, for Morrison, is explicitly an
act of self-responsibility before the stories that haunt the historical
present of her life-a life that she deliberately has assumed as that of
an Mrican American writer. The o pening phrase of The Bluest Eye is,
"Quiet as it's kept." 35 4 This phrase was a familiar one fro m Morrison ' s
childhood, one she heard again and again , listening t o adult black
women talking amongst themselves . The hope in this p hrase, from
the perspective of the adult women looking back on the young girl
friends who lived through the character Pecola's undoing, is that the
"us" that is keeping the secret can admit to i t and therefore confirm
that this "us" has the power to confront even the most h o rrible reality.
Telling a story gives a possible new m eaning to the "us" that is formed
even if the secret that made us can never be fully revealed, not only
because it is too horrible, but also b ecause the story comes too late to
save Pecola. As Morrison writes,

�lock

The words are co nspiratorial. "Shh, don ' t tell anyone else," and "No
one is allowed to know this. " It is a secret between us and a secret
that is being kept from us. The conspiracy is both held and with
held, exposed and sustained. In some sense it was precisely what the
act of writing the book was: the public exposure of a private confi
dence. In order fully to comprehend the duali ty of that positio n ,
one needs to think of the immediate politi cal climate i n which the
writing took place, 1 9 65-69, during great social upheaval in the life
of black people . The publication (as opposed to the writing) in
volved the exposure ; the writing was the disclosure of secre ts, secrets
"we" shared and those withhel d from us by ourselves and by the
world outside the community. 3 55

The "we" is in quotation marks because this group is not just there ,
but is formed in part by the secret and the effort to fathom the mean
ing of the rape of a young black girl who only can be there when she
hallucinates a white self with the bluest eyes. How can "we" make
sense of that? Of a young black girl who cannot see hers elf until she
becomes mad enough to see herself as the idealized white girl with the
bluest eyes? She strives to take on her own version of the idealized
identification "white girl . " Then she becomes what everything i n the
racist world in which she grew up told her she could not b e . The
young girl 's hallucination of herself is madness because she must ex
tinguish herself to see herself as "worthy" of her existence. Psych osis
35 3
3 54
3 55

at 1 2 1 .
ToNI MoRRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 5 (Alfred A. Kappf 1 994) ( 1 970) ( i talics omitted ) .
Morrison, supra note 350, at 1 47.
!d.

""

COSTS AND WRONGS OF NATIVISM

1 999]

679

is the only way for her to dream up a self because she lives her "black
ness" as an absolute limit on any attemp t to fill herself in and become
a person . The adult women who tell the story stumble before they
make the identification with her that they must to reveal the secret, an
identification they did not make when they let her go to the abyss of
her madness. Pecola is not alone in the brutal limitations imposed
upon what she could make of herself as a black girl in a racist society.
The story proceeds through rememoration-re-identification of what
it m eans to be an Mrican Ameri can.
How does the writer find the language to tell this story? What is it
about this story and the language i n which it is told that m akes it an
expression of identification and re-identification of the difference of
Mro-American culture? Morrison explains:
The points I have tried to illustrate are that my choices of language
( speakerly, aural, colloquial ) , my reliance for full comprehension
on codes embedded i n black culture , my effort to effect immediate
coconspiracy and in timacy (without any distancing, explanatory
fabri c ) , as wel l as my ( failed) attempt to shape a silence while break
ing it are attempts ( many unsatisfactory) to transfigure the com
plexity and wealth of Afro-American culture i n to a language worthy
of the culture.356

It might seem strange to use Morrison and Borges as if they are
making the same point. B orges is speaking of the unsunderable con
nection between himself and the Spanish language and culture. He
implicitly draws the connection between Spanish language and Latin
culture . But the Spanish language also embodies the culture of Spain,
which is not Latin American. Morrison writes in English , but hers is
an English that amongst other things expresses the colloquial prac
tices of black folklore and the day-to-day expressions encoded in Mro
American culture . Both writers articulate the insight that who they
are is inseparable from the way they are "activated" in language and
that their language is inseparable from both the culture that brings it
to life and their own identification with that culture . Morrison and
Borges describe language as an essential parameter of their lives, but
one that the complex relationship language has with culture, ethnic
ity, nationality, and race shapes. As is the case with all parameters, the
very attempt to articulate its significance reworks its meaning.
2.

Language and Culture

The exact relationship between the person, language, and
though t remains a matter of dispute, as does the precise connection
between language and culture . Steven Pinker, for example , has ar35 6

!d. at 1 50 .
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gue d that we all think i n a prelinguistic medium called
"Mentalese. "357 As a result, the mode of linguistic expression h as no
real bearing on our thoughts and on our access to reality. Pinker
could imagine a world in which we all speak in the same universal
language. 35 8 Perhaps James Joyce in Finnegans Wake came closest to
realizing such a world, undoing the boundaries of historical human
languages . But to do so Joyce also had to imagine the dissolution of
the rigid ethnic, national, and sexual identifications. 359
For human beings living today, h owever, language differentiation
is inseparable from the lived experience of ethnicity, national conflict,
and racism. This is not to say that Pinker is right or wrong, although
other thinkers and linguists strongly disagree with him. For example,
Benj amin Lee Whorf, who has devoted his life to studying the unique
syntax of the Hopi language, argues that different structures of lan
guage can shape our conceptualization of basic parameters such as
space and time. 360 And yet, if we listen to Morrison,3 6 1 to imagine the
English language is not to imagine the form of life of Mri can Ameri
can culture, even though Mrican Americans speak English . 3 62
Culture is more than language. To parallel (and deepen ) an ob
servation central to th e screening model of discrimination we de
scribed earlier, 363 culture is the full range of encoded day-to-day
behaviors, which at least in part find expression in the p ersonas
through which a culture is assumed. Not all culturally embedded
communication is verbal. Many ways of signaling to one anoth e r mark
our connection or our iden tification vvith a group . Signs-a way of
pointing a fi n ger, raising the eyebrows, sighing in church, nodding to
35 7
35 8
35 9

STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT
See id.

55-82 ( 1 994) .

at 82.

See J>uv!ES jOYCE, FtN;o.; EGANS WAKE ( Paladin 1 992) ( 1 939) . Toni Morrison evokes
this "paradise" as she ends her new n ovel by the same name:
There is nothing to beat this solace which is what Piedade 's song i s about,
although the words evoke memories neither one has ever had: of reaching
age in the company of the other; of speech shared and divided bread smok
ing from the fire; the unambivalent bliss of going h om e to be at home-the
ease of coming back to love begun.
To:-�1 MoRRISO"-", PARADISE 3 1 8 ( 1 998) .
3 60 See generally BEN]A.MIN L E E vVI-IORF, L\:-JGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY ( 1 964) (illus
trating the principle of linguistic relativity, which states that the structure of a human be
ing's language influences her u nderstanding of reality and her behavior) .
361
See supra text accompanying note 350.
362
As the anthropologist Gananath Obeyeskere has observed:
There are people who are thoroughly fluent in an alien language but are
quite incapable of understanding the alien culture . This is simply because
culture is not coterminous with language. The variety of normative behav
ior governed by implicit m eanings, n onverbal communication, and
nonlinguistic symbolic forms shows that language p rovides at best access to
the cultu re .

GANAi':TH 0BEYESEKERE, THE WoRK

36 3

See

OF

CuLTURE 230 ( 1 990) .

supra text accompanying note 250.
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each other o n the street, a n d shakin g hands-allow others t o identify
the signaler as a member of a particular group.
These nonverbal personas are crucial to how actual human be
ings express culture . But personas are lived only as the people who
are the members of the culture and who bring it to life assume and re
imagine them. Because human beings are the enti ties that express
themselves and their cultural identifications through these p ersonas,
the meanings of those personas always are changing. At the same
time , one can both misinterpret and stereo type the cultural personas
of others. This misinterpretation and stereotyping is one of the many
ways in which people convey rac ism and ethnic disparagement within
a culture . Sometimes it takes the subtle form of mistakenly thinking
that only other cultures have personas , while we white Anglos simply
represent the moral and decent mode of behavior.
The proposition that language and culture are not co terminous
does not imply that language is not a basic parameter of culture . A
person who has no access to the language of a culture is severely, if
not entirely, limited in her access to that culture. We may dance the
salsa; we may love Mexican food; we may be obsessed with the tradi
tion of hyper-realism found in many of the great South American
novels; we may be completely convi nced that Puerto Ric o is economi
cally and politically disadvantaged because of its commonwealth sta
tus. 364 More profoundly, we may have thrown in our lot with people
who are Latino/a and find in these l oves the most important relation
ships of our lives. But neither our l ove for Latin music, our apprecia
tion of South American literature, our deep sym pathies for the
political concerns of the Latin American community, nor even the
profound love and respect we feel for Latino/a members of our fami
lies will make us part of that culture. Similarly, learning to speak
Spanish , while undoubtedly enhancing our access to the culture,
alone cannot make us a part of it. Language for most of us is more of
a limit than a parameter precisely because attaining fluency in an
other language is a truly formidable goal.
One cannot easily draw with exactitude the relationship between
language and culture . If we are monolingual, to what extent are we
enclosed in our culture? George Fletcher, who fully recognizes the
complexity of this question, convincingly draws a clear connection be
tween language and culture when he examines the relationship be
tw·een the English language and the subculture of law. 365 Fletcher, in
one of his several examples, argues that the different meanings of rea
son in English , German, and French make it virtually impossible to
364 See DEFREITAS, supra note 6, at 2 6-36 ( describing Puerto Rico's historic and current
status) .
365 See Fletcher, supra note 3 1 , at 329.
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translate accurately the term "reasonable person" and to convey to
participants in other legal systems the place it holds in our legal sys
tem. 3 66 Fletcher writes:
I n contrast to a single rule based on reasonableness, European law
yers start their arguments with broad, sweeping rights. They would
say, for example, that you have the right to use all the force neces
sary to protect your i n terests regardless of th e costs that fall on
others. But this is o nly the first step of a structured argu m e n t. If it
appears that the defensive force imposed a disproportionate cost on
others, European lawyers would apply the doctrine of abus de droit
the principle that defeats the exercise of absolute rights i n particu
lar situations. Not surprisingly, in view of the doctrine of reasona
bleness, English-speaking lawyers have no need fo r the doctri ne of
"abuse of rights. " 367

In Fletcher's view, this variance in the definitions of reason reflects an
important difference between the subcultures of Anglo-Ame rican and
European legal systems. 368 The use of the word "reasonable" suggests
an Anglo-American preference for pluralism in legal thought as op
posed to the stronger notion of rights that some European legal sys
tems defend. 3 69 The word and the meaning it has acquired over time,
including the preference for pluralism that comes to be a p art of what
reasonableness encodes as a word of art in the subculture of law, pass
down through the generations and blend into the traditions of legal
scholarship. For Fletcher, thought, language , and culture have a re
ciprocal relationship. 3 70
We think Fletcher is exactly right. The relationship between
thought, language, and culture is both reciprocal and dynamic. But
we would make one important addition , addressing the question of
whether or not there is a determinative or consti tutive relationship
between thought and language and between language and culture :
this i s not the right way t o think about these relationships b ecause lan
guages and cultures live only through persons and personas. It is not
the right language because human beings also fabricate the cultural
personas in which they express themselves. Fabrication disrupts the
causal chain that we need to show a determinative relationship be
tween language and culture and leaves us with the potential to shape
and reshape ourselves.

3 66
36 7
368
3 69
3 70

See id. at 329-3 1 .
!d. at 330.
See id. at 330-32.
See id. at 3 3 1 .
See id. at 33 1 .
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Turning Limits into Parameters: Language, Culture, and
Individual Choice

We have seen that i t is hard to learn a n ew language well enough
to make another culture accessible , and it is harder still to revise o ne
self to identify with that culture, whether psychically or i n one 's out
ward relations with others. Yet we also have seen that this learning
and revision is just what generation after generation of immigrants,
including those from the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central and South
America, have achieved. Although the high degree of difficulty di
minish es the potential occurrence of cross-cultural movement, it by
no means erases that potential . It follows that freedom is deeply im
plicated in the potential ' s realization. We repeat our central argu
ment: Each of us-those experiencing that difficult p rocess of
linguistic and cultural access, as well as natives-should receive the
legal freedom to re-evaluate and rerepresent our basic identifications,
including the significance we give to our moth er tongu e . D ifferent
people will value this freedom diffe rently.
For us, this distinction between the freedom and the value of the
freedom is crucial in the case of language rights. Consequently, we
disagree with the terms that define one current of the multicultural
debate : the current that poses a choice between a liberal nationalist
rooted in and contained by l inguistic and cultural context-and a cos
mopolitan conception of the subj ect-surmounting context to con
struct an independent, personalized identity. In our view, the choice
between those two conceptions is false whe n posed either to defend or
to undermine the importance of cultural or language rights.
Jeremy Waldron views cosmopolitanism as an ethical and political
ideal that best expresses the value of the freedom to make sense of
our basic iden tifications. 37 1 Waldron describes the cosmopolitan as
follows:
[One] may live all his life in one city and maintain th e same citizen
ship throughout. But he refuses to think of himself as defined by his
location or his ancestry or his citizenship o r his language. Though
he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish ances try, he does not
take h is identity to be compro mised whe n he learns Spanish, eats
Chin ese, wears clothes m ade i n Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung
by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment, follows Ukrainian poli
tics, and practices Buddhist m editation te chniques. He is a creature
of modernity, conscious of living in a m ixed-up world and having a
mixed-up self. 372

3 7 1 See jeremy Waldron, i\t!inmity Cultu-res and the Cosnwpolitan Alternative, in THE
OF MINORITY CuLTURES, sup-ra note 340, at 95.
372

ld.
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Waldron bolsters his appeal to the ideal of cosmopolitanism by argu
ing that liberal nationalists are wrong to emphasize the importance of
defining oneself through a specific culture and language . 373 ·will
Kymlicka counters, correctly in our view, that the sort of cultural m e
lange that Waldron describes does not actually involve movi ng be
twee n cul tures. 374 For those who do attempt such a m ove , language
fluency will be a first, necessary step. Waldron exaggerates how easy i t
i s for us, particularly as adults, truly to escape our "mother" ton gue . 375
Yet Waldron certainly has a right to his imaginary domai n and
deserves the psychic and moral space to define himself as a cosmopo li
tan. 37 6 Indeed, one can understand Waldron as describing an immi
grant identi ty-one that has fluid parameters because m any different
social and historical forces constitute it. 377 Gloria Anzaldua m akes a
similar point when she describes what she calls the c o nsciousness of
the new mestiza:
The n ew mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions,
a tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be an Indian i n Mexican
culture, to be Mexican fro m an Anglo point of view. She l earns to
j uggle cul tures. She has a plural personality, she operates i n a plu
ralistic m ode-nothing is thmst out, the good th e bad and the ugly,
n othing rejected, nothing abandoned. No t o nly does s h e sustain
contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else .378

Both Waldron and Anzaldua are describing processes by which
an individual comes to terms with a complex historical web of rela
tionships. The new mestiza consciousness is in part a political act that
373

See id. at 1 0 5-08.
See Wil l Kymlicka, From Enlightenment Cosmopolitanism to Liberal Nationalism
1 0-1 1 (Sept. 1 1 , 1 997) ( paper presen ted at the Program for the Study of Law, Philosophy,
and Social Theory) (on file with authors) .
37 5 See id. at 1 0 1 .
37 6 Cosmopolitanism as a special, overarching, constn!Cted identifi cation h as faced
criticism as a mask for the more particular white, male, middle-class identi fication of a
handful of academics. See Bruce Robbins, Comparative Cosrnopolitanisms, in CosMorouTrcs
246 ( 1 998) ( discussing some of the pitfalls of cosmopolitanism either as a reality achieved
by globalization of an elite or as an ethical or political identi fication that recognizes the
value of freedom and the equali ty of all human beings) ; see also Ph eng Cheah , Given Cul
t-ure: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism, in CosMorouTrcs, supra, at 290
(cri ticizing northern academics who critique nationalism as a weapon for southern nations
resisting re-colonization and control by multinational corporations) .
377 \Ne must note here, as we saw in supra Part II.C. 1 , that economic discri mination
remains central to the lives of large numbers of Latinos/ as i n this country. This discrimi
nation against immigrants, particularly immigrants who are racialized, i s not l i mited to
Latinos/ as. But because of the discrim ination, there is a sense in which cosmopolitanism
may not be a rational alternative for many Latinos/ as. We must distinguish the decision to
stay within a banio to reduce the risk of exposure to a brutally discriminatory "outside"
culture from the affi rmance of loyalty to a group iden tification made by a person whose
means give rise to alternative choices.
3 78 A'-:ZALDL'.-\, supra note 1 5 1 , at 79.
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turns limits into parameters and thereby challenges the meaning of
being Indian in Mexico. Yet in Anzaldua's description , cultures con
tin ue to operate as both limits and parameters in part through the
personas they m ake available to the individual seeking to make sense
of her complex identifications. No Anglo could access the Mexican
persona from the Indian point of view in the same way that Anzaldua
does. Both Anzaldua and Waldron not only are describing piecing
together identities (and in the case of Anzaldua, playing with cultural
personas to expand their meaning) , but also are telling us how they
morally and eth ically value their identifications. This process of evalu
ation is that which freedom demands be left to the individual.
For these reasons, we need not choose between liberal national
ism and cosmopolitanism in the context of defending language rights.
Each principle accurately describes how some individuals come to
value their freedom to make sense of their identifications. Consider
as an example individuals who identify themselves as both Quebecois
and liberal nationalists . For these individuals a commitment to the
French language is essential to their self-definition, and they sh ould
be free to identify with their inherited language in this strong man
ner. Waldro n ' s real rebellion is not against these people, at least not
on our reading of him. Rather, Waldron argues against the idea that
our heritage rigidly predetermines our identity so as effectively to un
dercut the moral or ethical dimensions of whom one m igh t be
come. 379 On this point, we agree with him. People must b e morally
free to make sense of their identifications in th eir own way. Some
times this means a brutal uprooting of oneself fro m one ' s culture and
linguistic background. Again to quote Anzaldtla:
To this day I ' m not sure where I found th e strength to leave the
source, the m other, disengage from my family, mi tierra, mi gente,
and all that picture stood for. I had to leave home so I could find
myself, find my own intrinsic nature buried under the personality
that had been i mposed on m e . 380

It is precisely because the relationship among languages, cultures,
ethnicities, class, and race is complex that it is difficult to draw the
kinds of causal claims that tell us what determines what. But this diffi
culty actually is a good thing. The intractability of grasping exactly
how these relationships affect one another leaves open a space for our
freedom to practice self-responsibility. To put the argument more
strongly, one even can understand the intractability as a result of our
freedom to re-imagine ourselves and to re-evaluate our fundamental
identifications and what they mean to us.
3 79
38 0

Sn• \-\'aldro n , sujJra n o te 371 , at 1 1 1 - 1 2 .
sujJia n o te 1 5 1 , at 1 6.

A:'-�ZALDG.-\,
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Chandran Kukathas has defended the position that cultural
rights ( i ncluding group-differentiated rights) to such things as lan
guage, territory, and culture are necessary for the meaningful exercise
of autonomy. 381 "Put simply," Kymlicka argues, "freedom involves
making choices amongst various options, and our societal culture not
only provides these options, but also makes them m eaningful to
us . " 382 For example,
[ w] hether or not a course of action has any significance for us de
pends on whether, and h ow, our language renders vivid to us the
point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid
these activities is shaped by our h istory, our " traditions and conven
tions". U nderstanding these cultural narratives is a precondition of
making i n tellige n t judgements [sic] about h ow to lead our lives. In
this sense, our culture no t only provides options, i t also "provides
the s p e c tacles through which we i d e n ti fy experi en c e s as
valuable . "383

We agree with Kymlicka on this point. He shows again that the
way i n which language "activates" someone who in turn activates h er
language i s basic to the p rocess o f forming a unique p erson. B ut we
need to address two tensions in his formulation. The first is a techni
cal point: Kymlicka writes of autonomy while defending the proposi
tion that our autonomy is dependent upon the phenomenal world. I n
other words, he is n o t using autonomy in the strict Kantian sense. 38 4
In contrast, we address this p roblem with an existential re-interpreta
tion of Kant's notion of moral freedom , the only kind of freedom
open to us , according to Kant. Second, a tension remains between us
and Kymlicka that also lies at the heart of Waldron ' s disagreement
with him on the question of h ow culture, and more specifically h o
mogenous culture , frames our choices. If our culture effectively
bounds our choices, then the very culture that purportedly serves our
freedom limits it, regardless of the culture ' s contents ( in cluding, for
example, its protection of individual rights ) . By postulatin g a kaleido
scope of cultures, Waldron in part tries to keep us from being limited
and predetermined. 38 5 Waldron does not want his national o rigin or
38 1
3 82
383
3 84

See ·WILL

KYMLICKA,

MuLTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 8 3 ( 1 995) .

!d.

!d. (quoting RoNALD DwoRKIN, A MATrER OF PRJNCIPLE 228 ( 1 985) ) .
Strictly from the standpoint of practical reason, autonomy demands that our phe
nomenal relationships or ties do not define us. I f we were to treat ourselves as constituted
by these ties then we would be treating ourselves as objects of study, controlled or con
structed by forces that theoretical reason could grasp. For an excellent explanati o n of why
Kan t need not defend dualisms in order to defend the self because it is a practical stand
point and a theoretically demonstrable conception, see KoRSGAARD, supra note 303, at 1 5987.
3 85 See Waldron, supra note 37 1 , at 1 1 0- 1 2 .
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linguistic descent to capture his imagination. 386 This predetermina
tion is inconsistent with most strong conceptions of freedom .
Kymlicka recognizes that cultures are open-ended phenomena,
yet at times h e lapses into the language of determinism: "familiarity
with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable . " 38 7 In
other words, because persons construct culture through their identifi
cation with ( or against) it, a " culture" always changes. Toni Morrison
describes a dynamic relationship : language activates the person, but
the person also activates language by stretching the limits of the
meaning of her identifications. 3 88 True, language is a basic parameter
of our lives, but even if one remains monolingual, it is a cultural pa
rameter whose meaning changes for her as she struggles to articulate
its unspoken possibilities.
Yet, like Kymlicka, we defend the connection among culture, lan
guage rights , and individual freedom. Dworkin 's distinction between
parameters and limits aids this defense. As Dworkin reminds us, our
lives are indexed; the true particularity of anyone ' s situation will in
clude a whole host of limits and parameters. 389 We argue that this
indexing occurs because given sets of identifications form all of us.
Because there should be no precise way to determine which are limits
and which are parame ters, and because that "determination" is part of
a person 's freedom , some people will seek to break out of their lan
guage and national background by assimilating into another language
and culture. To make this break, some may interpret their language
as a "soft parameter. " 390 Others, like Borges, define their language as
a "hard parame ter," 391 which gives them a fundamental sense of them
selves. Borge s ' s definition of language as a hard parameter provides
him the most basic sense of himself as a man and as a writer. We
experience our freedom in large part through our endeavor to deter
mine which are limits and which are parameters in our lives. Further
more, we try to determine h ow we understand exactly how the
parameters bind us to a tradition and to the cultural narratives con
tained therein and how they enable us to tell new stories, including
stories about ourselves.
386
38 7

See id.

supra note 38 1 , at 89 ( quoting Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National
Selj�Detennination, 87 J. PHrL. 439, 449 ( 1 990) ) .
3 88 See Morrison, sujJra note 350, at 1 46.
3 8 9 See Dworkin, supra note 335, at 69-70.
3 9 0 !d. at 70 ( "Soft parameters are those aspects of assignment that, when violated,
reduce the value of the performance but do not annihilate i t: they act as standards of good
performance that permit defects to be compensated by high success against other
standards." ) .
39 1
!d. ("Hard parameters state essential conditions: if they are violated the perform
ance is a total failure, no matter how successful in other respects. " ) .
KY\ILT CKA,
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To confront this substantial challenge, we must have our i magi
nary domain protected. Part of Anzaldua' s struggle to become a p er
son involved her effort to free herself from the stereotypi cal personas
in and through which the maj ority Anglo culture defined the mean
ing of her Chicana identification. But her struggle did not j ust involve
inversion, affirming the features of the stereo typical personas imposed
by Anglo culture. Instead, her struggle involved a complex re-working
of the metaphor of the borderlands in whi ch the mestiza can recreate
the complex being that is herself. This process involved n o t only the
celebration of the Spanish language but also the affirmance of Span
ish as a living tongue, which the Mexican American Spanish with
which she grew up changed and enriched. " But Chicano Spanish is a
border tongue which developed naturally. Change , evoluci6n, enri
quecimiento de palabras nuevas p ar invenci6n a adopci6n have created vari
ants of Chicano Spanish, un nuevo lenguaje. Un lenguaje que corresponde
a un modo de vivir. Chicano Spanish is not incorrect, it is a living
language. " 3 9 2
E.

Equality, Language, and Rights

Chandran Kukathas suggests that the right to "exit" approp riately
resolves tensions among language, culture, and individual freedom. 393
We disagree because this negative option does not provide the mea
sure of freedom demanded here. First, the right to exit implies that
cultures have sharper boundaries than those existing in the real
world. Second, it implies that " exit" is p ossible. It is almost impossible
to exit a first language, like it or not. One may learn new languages,
but her " mother" tongue stays with her forever. Third, and m o re im
portantly, many people do not want to exit. Instead, they want to push
against or re-interpret the meanings of their culture.
In place of the right to exit, we propose the righ t to the imaginary
domain . This right furnishes the person with the moral and psychic
space to come to terms with the full particularity of her situati o n , with
language , with culture, with gender, and with sexuality. It does so in
part by insisting that how we live with and define the parameters of
our life is basic to our freedom. People differ, and profoundly so
when it comes to their desire to be rooted in their native language
and culture . But they certainly should have the right to affirm their
language because it inevitably is, at a minimum, a basic parameter,
3 92 ANZALDUA, sujmz n ote 1 5 1 , at 55. Similarly, a day care worker protests a supervisor's
·workplace E nglish: "Our language is . . . our culture; no one can take that away from us."
Delgado & Guthrie, supra note 84, at A4.
3 93 Therefore, we disagree with Chandran Kukathas's argument th at we do n o t n eed to
have cultural rights because the righ t to exit is sufficient. See Chandran Kukathas, Are There
A ny Cultural Rights ?, in THE RIGHTS OF MI�O RITI C U LTURES, supra note 340, at 228, 2 5 1 -52.
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which is crucial to h ow they shape an identity of their life. At the
same time, we should never undermine the freedom to re-imagine
o urselves.
Only the "degradation prohibition" limits the right to the imagi
nary domain. 394 The degradation prohibition forbids the characteri
zation of someone as unworthy because of h ow she has constituted
herself from her basic identifications. 395 One degrades a person i n
our sense i f o n e does n o t allow h e r to b estow value on h e r lan
guage. 39 6 Again we quote Anzaldua:
So, if you want to really hurt me, talk badly about my language.
Ethnic iden ti ty is twin skin to l inguistic identity-! am my language.
Until I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself.
Until I can accept as legitimate Chicano Texas Spanish, Tex-Mex
and all the other languages I speak, I can n o t accept the legitimacy
of myself. U n til I am free to write bilingually and to switch codes
without havin g always to translate, while I still have to speak English
or Spanish whe n I would rather speak Spanglish, and as long as I
have to accommodate the English speakers rather than having them
accommodate me, my tongue will be illegi timate . 39 7

This freedom to use one ' s own tongue is crucial to equal dignity. By
denying someone the freedom to affirm her linguistic origin as she
ethically interprets it, one robs from her the basic freedom to practice
self-responsibility for her identifications. If the State instead imposes
its evaluation of her language on her, it denies her equal worth as a
free person.
People still will ask who , as between natives and immigrants ,
should have t o accommodate whom? W e should resolve this question
by reference to the concept of reasonableness, which helps us deter
mine what we should expect in social relations with others, viewed as
free and equal persons. We repeat the definition of reasonableness
we offered earlier in this Article 39 8-we are reasonable whe n we real
ize that we are capable of recognizing and harmonizing our pursuit of
the good with creatures having equal dignity. Applying that defini
tion, it is unreasonable for Anglos to treat Latinos/ as as anything
other than free persons who bestow value on their language . It fol
lows that both Official English and Workplace English are unreasonaCoRNELL, AT THE H EART, supra note 295, at 60.
This means, for exam ple, that no one can u·eat someone as less than worthy of her
personhood because of her lived sexuali ty. See id. at 3-32 (discussing sexual freedom ) . To
treat someone in such a manner is first and foremost to deny them their freedom by mak
ing their sex or sexuality an imposed limit on h ow they can l ive their lives. See id. at 33-65.
39 6 See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 1-52 ( describing the brutal punishment of
school c hildren in parts of the United States for speaki ng their native languages) .
3 9 7 ANZALDL'A, supra note 1 5 1 , at 59.
3 9 8 See supra note 3 1 5 and accompanying text.

39 4
39 5
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ble. We can make a similar argument by reference to Kant's own
understanding of external right. The suppression of Spanish is a
maxim that cannot be made a universal law without suppressing the
form of rightfulness.3 99
Of course, some still migh t say that Latinos/as remain free per
sons no matter how Anglos view their language and despite any meas
ures Anglos take to denigrate or more directly to suppress it. A s trong
Kantian answer would be that such particularistic suppression of a
creature of reason always falls afoul of the moral law, with i ts universal
izability requirement. That would be the end of the story. But even if
we do not stop there , we can see how these measures impose a cost o n
th e exercise of that freedo m . The imposition o f that co st cannot be
reasonable in Rawl s ' s sense of the word, because Anglos impose i t pur
suant to the view that the linguistic valuation that Latinos/as m ake is
less worthy than that which Anglos make. The State' s imposing the
assimilation norm controverts the legal freedom the State must au
thorize as the source of the evaluative design of one's life . I t is unrea
sonable to expect people to give up their freedom to affirm their lives
as they see fi t to "Americanize" themselves.
Furthermore, Official English clearly degrades people b ecause of
their linguistic descent.400 By degradation we mean a grading down
because of ethnicity-of one's ethnic background or linguistic origin.
In a world of Official English, Spanish speakers are "picked out" be
cause of their language and marked as not belonging to the maj ority
group.40 1 To belong, they have to become "American" and assume an
399

400

See supra note 292.

One commentator has attempted to subvert the courts' volition reading in Work
place English cases, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text, by arguing that bilingual
ism is a "disability," making it an immutable characteristic. See Mirande, supra. note 1 7, at
1 03 . Mirande relies on studies showing that "code switching" takes place automatically for
many bilingual speakers. !d. at 94. Code switching means at least 1:\vo things. First, bilin
gual speakers semiconsciously i ncorporate words from both languages when they speak.
Second, they unconsciously respond in the language in which they are addressed. That is,
if a worker addresses a coworker i n Spanish on the job, she will answer i n Spanish before
she has a chance to catch herself. Under this analysis, those bilingual in Spanish and
English cannot help themselves from code switching; therefore the argument goes, bilin
gualism is both something like an immutable characteristic and a disability. See id. a t 94-98.
We sympathize with Mirande's goal of reforming the law to protect bilingual Spanish
speakers from losing their jobs for their "aberrant" speech. But we would find it sad in
deed if we had to in terpret bilingualism in Spanish in this way in order to make Workplace
English legally redressable. We offer a more direct approach to the same end.
40 1
See Margalit & Raz, supra n o te 387, at 449 . They write:
It may be no more than a brute fac t that people's sense of their own iden
tity is bound up with their sense of belonging to encompassing groups and
that their self-respect is affected by the esteem in which these groups are
held. But these facts, too, have important consequences. They m ean that
individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups, membership of
which contributes to one's sense of iden tity, be generally respected and not
be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution.
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i den tity that others imagine to be bound up with the i mpositi on of the
English language.40 2 Workplace English similarly d e g rades Spanish
sp eaking workers and accordingly is invalidated.
Discrimination against Spanish speakers affects the way they vi ew
th eir own language. Speaking Spanish becomes an imp os ed limit.
This imposed limit not only violates a perso n' s freedom, but al s o sub
jects her to a serious inequality by turning her language into a mark
that determines how to meet her life prospects . Accordingly, cour ts
should legally mark this discrimination with the status of a "suspe ct
classification . " In the analysis of D avid Richards:
In each case its irrationalist obj ect is not some brute fact that canno t
be changed, b ut central features o f moral personality-iden tifica
tions that make one a self-respecting member of a community that
one reasonably values. The suspectness of the underlying prej udice
in each case is i ts irrationalist i nterpretation of central aspects of
human personality and the unjust degradation of the culture
( moral slavery) with which a person reasonably identifies .40 3

Spoken language obviously is central to the identity of many Latinos/
as. We should consider steps taken to force a person to forsake that
identi ty altogether or significantly to repress it as "moral slavery" m
Richards 's sense.4°4
CoNCLUSION: ENGLISH
LINGUISTIC

ONLY AND THE
S ELF D EFENSE

RIGHT TO

-

This conclusion turns first to our substantive case against English
Only. It then addresses methodology, suggesting a series of lessons
emerging from this Article ' s j oint deployment of economic analysis
and rights theory.
Could there be a situation compelling enough to accord a group
the right to impose its language or to ask for significant state rein
forcement of i t? The Quebecois, arguing that French can survive only
if it insures that the next generation will learn it, have sought to keep
English from being taught in the schools that have a maj ority French
population. 40 5 Can English Only statutes that demand the suppres
sion of other languages have similar defenses?
Icl.
402

One, of course, can judge this impositi on as a form of denial because one j ust as
easily can perceive the Spanish language, particularly in the Southwest, as crucial to what i t
means t o b e a n "American" w h o lives in that part of t h e country.
40 3 R.J CI-L\RDS, supra note 79, at 355.

40 4
40 5

Jd.

Not all claims of polyethnic righ t are this strong. The demand, for example, for
bilingual education for Spanish-speaking children in New York City does not include for
bidding a language minori ty to have i ts language in the schools. The opposi te is the case.
The demand is instead that the Spanish language be allowed to have a presence in the
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George Fletcher, analogizing to the criminal law doctrin e ofj usti
fication, argues that a people has a right to linguistic self-defense in
some cases. Recall that, for Fletcher, language and culture h ave a
close causal connection . 40 6 Fletcher further argues that given a con
flict between two languages over which language should govern, there
can be no "neutral" perspective from which to judge which language
is better for any culture. He explains: "It is better to think of the
struggle to retain a language as an expression of a localized imperative
to survive against an external threat. Thus it seems that the principle
of self-defense provides a better framework for justifYing measures of
defense than does the neutral standard of necessity." 40 7
Fletcher emphasizes historical p riority as a key factor in the deter
mination of who should receive this right of self-defense when two
peoples and two languages fight for preeminence. Using Kant's fa
mous example that who got on the plank first can determine who has
the right to push the other off, 408 Fletcher argues that p riority in time
should be determinate . 409 In addition, says Fletcher, only a seri ous
and demonstrable challenge to the survival of the language can trig
ger the right to self-defense. 4 1 ° Finally, Fletcher stipulates three ancil
lary requirements: first, th e defensive measures should be effective;
second, they must be reasonably necessary, for that is the cheapest
means available for linguistic survival; and third, there must be a sense
of proportionality. 4 1 l
We take seriously the proposition of a right of linguistic self-de
fense. 4 1 2 But, using Fletcher's standards, it is crystal clear that such a
right cannot justifY English Only. No serious threat to the survival of
the English language exists because there are and will continue to be
high-powered economic incentives for immigrants to learn English.
The assimilation process of today ' s immigrants, like that of every p re
vious immigrant group , indeed has triggered a Kulturkampf, but not
one that threatens the survival of our language . Under the economic
theory of language and in light of the emerging role of English as a
global lingua franca, the very suggestion of a threat is absurd .
schools, a presence needed because of the l arge n umbers of Spanish-speaking c hildren in
New York City.
4 06 See supra text accompanying note 365.
40 7 Fletcher, supra note 3 1 , at 337.
408
See K-\�T, supra note '292, at 60-6 1 .
409
See Fletcher, s ufJra note 3 1 , at 337.

410
41 1

Ser id.

Sre id. at 337-38. v\'e note that although Fletcher takes linguistic patriotism verv
seriously, h e still questions whether it ever would be necessary to impose the majori ty l an
guage in all public offices and services. See id. at 337.
412
·we see this righ t as a group-differen tiated right in Kymlicka's sense, but one that
still adheres to individuals.
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Furth ermore, even if a threat caused the issu e to be joined, i t
would n o t b e a t all clear that English should have a priority enti tl e
m ent nationwide. In the Southwest, wh ere most of the Ti tle VII cas es
h ave arisen, Spanish was first in time . That Anglos con que red these
Spanish-speaking areas and that the Spanish speakers gradu ally lost
their language rights4 1 3 presumably would create an issue u nder
Fle tcher's standard. We would take seri ously the proposition that
Spanish-speaking people in the Southwest (and Puerto Rico) h ave this
right to linguistic self-defense, although the articulation of that case is
beyond this Articl e 's scope.
Absent a plausible case for a right to linguistic self-defense, no
plausible case for E nglish O nly mandates arises because they contro
vert the equal dignity of free persons. Indeed, if the m eaning of
"American" turns on identification with a political culture based on
legal recognition of the equal dignity of free p ersons, then to repudi
ate English Only is to do something quintessentially American .
Three l essons emerge from this Article's j oint application of eco
nomic analysis and rights theory to the field of language rights. First,
economic analysis may be ill-equipped to identify morally defensible
policy results when one conducts it on a stand-alone basis. This is not
because it lacks moral implications, h owever. To pursue an efficient
outcome is to pursue the utilitarian goal of providing the greatest
good to the greatest number on the assumption that "greatest wealth"
can serve as a valid proxy for "greates t good. " This assumption is de
fensible in a world of scarcity and suffering. But problems arise if the
efficiency calculation comes to contain a broader policy i nquiry. For
one thing, confron ting scarcity and suffering means addressing distri
butional as well as productivity questions. Problems remain even if we
follow the law and economics tradition and put distributional ques
tions to one side. Th e normative weight of economic analysis varies
directly with the certainty of the results it yields; consequently, the
results tend to become less and less certain as the economic analysis
increases in sophistication. Economic analysis, while calculative, is not
a calculus that yields uncontestable states of nature. It yields a multi
plicity of possible consequences-complex, contingent results that
vary with the factors one includes in th e cost assessment.
Consider by way of example some of the economic propositions
and results this Article considers. Diversity entails costs, and an effi
ciency analysis implying a world of complete segregation follows. Yet
we also have seen that this result cannot be absolutely right even as a
matter of cost analysis, for at some point diversity provides benefits .
4l�

This loss occurred despite a reservation o f equal rights i n Article

Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1 848, U . S .-Mex . ,

9
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o f the Treaty of

Stat. 022. For a n account o f the disappear

ance of o ffi cial bilingualism in the southwestern states, see Perea,

supra n o t e 1 0 ,

at 3 1 6-23.
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We a re left to speculate about the location of a tradeoff point and to
make a correspondingly ambiguous message for policy. We also have
seen in this Article that the costliness of Title VII enforcement pro
vides only a starting point for discussion of the legitimacy of Title VII.
Further analysis may show that the costs fall on a protected class that i s
manifestly willing to bear them. Similarly, even though costs are a
crucial policy concern, the mere focus o n the economic costs of lin
guistic diversity can achieve no more than very little p rogress toward
the articulation of the best p olicy regarding linguistic diversity. Mean�
while, the contingent nature of economic inquiry makes it p ossible to
smuggle in normative p resuppositions that tilt an analysis purveyed as
"pure" cost assessment. Our point is not to bar these normative
presuppositions. They may be determinative in a world where proj ec
tions of wealth effects are necessarily contingent. But they need to
acquire transparency.
Expanding the context in which economic
analysis proceeds helps us to see more clearly how fact and value
in terre late .
Second, this Article ' s j oint deployment of economics and ethics
teaches a lesson about the bearing of economics on cultural debates.
It has both heuristic strengths and limitations. The strength lies in
the ability of economics to freshen the hothouse atmosphere of Eng
lish Only discourse. The universalized, rational economic actor enters
a stage on which nativists darkly depict immigrants as " others" and
characterize Spanish speech as threatening. By showing Anglos that
Latinos/as are doing precisely what Anglos would do if they found
themselves in the immigrant situation, the rational actor defuses the
threat. Furthermore, by directing Anglo attention away fro m cultural
insecurity and toward cost, economic analysis shows Anglos j ust how
one-sided our Kulturkampf is: English wins in the long run , p eriod.
The weakness of economic analysis in this context lies in the fact that
the rational economic actor operates free of cultural attachments . Ac
cordingly, it has little to tell us about cultural rights. More generally,
utilitarianism does not and cannot p rovide us with an adequate ac
count of the individuation and multiplicity of persons . 4 1 4 To put the
rational economic actor in the p osition of an ideal spectator and legis
lator is to assess empirical costs without assessing individual, subj ective
valuations of cultural attachments. Different individuals will value
English and Spanish differently. Respect for them in their multiplicity
and their individuation means we must recognize and allow for those
different valuations. Therefore, ethical evaluation must take individ
ual consequences as well as social consequences into account.

41 4

See Ro.wLs,

supra n o te 294,

at

26-27.
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The third lesson directly follows. Economic analysis cannot take
place
of moral and political philosophy b ecause reference to their
th e
value to others cannot quantify and determine the worth of p ersons .
We all have incalculable worth as persons , and therefore we all h ave
equal value in a significant sense . A powerful message for legal policy
follows: freedom is the key because our worth as persons flows from
our capacity to shape an identity through the practice of ethical and
moral self-responsibility. The problem, of course, is that no real-world
legal system can realize complete freedom for every individual. Coop
eration among free persons in societies requires constant freedom
limiting compromises . But we strongly argue that these compromises
must be reasonable. Economic analysis comes i n to assist at this point,
describing ( and in some cases quantifying) the costs of p rotecting
freedom, whic h helps to inform our j udgment as to what is reason
able. In doing so, economic analysis cannot replace the need for nor
mative standards for treating each individual as a free and equal
person.

